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Abstract 
 
Civilian Power Status Questioned: The Curious Case of Post-Unification German Foreign Policy Toward 
Iran 
 
By approaching post-unification German foreign policy toward Iran from an original, civilian 
power perspective, this thesis not only offers a new way of explaining the relationship, but 
considers, for the first time, the wider implications of this relationship for prevailing 
understandings of German foreign policy and interest. 
 
Despite concern that with unification, Germany would return to rationalist and materialist 
aims in its foreign policy, instead, the prevailing characterisation remains one of ostensible 
continuity as a civilian power.  Notwithstanding the prevalence of this explanation, existing 
literature has advanced a fundamental question regarding the extent to which Germany 
remains a civilian power, or is, in fact, pursuing an increasingly normalised approach to 
foreign policy.  In this manner, case studies of German foreign policy, identity, and interest, 
capable of addressing this issue, are of particular value.   
 
Although German foreign policy towards Iran is prominent, it remains greatly under-
evaluated, and has never been substantively addressed from any theoretical or analytical 
perspective, despite appearing to challenge civilian power understandings of Germany’s 
foreign policy and interest. 
 
In approaching this case from a civilian power perspective, this thesis not only advances a 
new way of understanding Germany’s relationship with Iran, but critically, it considers the 
extent to which this relationship may, in fact, problematize wider, prevailing understandings, 
of post-unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest, as a civilian power. 
 
Ultimately, by addressing Germany’s relationship with Iran from this new perspective, this 
thesis makes an original and significant contribution to knowledge, by demonstrating that 
contrary to prevailing, civilian power explanations, Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran is 
primarily explained by economic interests, albeit with a crucial, civilian power contingency, to 
ensure diplomatic solutions to conflict and avoidance of using force. 
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Introduction 
 
Despite palpable concern that with unification, Germany would return to rationalist and 
materialist aims in foreign policy,1 instead, the prevailing characterisation remains one of 
ostensible continuity2 as a civilian power.3   According to such an understanding, traditional, 
rationalist and materialist interest is eschewed, and identity-based interest formation occurs.4  
In this manner, the prevalence of such an explanation of post-unification Germany, means 
case studies appearing to challenge this understanding of its foreign policy, and interest, are of 
profound implication to academics and policymakers alike.  One such case in particular, 
although prominent, and appearing to challenge prevailing, civilian power understandings of 
Germany’s foreign policy and interest, remains greatly under-evaluated.  This is the case of 
post-unification German foreign policy towards Iran. 
 
For one school of thought, mirroring a constructivist explanation of the relationship, 
Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran is an apotheosis of European multilateralism and 
cooperation,5 in which non-material themes such as human rights, rule of law, and 
democratisation, are of central interest,6 and relatedly explain its policy.  For the other school, 
however –reflecting a largely rationalist and materialist interpretation of foreign policy– 
Germany’s interest in the relationship is fundamentally unilateral, and appears more 
																																																						
1 William E Paterson, "Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?," German Politics 19, no. 1 (2010): 44.; 
Hanns Maull, Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, ed. Hanns Maull (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), 2-3.; Hanns  Maull, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers," Foreign Affairs 69, no. 5 
(1990): 91. 
2 Andrei S Markovits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), 24.; Sebastian Harnisch, "Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German 
Foreign Policy," German Politics 10, no. 1 (2001): 34-53.; Thomas Banchoff, "German Identity and European 
Integration," European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 3 (1999): 259.; William E Paterson, "Beyond Semi-
Sovereignty: The New Germany in the New Europe," German Politics 5, no. 2 (1996): 182. 
3 Maull, 3.; Adrian Hyde-Price and Charlie Jeffery, "Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality," 
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 4 (2001): 695. 
4 Banchoff,  259.; Markovits and Reich, 206.; Hanns Maull, "German Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a 
‘Civilian Power?’," German Politics 9, no. 2 (2000): 14. 
5 Matthias V Struwe, "The Policy of "Critical Dialogue": An Analysis of European Human Rights Policy 
Towards Iran from 1992 to 1997," Durham Research Online  (1998): 3.; Riccardo Alcaro, Europe and Iran’s Nuclear 
Crisis: Lead Groups and Eu Foreign Policy-Making (New York: Springer, 2018).; Cornelius Adebahr, Europe and Iran: 
The Nuclear Deal and Beyond (Routledge, 2017). 
6 Struwe,  20.; Bernd Kaussler, "European Union Constructive Engagement with Iran (2000–2004): An Exercise 
in Conditional Human Rights Diplomacy," Iranian Studies 41, no. 3 (2008): 265-95. 
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adequately explained by commercial and trade interests.7  That is to say, for this school of 
thought, the non-rationalist, non-materialist interests of an archetype civilian power, appear 
marginalised, or potentially inconsequential to explaining Germany’s foreign policy towards 
Iran.  Accordingly, at the essence of these contradictory explanations of Germany’s foreign 
policy towards Iran, lies a critical problematizing of the very understanding that a 
constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept,8 may in fact account for German foreign policy 
and interest in this case. 
 
Despite this apparent anomaly, present accounts of Germany’s relationship with Iran have 
neither considered the relationship from a civilian power perspective, nor meaningfully 
addressed it from any underlying analytical or theoretical vantage point.  Nevertheless, as 
evidenced by these two distinct schools of thought –representing differing theoretical and 
analytical perspectives– determining whether Germany’s relationship with Iran can be 
explained by its civilian power role concept, is both the key to resolving fundamental 
differences within existing literature, and of potential implication for wider understandings of 
post-unification Germany.  This means approaching the relationship from such a perspective 
allows one to better explain Germany’s relationship with Iran, as well as understand its true 
significance, in a broader context. 
 
Consequently, this thesis undertakes an original approach to researching Germany’s 
relationship with Iran, in which the prevailing theoretical perspective of Germany’s civilian 
power role concept is leveraged, to consider whether this can, indeed, explain the relationship, 
despite apparent challenges to its fundamental assumptions.  In this manner, the thesis not 
only aspires to resolve a present dichotomy of explanations concerning the relationship itself, 
but to further determine if leading explanations of post-unification German foreign policy, 
																																																						
7 Johannes Reissner, "Europe and Iran: Critical Dialogue," in Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign 
Policy, ed. Richard N Haass and Meghan L O'Sullivan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 
36-39.; Charles Lane, "Germany's New Ostpolitik," Foreign Affairs  (1995): 77-79.; Johan Bergenäs, "The 
European Union's Evolving Engagement with Iran: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back," Nonproliferation Review 
17, no. 3 (2010): 500-03. 
8 Harnisch,  37.; Banchoff,  259-89.; Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power?: The 
Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, ed. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2001), 3.; Maull, Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, 3-4. 
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and interest, are, in fact, problematized by this case.  Accordingly, there are two questions 
underlying this research project: 
 
1. To what extent does Germany’s bilateral relationship with Iran challenge fundamental 
assumptions of contemporary German foreign policy, identity, and interest (as encapsulated by the 
civilian power role concept)?   
 
2. How does one explain post-unification Germany’s bilateral relationship with Iran? 
 
 
To address these questions, the thesis will begin with a literature review chapter, in which key 
differences between rationalist, and constructivist analytical perspectives of foreign policy will 
be outlined.  In doing so, it further demonstrates that differences between these perspectives, 
in turn, constitute a fundamental source of debate surrounding the orientation of post-
unification Germany.  Despite this, the chapter ultimately demonstrates that a constructivist-
variant, civilian power role concept, represents the prevailing, or leading explanation of post-
unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest.  By evidencing this, the chapter 
critically establishes that a constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept, is the necessary 
theoretical framework for purposes of addressing the relationship.  The chapter then shows 
how existing accounts of Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran have resulted in crucial 
differences of understanding, which remain unresolved.  Above all, it will be demonstrated 
that these differences not only preclude true understanding of the relationship, but in 
appearing to problematize wider assumptions of post-unification Germany’s continuity as a 
civilian power, they hold particular value for advancing present understandings of post-
unification Germany. 
 
Following this, chapter two will articulate how a process-tracing methodology is optimal for 
purposes of conducting a single-case study, of post-unification German foreign policy and 
interest.  The chapter shows that although a process-tracing methodology comes in several 
forms, with differing aims and assumptions, a case-explaining form of process-tracing is ideal 
for addressing the research questions of this thesis.  Having established this, and noted a 
process-tracing methodology’s use of diagnostic criteria, the chapter then returns to 
consideration of the civilian power role concept, to establish the key, diagnostic criteria 
utilised.   These diagnostic criteria are shown to manifest in four, distinct facets of the civilian 
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power role concept, which can be used within a case-explaining, process-tracing methodology, 
to determine whether a civilian power understanding can explain Germany’s relationship with 
Iran.  These facets of a civilian power Germany are: 
 
1. A commitment to multilateralism and cooperation. 
 
2. A commitment to human rights, rule of law, and democratisation. 
 
3. An acceptance that norms and values supersede material interests. 
 
4. A belief that political and diplomatic solutions are always preferable to use of force. 
 
With these four facets in mind, chapters three through six each address one facet of the 
civilian power role concept, to answer the research questions above. 
 
Chapter three addresses the multilateral and cooperative facet of Germany’s foreign policy 
towards Iran, by looking at its policy intersections with three partnerships central to both 
Germany’s ostensible identity as a civilian power, as well as its relationship with Iran: The 
United States (U.S.), the European Union (E.U.), and Israel.  In addressing this facet, the 
chapter will ultimately evidence an assertive, unilaterally inclined Germany, committed to 
pursuing its subjective interests towards Iran, despite expectations it would bilaterally 
prioritise multilateral and cooperative efforts as a civilian power. 
 
Following this, chapter four addresses Germany’s commitment to human rights, rule of law, 
and democratisation in its relationship with Iran.  The chapter evidences that notwithstanding 
both an espoused commitment to such interests in its relationship with Iran, and a professed 
contingency of political and economic ties to improvements in these areas, Germany’s policy 
ultimately exhibited indifference to these considerations, and resulted in further intensification 
of economic relations. 
 
Bearing these economic features in mind, chapter five considers the extent to which 
commercial and trade relations appear to challenge civilian power expectations that norms 
and values come before rationalist, and materialist, economic interests.  By addressing this 
facet of the civilian power role concept, the chapter demonstrates that economic 
considerations do, in fact, explain most of the relationship.  Of critical importance, however, 
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the chapter ultimately shows that Germany’s commitment to a key, identity-based interest in 
preventing use of force, or contributing to use of force through economic ties, curbs, or even 
at times, precludes, economic engagement.  In this manner, the chapter evidences a clear 
limitation to otherwise rationalist, and materialist interests, and suggests the final arbiter of 
Germany’s policy interest towards Iran is, indeed, based upon identity. 
 
Having established that an underlying identity, curbs, or even precludes, an economic interest 
noted to trivialise several facets of the civilian power role concept in this case, chapter six 
considers whether such an identity is attributable to the fourth, and final facet of the civilian 
power role concept: a commitment to political solutions, and an abhorrence of use of force.  
Ultimately, the chapter not only demonstrates a high-degree of confidence this identity in 
question is consistent with the civilian power role concept, but it critically shows that the 
depth of Germany’s interest in this facet, further explains an ardent defence of its subjective 
policy strategy towards Iran. 
 
Ultimately, by approaching Germany’s relationship towards Iran from this original 
perspective, it will be evidenced that despite a prevalence of civilian power understandings of 
post-unification Germany, this case study of German foreign policy, and interest, largely 
challenges prevailing, civilian power explanations.  However, despite demonstrating that 
Germany’s post-unification foreign policy towards Iran reflects a shift away from civilian 
power explanations, and underscores a largely economic one, this thesis nevertheless shows a 
key civilian power contingency remains the final arbiter of Germany’s policy.  In doing so, this 
study stands to make a significant, and original contribution to knowledge by: 
 
1. Greatly clarifying present explanations of Germany’s relationship towards Iran, with 
the first substantive account from any theoretical, or analytical perspective. 
 
2. Leveraging this original perspective of Germany’s relationship with Iran to question 
the validity of civilian power explanations of post-unification German foreign policy, 
identity, and interest, in this case. 
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This means the thesis not only offers an original perspective of the relationship itself, but 
critically, it considers for the first time how Germany’s relationship with Iran holds wider 
implications for prevailing explanations of German foreign policy and interest.  In other 
words, the original perspective of this thesis not only holds significance for advancing new 
understandings the relationship, but it makes a valuable contribution to a growing body of 
literature preoccupied with Germany’s ostensible continuity in foreign policy as a civilian 
power. 
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Chapter One: A Review of Literature 
	
Introduction 
	
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, academic literature concerning Germany’s 
relationship with Iran is surprisingly limited,9 and in many respects, contradictory in its 
explanation of Germany’s underlying interest.10  Moreover, at the essence of such 
contradictions, lies a fundamental challenge to prevailing understandings of post-unification 
German foreign policy, identity, and interest.11  Although this may be accurate, what exactly 
does this mean?  In what respects are existing accounts of Germany’s relationship with Iran 
limited?  Where are contradictions in the relationship apparent, and how are these 
contradictions relevant to prevailing understandings of post-unification Germany?  
Furthermore, what, in fact, even constitutes a “prevailing understanding” of German foreign 
policy, identity, and interest?  As these questions suggest, in order to fully understand where 
limitations to knowledge exist, and how such deficiencies in turn necessitate this unique 
approach to explaining Germany’s relationship with Iran, it is firstly essential to address 
existing thought on post-unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest, as well as 
literature regarding Germany’s relationship with Iran.  Accordingly, the following chapter –a 
review of literature– aims not only to demonstrate that a profound gap in knowledge exists 
concerning German foreign policy towards Iran, but further, to illustrate precisely how this 
under-evaluated case study of German foreign policy, potentially indicates a wider, and 
critical challenge, to prevailing understandings of post-unification Germany as a civilian power. 
 
To accomplish this, the following chapter will begin by addressing leading rationalist, and 
materialist understandings of foreign policy, in order to demonstrate how these, remain 
inconsistent with post-unification Germany, and therefore are considered inadequate for 
explaining German foreign policy and interest.  Thereafter, alternative constructivist theoretical 
perspectives will be addressed, before demonstrating how a constructivist account of foreign 
policy, ostensibly inspires, and underpins the prevailing understanding of post-unification 
																																																						
9 Refer to the introduction of this thesis. 
10 Refer to the introduction of this thesis. 
11 Refer to the introduction of this thesis. 
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Germany, as a civilian power.  The chapter will then consider what constitutes a civilian power.  
Although, indeed, this thesis concerns itself with German foreign policy towards Iran, 
critically, it does so as a case study of post-unification German foreign policy, identity, and 
interest.  Consequently, before even turning to literature on the relationship itself, this case 
study approach both necessitates in-depth consideration of theoretical and analytical 
perspectives, as well as debates regarding post-unification German foreign policy, and 
interest.  Only once this is accomplished, will the chapter then be able to effectively address 
the manner in which current literature on Germany’s relationship with Iran, not only remains 
limited, and appears contradictory, but critically, as such, presents challenges to broader 
understandings of post-unification Germany, as a constructivist-inspired, civilian power.   
 
Ultimately, by approaching existing literature in this manner, the following chapter will 
underscore that literature, albeit instrumental in furthering knowledge concerning post-
unification German foreign policy towards Iran, has nonetheless insufficiently resolved 
analytical challenges through advancement of contradictory explanations.  These 
contradictions not only limit understanding of the relationship, but remain central to a 
growing body of literature concerned with the future of Germany’s civilian power 
understanding.  In this manner, the review of literature will demonstrate a vital necessity of 
considering Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran from the original perspective envisaged in 
this thesis, thereby allowing not only for an original contribution to knowledge, but one of 
significance, and wider value, to understandings of post-unification Germany. 
 
1.1 Broader Understandings of International Relations 
 
To truly understand the contradictory nature of existing accounts of German foreign policy 
towards Iran, it is firstly essential to begin with scholarship’s generalised theoretical and 
analytical perspectives of international relations.  Myriad debates within scholarship 
concerning German foreign policy in general, and Germany’s relationship with Iran in 
particular, exist in terms of Germany’s conformity to, or divergence from, such perspectives.  
As such, consideration of these analytical perspectives is essential, both in order to show how 
prevailing interpretations of post-unification Germany differ from rationalist explanations, as 
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well as how these differences, in fact, remain central to presently contradictory explanations 
of Germany’s relationship with Iran. 
 
1.1.1 Rationalist Explanations 
 
To begin, it is important to understand that leading “theoretical paradigms” of neorealism and 
neoliberalism fall into a school of “rationalist” thought, whereby, states are viewed as the 
primary actors upon the international stage, and “material interests, a set of external 
constraints and rational choices,” ultimately coalesce to forge the calculus and basis of state 
action.12  However, beyond these consistent attributes, rationalist perspectives are largely split 
according to differing conclusions, despite similar fundamental assumptions.13  
 
Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work in neorealism, Theory of International Politics,14 posits that states, 
as the fundamental actors in the international environment, exist in an anarchic world, and are 
motivated by self-preservation, and self-interest.15  As a result, Waltz posits the sustained, 
anarchic nature of the international realm, leads states to conduct themselves as profoundly 
individualistic actors.16  Such a theoretical view predicates itself upon the notion that a state’s 
individual ability to act influentially through traditional military, or economic means, plays an 
essential role in determining a state’s relative “systemic position.”17 In other words, a state’s 
capacity to advantageously position itself within the global “balance of power,”18 or 
“distribution of capabilities”19 among states, remains the central focus, and endgame of all 
state action. 
 
Critically, such neorealist theoretical perspectives factored prominently in literature 
addressing early-unification German foreign policy, with some anticipating increased 
instability within Europe following the Cold War’s conclusion, and a dissolution of the bipolar 
																																																						
12 Banchoff,  261. 
13 Struwe,  7. 
14 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010). 
15 Ibid., 93. 
16 Ibid.	
17 Struwe,  7.	
18 Waltz, 102. 
19 Ibid., 97-98.	
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geopolitical environment.20  For neorealists, bipolarity was an essential aspect of preserving 
peaceful interactions between European states following World War Two, and cognizant of a 
shifting balance of power, it was hypothesised that a return of multipolar power dynamics on 
the European continent, would likely entail a resurgent Germany, determined to become a 
leading power.21  Kenneth Waltz himself envisaged a Germany not only destined to reassume 
its position as a major power,22 but one systemically preordained to eventual proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.23  Indeed, for some, notwithstanding domestic apprehension in Germany 
over assertive foreign policy, Germany pursuing a neorealist approach to international 
relations in the post-unification era held merit.24  The prominence of such neorealist 
understandings led many to anticipate a re-emergence of German assertiveness, or 
alternatively, a determination to dominate others as an economic bulwark.25  In this manner, 
whether perceived as the product of German calculation or not, literature in the era of 
unification reflected a palpable sense “German unification […] [could be] a ‘runaway freight 
train’ headed for collision as a result of sheer momentum and the inability or unwillingness of 
the drivers to apply the brakes.”26 
 
However, despite a neorealist school of thought on German foreign policy in early-unification 
scholarship, others discerned relative continuity27 between pre- and post-unification German 
foreign policy, thereby challenging neorealist interpretations, which anticipate states will 
recalibrate their policy, amidst changes to the global balance of power.28  Consequently, the 
ostensible absence of any significant changes in Germany’s foreign policy, identity, and 
interests, despite geopolitical changes, represented for some, a fundamental challenge to 
realist explanations of contemporary German foreign policy.29  This continuity not only raised 
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questions as to whether neorealist perspectives remained consistent with the essence of 
contemporary foreign policy,30  but led others to further determine realist perspectives are 
inadequate for explaining German foreign policy, because “the term ‘power’ no longer means 
what it used to”.31  Importantly, for some, this was attributable to an understanding power no 
longer predicated itself on “military force and conquest,”32 because power was determined less 
by the means utilised to influence others, and more by a simple capacity to do so.33  In this 
regard, state interest could very well feature a subordination of traditional military power to 
“economic, political, institutional and ideological sources of power”,34 whereby, regardless of 
intent, a return to Germany’s pre-war foreign policy was no longer possible, because the 
essence of power itself had changed.35 Accordingly, and of profound significance both for 
understanding post-unification Germany, as well as expectations of its foreign policy 
behaviour towards a state such as Iran, these doubts, in turn, led scholars to seek out 
alternative explanations of German foreign policy, beyond the scope of realist accounts. 
 
With such sentiments in mind, other rationalists, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye foremost 
among them, sought to address such perceived theoretical deficiencies with the advancement 
of neoliberal thought.36  Preeminent among rationalist alternatives, and expanding upon the 
sense of potential military subordination to economic and institutional power, this neoliberal 
perspective held that deficiencies inherent in realist explanations of international relations37 
could be overcome, and reality better explained,38 in terms of “complex interdependence”.39 
According to this perspective, contrary to eras in which power, and interest may have 
engendered military conflict with one another, today, societies are profoundly interconnected 
through “formal” and “informal” ties, at “interstate, transgovernmental, […] [or] 
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transnational”40 levels.  For this understanding, an absence of hierarchy exists amongst issues, 
by which, contrary to realist thought, an issue of “military security does not [inherently] 
dominate the agenda,”41 and “military force is not used by governments towards other 
governments […] when complex interdependence prevails.”42  In this sense, a neoliberal 
theoretical explanation seeks to explain that a state such as Germany might avoid realist 
tendencies simply because cooperation and institutionalisation represent mitigating factors for 
conflict, and trivialise the pre-eminence of traditional power determinants.43  Thus, amidst 
what many saw as a perplexing degree of continuity from Germany following unification, 
neoliberals aspired to better explain German foreign policy, particularly given that whether 
subscribing to rationalist thought or not, observers were cognizant that for contemporary 
Germany, “institutions […] economic interdependence […] vibrant international 
organisations” and other such features of interconnectedness, are preeminent considerations.44 
 
However, notwithstanding such parallels, as well as claims that neoliberalism represents an 
opposing end of the rationalist spectrum from neorealism,45 this perspective –similar to all 
rationalist interpretations of international relations– would nevertheless anticipate a 
noticeable shift in German policy, based upon structural changes to the international realm.46  
Regardless, neoliberalism represents an essential theoretical progression in literature’s framing 
of contemporary German foreign policy, as well as understanding the significance underlying 
contradictory accounts of German foreign policy towards Iran. 
 
As Matthias Struwe explicitly notes in “The Policy of Critical Dialogue: an analysis of 
European Human Rights Policy Towards Iran 1992-1997,”47 –arguably the only work in 
existence to tangibly reference theoretical perspectives underlying German and European 
foreign policy towards Iran– neoliberalism, indeed, holds important conceptual relevance to 
understanding this relationship.  For Struwe, such an analytical perspective represents a 
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compelling explanation for Germany’s desire to cultivate a robust economic facet of its 
relationship with Iran, given that for neoliberals, economic linkages are a potential catalyst for 
inducing political change, while reducing the probability for conflict.48  In doing so, what 
Struwe indirectly, albeit significantly, illuminates, is that for some, robust commercial and 
trade interests bespeak an intrinsically rationalist German actor.  Indeed, this point of 
significance will be revisited in greater detail later.  However, despite the significance of this 
point, in many respects, one of Struwe’s greatest contributions on the subject of German 
policy towards Iran, is a further recognition of the inherent limitations of rationalist thought 
to account for other prominent aspects of post-unification German foreign policy towards 
Iran.49  In Struwe’s opinion, despite neoliberalism’s apparent capacity to explain some aspects 
of Germany’s underlying interest, rationalist perspectives nevertheless fail to adequately 
explain how other, normative and identity-based dimensions, constitute important 
considerations in the design and implementation of its Iran policy.50 In this manner, a 
perceived gap in explaining the relationship itself, which mirrors a more widely sensed 
inability to explain post-unification German foreign policy through a rationalist, or materialist 
lens, encourages approaching the relationship from a perspective addressing non-rationalist 
interests as well.  But to what extent has literature proposed theoretical and analytical 
perspectives that might account for such normative and identity-based considerations in 
foreign policy? 
 
1.1.2 Constructivist Accounts of Foreign Policy 
 
To some, the prominent rationalist perspectives are often inconsistent with reality, particularly 
given the appearance of normative and identity-based considerations in foreign policy by 
states like Germany.51 In this regard, others, preoccupied with a perceived disparity between 
rationalist expectations, and foreign policy choices by post-unification Germany, have instead 
subscribed to a constructivist explanation of German foreign policy and interest.52 In many 
respects, this is not a surprising decision for those who perceive shortcomings in rationalist 
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accounts of German foreign policy.  In fact, the concept of constructivism was itself 
precipitated by a perceived inability of rationalist analytical perspectives to attribute foreign 
policy outcomes, to underlying self-interest, and “rational calculation.”53 Accordingly, with a 
sense theoretical perspectives had somehow failed to explain German continuity, and interests 
of a non-rational nature, scholars referenced constructivism as a potential means of 
understanding why a now capable, and increasingly influential state like Germany, failed to 
pursue unilateral, self-interested, and accordingly, rationalist, foreign policy aims.54  But what 
exactly does constructivism entail, and to what extent does this inform literature on German 
foreign policy? 
 
Although for rationalist accounts of foreign policy, “behavior represents the purposive pursuit 
of prosperity and security within a given international constellation of power, institutions and 
politics,”55 for constructivism, the focus of explaining behaviour rests instead upon the manner 
in which identity shapes the course of state action.56 John Ruggie, one of the foremost scholars 
on the subject of constructivism, argues rationalist perspectives have become myopic in 
viewing the institutional structure of international relations as “material[istic]” and 
individualistic.57 This, in turn, produces a critical indifference towards the role of “identity and 
interests” in foreign policy –something rationalists often assume to be merely “exogenous and 
given.”58  In this manner, a constructivist perspective focuses precisely on the weaknesses of 
rationalist explanations of foreign policy, that others have sensed in both the context of post-
unification Germany generally, as well as its relationship with Iran, specifically.  By inferring 
the existence of state calculus and interest forged beyond rationalist considerations, in much 
the same way literature has concerning Germany, this constructivist perspective posits 
“identity and/or interests of actors,” do in fact, constitute central factors in foreign policy 
behaviour.59 Given constructivism can be viewed as a major attempt within literature to 
address state objectives existing beyond the scope of traditional assumptions of interest, this 
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means constructivist thought has garnered further support, as limitations to traditional, 
rationalist interpretations have become progressively acknowledged within literature.60  In this 
manner, examples of foreign policy continuity, despite material and structural changes –post-
unification Germany being a prime example thereof– are frequently referenced to bolster, and 
even substantiate the theoretical validity of constructivism.61 
 
It remains important to note that material interests are not inconsequential to constructivists, 
but rather, a secondary impetus underlying state behaviour, to how “collective identity shapes 
the content of state interests and the course of state action.”62  This is a critical point, as the 
existence of material interests for a state such as Germany, say, in the form of trade and 
commercial relations, does not inherently refute constructivism.  Despite a clear theoretical 
divergence from rationalist perspectives, constructivist thought does recognise “power and 
interests are intimately involved.”63 In contrast, however, it means identity, and its related 
interest, are expected to supersede, or transcend the material.  This means for some 
constructivists, “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human 
action and interaction depends [entirely] on the dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world.”64 The implication being: even at a material level, there is 
a fundamentally normative, and identity-based interest underlying policy behaviour. 
 
In this manner, despite acknowledging a material level of interest by states, constructivism’s 
greatest strengths are revealed under conditions in which there is an absence of substantive 
material interests that can explain foreign policy behaviour.  It is here, in the realm beyond 
material, and patently rationalist explanations of state action, where constructivists submit a 
fundamental “role of human consciousness in international relations” must necessarily occur,65 
and the “building blocks of international reality are ideational”,66 in the absence of other 
explanations for policy.  Here, “ideational factors” –as the manifestation of underlying 
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normative understandings of states–67 are the only discernible impetus of foreign policy 
decisions.  The normative understandings of an actor ostensibly coalesce to forge a “state 
identity,” and this, in turn, represents “constructivism’s core explanatory concept”.68 
 
In this regard, constructivism holds that foreign policy is emblematic of underlying socio-
political, or socio-cultural identities of a state,69 and foreign policy ostensibly mirrors a 
subjective “‘national identity […] its interests and aspirations […] [as] embedded in […] 
history’”.70  The convergence and confluence of these normative, and identity-based 
understandings, accordingly establishes a “logic of appropriateness” in foreign policy –
reflecting both societal, as well as international expectations of a policy– by which, state action 
extends beyond mere “interest maximisation”,71 and exists as a function of its identity.  
However, and most imperatively, this means constructivism’s validity in a particular case 
remains contingent upon exhibiting both “content of state identity,” as well as “its effects,”72 
upon policy outcomes.  In other words, there is one “observable implication –state behavior 
should not contradict state identity,” and “where behavior contradicts identity, the latter 
cannot be considered a source of its conduct.”73 
 
This means despite constructivism’s preoccupation with the exact shortcomings surmised by 
many in the context of post-unification Germany, whether constructivism offers an adequate, 
or valid explanation of a state such as Germany, and its relationship with Iran, is entirely 
contingent upon policy behaviour affirming a state’s accepted, and espoused identity.  
Accordingly, in order for constructivism to explain foreign policy behaviour of a state like 
Germany, one must first and foremost, establish an underlying identity, and secondly, 
determine if its foreign policy is consistent with such expectations.  But to what extent does 
literature on Germany appear to accept a particular identity?  And moreover, do existing 
accounts attribute post-unification German foreign policy to such an identity?  With these 
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questions in mind, and to understand the manner in which expectations of post-unification 
German foreign policy behaviour may exist, as well as potentially explain Germany’s 
relationship with Iran, it is now essential to consider literature’s prevailing interpretations of 
post-unification German foreign policy, and identity. 
 
1.2 Civilian Power or Emergent Hegemony? 
 
As noted above, literature preceding, and in the immediate aftermath of German unification, 
featured a speculative narrative of renewed German assertiveness.  In the years following 
unification, as the dust of broad speculation settled into reality, two prominent schools of 
thought had emerged within literature concerning German foreign policy: one positing 
German foreign policy would remain constrained by institutionalisation and cooperation, 
while the other, anticipated an inevitable ascendency by Germany to a position of hegemony.74 
This dichotomy led to the advancement by Gunther Hellmann of two frequently referenced 
“images of Germany”: Germany as a “Gulliver,” “bound to become too big for the rest of 
Europe to handle,” and conversely, Germany as a “Ulysses,” suggesting awareness of, and a 
determination to ensure self-restraint in its foreign policy behaviour.75  
 
Notwithstanding the advancement of hegemonic characterisations in early, post-unification 
literature concerning Germany, over time, a growing body of literature on post-unification 
Germany led Hellmann to declare: “the most prominent feature of German foreign policy has 
[in fact] been the continuity in the rhetoric of continuity.”76 Nevertheless, although a growing 
body of literature, indeed, bespoke continuity, for others, questions arose as to whether it was 
more a “‘rhetoric of continuity’ rather than continuity itself.”77  In this regard, even with 
continuity increasingly recognised within literature following unification, questions regarding 
the validity of this perspective have never been fully resolved.  Accordingly, questions as to 
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whether German foreign policy –in case studies such as Iran– in fact, supports assumptions of 
continuity, holds particular value today, in that wider questions of German continuity with 
pre-unification tendencies endures as a fundamental question within literature on 
contemporary Germany. 
 
Despite the existence of fundamental doubts, it is vital to recognise advancement of a 
continuity narrative was progressively bolstered by the publication of substantive empirical 
analyses from the likes of Anderson and Goodman, who cite striking consistency between pre-
unification and post-unification German foreign policy, particularly with respect to 
cooperation and European integration efforts.78 For some, this disposition resulted from a 
“forty [year] […] reliance on a web of international institutions […] caus[ing] these 
institutions to be embedded in the very definition of state interests”,79 whereby, contemporary 
German foreign policy remains forever tamed in a tale of progressive “institutionalisation of 
power”.80  This, in turn, ostensibly subdued traditional state interest.81 
 
Such literary assertions, paired with a lack of validation for more cynical predictions of 
renewed German assertiveness, had the implication of encouraging scholarship to more 
widely embrace the narrative of continuity, along with its implications for rationalist 
understandings of foreign policy.  Not only did continuity receive widespread acceptance,82 
but as Germany’s “axiomatically multilateralist” nature,83 and penchant for Selbsteinbindung, or 
self-restraint,84 continued at the expense of rationalist anticipations, literature focused upon 
the manner in which identity, ostensibly superseded subjective, or individualistic “interests 
and preferences.”85 Accordingly, enduring features of pre-unification Germany –such as 
multilateralism– in post-unification German foreign policy, appeared to some, emblematic of 
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an identity rooted in normative understandings.86   This, in turn, led others to settle upon an 
understanding of Germany’s “firm preference for normative and institutional over material 
interests”,87 in which more consistent with a constructivist understanding of foreign policy, 
rather than a rationalist, or materialist one, “deeply rooted norms […] colored German 
perceptions of rationality”,88 and shaped its identity accordingly. 
 
Such perspectives represent a critical development in literature, reflecting not only perceived 
continuity, but establishing tangible linkages between continuity, normative considerations, 
and the existence of an underlying state identity behind German foreign policy.  For some 
accounts, however, such factors, albeit perplexing from a rationalist perspective, were not 
without benefit, and perhaps even bespoke calculation.  In many respects, the espousal of 
normative commitments appeared profoundly efficacious in its ability to bestow long aspired 
to “stability, decency […] and legitimacy”89 upon Germany as a foreign policy actor, and a 
German “suppress[ion]” of national interests, would be natural, given the only national 
interest acceptable at this time was “international rehabilitation […] for historical reasons.”90  
In this sense, although an eschewal of conventional interests occurred,91 and aspirations to 
pursue rationalist objectives were not widely embraced by German society,92 it is nevertheless 
imperative to note, for some accounts, normative or not, the “positive narrative” of 
cooperation, and other interests emblematic of normative preoccupations, were ultimately 
conducive to the realisation of German interests, including reunification itself.93  Preceding 
unification, West Germany was “an economic giant but a political pygmy”,94 yet, through a 
long-term heeding of normative considerations, Germany managed to mitigate “diplomatic 
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disadvantages,”95 and “enhanced tangibly” its diplomatic potential.96 Benefits to German 
power and agency notwithstanding, such literary advancements merely served to further 
highlight a growing acceptance that calculated or not, German foreign policy featured an 
underlying identity, based upon normative understandings, and that interest itself was 
inextricably linked with it.  But how does literature choose to define this identity, and 
corresponding interest?  And importantly, to what extent does literature suggest this appears 
consistent with a constructivist explanation of foreign policy? 
 
1.2.1 A Civilian Power Identity 
 
Again, it is critical to appreciate two central premises within literature on post-unification 
Germany.  Firstly, a sense that German foreign policy, and relatedly interest, occur beyond 
the scope of rationalist expectations alone, and secondly, that these entail a normatively-
shaped identity.  Bearing these premises in mind, many have argued a constructivist 
perspective of German foreign policy constitutes the most compelling explanation for its 
behaviour in general,97 and for some, even aspects of German foreign policy towards Iran 
specifically.98 For such accounts, it is argued German state behaviour remains empirically 
attributable to German state identity,99 and post-unification continuity not only mirrors an 
“identity articulated within and across the major German parties”,100 but such identity 
supersedes traditional interests, in large part, due to its history.101  Indeed, such a dynamic 
does appear largely consistent with constructivism’s underlying assumptions.  However, if this 
accounts for German foreign policy, as noted previously, such a constructivist explanation 
necessitates both defining the identity itself, as well as evidencing its effects.  Accordingly, this 
requires further considerations, including the manner in which literature contends history, 
and related normative assumptions, supposedly forge an identity, as well as how this, in turn, 
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may function to shape German interest, and ultimately, foreign policy outcomes such as its 
relationship with Iran. 
 
In regard to such considerations, it is helpful to note literature on Germany is unambiguous in 
its attribution of contemporary German identity to a “legacy of the National Socialist past and 
the Second World War”, which are said to be “very apparent in [Germany’s] political 
institutions [and] […] discourses.”102 For such accounts, the manner in which the past so 
meaningfully shapes Germany’s present, results from two concurrent dynamics, whereby “the 
weight of ‘collective memory’” concerning the past,103 paired with a more objective, historical 
memory,104 work to bring about a contemporary German preoccupation with normative, and 
non-rationalist considerations in foreign policy,105 including “human rights, the rule of law and 
values such as liberty and equality”.106  This process is addressed in greater depth in chapter 
two, but for purposes of understanding the manner in which existing literature accounts for 
this dynamic, it is critical to understand that based upon such a perspective, literature not only 
ascribed Germany’s normative understandings to the tangible effects of history, but also the 
formation of Germany’s underlying identity.107  Consequently, for those to whom normative 
understandings and related identity explain German foreign policy, a post-unification 
Germany largely characterised by cooperation, espousal of supranational values, and a core 
belief that pursuing national objectives with military means was now superseded by other 
methods,108 meant the manifestation of such an identity, appeared more adequately 
characterised in terms of a quintessential civilian power,109 rather than a traditional one. 
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A term originally coined by François Duchêne in the 1970s, civilian power110 as a concept was 
later refined and endowed significant prominence by Hanns Maull, who strived to 
substantiate its direct pertinence to explaining contemporary German foreign policy, through 
a number of works.111 Arguably the foremost expert on Germany’s ostensible civilian power 
disposition, Maull succinctly summarises the civilian power concept as “a foreign policy role 
concept –a complex set of norms, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions– which tells a state how to 
behave.”112 In this respect, the civilian power role concept is considered emblematic of a 
constructivist explanation,113 which, in turn, is said to explain Germany’s lack of material 
interests, as well as abundant normative dimensions of its foreign policy.114  In other words, 
the civilian power role concept itself, is not only broadly accepted by civilian power 
proponents as a constructivist-variant role concept, but also, as the manifestation of 
Germany’s identity, which is accordingly said to explain its determination to eschew 
traditional, rationalist, or materialist interests, in foreign policy cases such as Iran. 
 
But what does this civilian power identity entail?  Interestingly, although numerous scholars 
have addressed the civilian power role concept, there is a relative consensus within literature 
as to its objective, non-country specific definitional parameters.  Accordingly, the general 
parameters of an ideal-type civilian power are assumed to entail the following six qualities, 
pursuant to various accounts within literature115 –which Maull specifically refers to as, the 
“civilizational hexagon of interrelated principles”116– entailing:  
 
1. Limitation or constrained use of force to resolve conflicts. 
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2. Promotion and advancement of the rule of law. 
3. Encouraging democratic participation. 
4. Pacifism, and non-violent means of conflict prevention, or resolution. 
5. Espousal of social justice within policy. 
6. Cultivation of interdependence amongst states. 
 
Further, it is argued “three norms” in particular have proven indispensable: 
 
“the willingness and ability to civilise international relations; […] the willingness to transfer 
sovereignty […] to supranational institutions […] and opponent of unilateral action; […] [as 
well as] eagerness to realise a civilised international order, even if this implies to forego short-term 
national interests.”117 
 
Beyond these more objective parameters, it is argued the approach reflects a subjective 
formation of “one’s own image of oneself and the expectations of others; both, in turn, reflect 
historical experiences and the effects of socialisation through learning.”118  In other words, as 
with a conventional constructivist account, the effects of historical and collective memories shape 
an actor within the scope of such generalised principles.  With this in mind, Maull identifies 
four distinct, identity-based aspects of contemporary Germany foreign policy as a civilian 
power: never again, never alone, politics not force, and norms define interests.119  From this 
perspective, both a never alone and politics not force disposition have ostensibly accounted for 
Germany’s categorical rejection of unilateral efforts –particularly of a military nature– as well 
as the societal expectation Germany would elect for pacifistic, and cooperative approaches to 
foreign policy as part of its civilian power identity.120  In this manner, there are clear 
behavioural expectations of a civilian power, in which given norms define interests121 –rather 
than rationalist, or materialist conceptualisations– foreign policy considerations ostensibly 
remain determined by these. 
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Thus, in many respects, it is Maull’s characterisation of a German foreign policy predicated 
upon a never again mentality,122 which appears to have the most pivotal and formative effects of 
the identity-based pillars.  As stated, “‘Never again’ […] mean[s] no more concentration 
camps, no more genocide, no more coddling up to dictators, and no more human rights 
abuses”, but in a much broader sense of impact for Maull, this combination of interests means 
German foreign policy features an “orientation” predicated upon crucial normative “‘do’s’ and 
‘don’ts’”.123  In this manner, a “self-perception as a Zivilmacht,” is understood to engender a 
determination to pursue foreign policy “in defense of victims of persecution and aggression”,124 
meaning not only are German “national interests […] routinely defined in terms of norms and 
values,”125 but there is supposedly a “missionary element […] in German foreign policy”126 
resulting from it.  Critically, for such accounts, this means Germany’s identity, as manifest in 
the civilian power role concept, entails a preeminent, if not requisite emphasis upon normative 
considerations in its foreign relationships,127 and these considerations are accordingly 
understood to represent the impetus of German foreign policy efforts. 
 
It is emphasised that “ideal-type civilian powers” exhibit a clear determination to promote a 
“civilizing” effect through international relations,128 notwithstanding acknowledgement that 
civilian powers are not necessarily obligated to advance “‘good causes’ abroad”.129 In this 
sense, literature is somewhat abstruse regarding the extent to which a civilian power is 
obligated to develop policy in a specific manner.  However, it is critically noted, a state only 
remains a civilian power, provided it preserves “key norms,” pursues behaviour consistent 
with, and “do[ing] justice to all principles under question,” and that should questions arise 
concerning the appropriateness of policy with values, the state will proactively attempt to 
reconcile any disparity.130  Based upon this argument, one would anticipate Germany’s 
incorporation of normative values such as human rights and democracy promotion in bilateral 
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relationships, notwithstanding their required consideration in foreign relations under German 
Basic Law.131  In this sense, and given acceptance within literature that the civilian power role 
concept remains inherently predicated upon constructivist thought, there is accordingly “one 
observable implication –state behavior should not contradict state identity,” and “where 
behavior contradicts identity, the latter cannot be considered a source of its conduct.”132  
 
In other words, at its essence, determining whether Germany’s relationship with Iran is 
explained by, or appears to challenge the prevailing characterisation of post-unification 
Germany as a civilian power, rests entirely upon the manner in which its behaviour remains 
consistent with expectations of said identity.  As argued by Maull, a civilian power advocates 
its underlying values in foreign policy, even provided it impedes the broader state of the 
relationship.133 With this in mind, the prevailing understanding of post-unification Germany 
as a civilian power would accordingly lead observers to expect Germany’s approach towards 
Iran will result in a pre-eminence of normatively-forged, identity-based interests –as 
encompassed by the civilian power role concept– and the eschewal of rationalist and 
materialist interests. 
 
Although literature appears fairly unanimous in its expected behaviour of a civilian power 
Germany, this entirely presupposes that one subscribes to the prevailing understanding of 
post-unification Germany as a civilian power.  Importantly, there is similarly a critical 
suggestion that constructivists may have embellished or exaggerated continuity,134 in which a 
myopic determination to continue advancement of the civilian power role concept has 
potentially supplanted meaningful analysis regarding normative change over time.135  Change 
and evolution of normative understandings is acknowledged within constructivist 
perspectives,136 and such an account anticipates a degree of flexibility within the normative 
underpinning of German foreign policy as time goes on.  As a result, this in turn, has 
precipitated a wider, and fundamental question concerning post-unification Germany –for 
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constructivists, and non-constructivists alike– as to whether or not Germany may potentially 
be moving towards “‘constructing normality’?”,137 despite observable continuity in the years 
following unification.  In this manner, for literature, although a civilian power role concept 
remains the prevailing understanding at the moment, whether case studies of German foreign 
policy appear to challenge, or confirm civilian power explanations, nevertheless remains of 
profound value to the wider field of scholarship on post-unification Germany.  Accordingly, 
attempting to explain a case study of German foreign policy such as Iran, along these 
theoretical lines, directly contributes to this debate of broader significance, in addition to 
further explicating the relationship itself. 
 
1.3 Normalisation Emerging? 
 
On this note, before preceding to literature concerning the case of Germany’s post-unification 
relationship with Iran, it is vital to appreciate that notwithstanding a current, prevailing 
understanding of Germany as a civilian power, there is nevertheless a growing body of 
literature raising the question of a potential normalisation of German foreign policy.138  
Consequently, it is imperative to address this theme before proceeding, for purposes of 
understanding how present analysis of the relationship itself, at its essence, mirrors this 
ongoing debate, and therefore, can beneficially contribute to a growing body of literature on 
the subject of potential normalisation, through the approach envisaged in this thesis.  But 
what exactly does this concept of normalisation entail, and how would one recognise more 
normalised behaviour in the case of German foreign policy towards Iran? 
 
For some scholars, Germany’s characterisation as a reluctant, albeit influential state –a 
reluctant hegemon139 of sorts– is potentially being supplanted by a different understanding, 
featuring an assertion of “national preferences”,140 and the “code word for this behavior […] 
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[is] ‘normalization.’”141  In this regard, literature refers to normalisation in the German case, as 
“shorthand for a unified Germany casting off post-war constraints acting on its foreign 
policy”, and a movement away from the “‘reflexive multilateralism’”,142 central to prevailing 
civilian power understandings.  As synopsised, although 
 
“Tamed power is characterised by multilateral institution-building […] [and] unilateral steps are 
avoided […] Normalisation, by contrast, is reflected in greater willingness to undertake unilateral 
demarches […] and a discourse of national interest in policy statements.”143  
 
Some accounts in literature posit that “key elites in the policy-making process have been 
recalibrating their approach in the light of their normative and ideational understandings of 
Germany’s foreign policy role.”144  Pursuant to this argument, more normalised tendencies 
merely remained obfuscated “behind [former Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s] smothering veil of 
rhetoric on continuity,” and the omnipresent historical legacy in Germany, in turn, resulted in 
a more piecemeal exhibition of “new ideas”145 concerning Germany and its subjective interests.  
Although some subscribing to this perspective argue Germany’s capacity for normalisation, 
and “rational decision-making,” remain fully reconcilable with normative dimensions of policy 
formulation,146 the implication is nevertheless a potential weakening in prevailing thought of 
Germany as a paragon of the civilian power role concept. 
 
As noted by Bulmer and Paterson’s in-depth analysis of Germany’s approach to a myriad of 
European Union (E.U.) related policy matters, Germany’s “ ‘tamed power’ characterisation 
[…] no longer holds,” and as evidenced by their analysis, “Germany will if necessary proceed 
alone (Alleingang) […] German power has become ‘normalised’.”147  For Beverly Crawford, 
this willingness runs deeper, to the extent that “power is crucial […] [and] national power 
plays the determining role in shaping Germany’s foreign policy preferences.”148  Expanding 
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upon the prominent argument advanced by Bulmer, Jeffery, and Paterson in Germany’s 
European Diplomacy: Shaping the regional milieu –in which the scholars portray Germany as 
actively shaping the institutional framework and “policy profile” in which they participate149– 
Crawford argues Germany goes further, by acting as a fundamentally unilateral foreign policy 
actor, particularly when its institutional framework of cooperation fails to catalyse national 
interests.150  Thus, in a striking divergence from the prevailing argument of continuity in 
foreign policy, some within literature have identified features suggesting notable differences in 
post-unification behaviour,151 as part of a potential normalisation.  The implication of such 
interpretations within literature signifies not only a problematizing of the widely-embraced 
narrative of Germany’s reflexive civilian power approach to foreign policy, but further, they 
serve to provoke deeper reflection upon prevailing understandings within literature that 
identify “norms and identity”152 as the preeminent impetus underpinning German foreign 
policy, rather than rationalist, or materialist aims, such as power.  Accordingly, the emergence 
of a normalisation debate within literature concerning post-unification Germany, holds the 
broader implication of suggesting a potentially diminished relevancy of identity within 
German foreign policy decision making. 
 
Critically, this characterisation in literature suggests Germany may, in fact, be progressively 
conformant to rationalist understandings of foreign policy,153 thereby serving to challenge the 
widely accepted understanding of German foreign policy, identity, and interest, based upon a 
constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept.  In this respect, despite suggestions 
otherwise, if one subscribes to the normalisation school of thought, generally, “normalisation 
means Germany is becoming more like other powers […] and implicitly, or explicitly 
conforming to the rationalist paradigms,”154 by moving towards “hard bargaining of agent 
power,” rather than reliance upon mechanisms consistent with civilian power 
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understandings.155 Given continuity not only led to the cultivation and espousal of counter-
theoretical perspectives such as constructivism, but further, served to substantiate their 
validity, a potential revelation that non-rationalist, non-materialist interests merely served as a 
façade, would mean evidence substantiating prevailing interpretations of contemporary 
German foreign policy faces a fundamental challenge.  Indeed, the gravity of this question 
regarding continuity as a civilian power, versus potential normalisation, is so profound, it 
constitutes for some, “the great foreign policy debate in Germany.”156 
 
In this respect, it is essential to bear in mind, literature has by no means wholeheartedly 
embraced a normalised understanding of German foreign policy.  This portrayal within 
literature is less indicative of an evolution in literature’s understanding of post-unification 
Germany per se, and more reflective of an emergent counter-perspective, and literary 
undercurrent, which seeks to account for what some see as an increasingly assertive, 
unilaterally inclined, and potentially rationalist Germany.  Regardless of such perceived 
indications, those subscribing to the prevailing understanding of Germany as a constructivist-
inspired, civilian power, have noted, if Germany was in fact driven by rationalist, and 
materialist tendencies, tangible exemplifications should have definitively emerged by the 21st 
Century, which they contend did not occur.157  Nevertheless, the ambiguity and uncertainty 
within scholarship concerning the enduring relevancy of normative and identity-based 
interests in the articulation of German foreign policy, merely underscores the necessity of 
further investigations into the matter.  Consequently, Germany’s relationship with states like 
Iran, represent valuable case studies for determining whether Germany’s civilian power 
identity, does indeed, endure as an appropriate explanation of its behaviour.   
 
It is helpful in this regard, to consider for purposes of such questions, that fundamental 
premises underlying constructivist interpretations of foreign policy, require evidencing 
“identity to have some permanence […] [and] in order to make a strong case for the 
persistence of identity […] one must also demonstrate its resilience in the face of intervening 
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structural change.”158  This means for purposes of considering a case study of German foreign 
policy such as Iran, embracing a constructivist theoretical perspective –i.e. the civilian power 
role concept– in analysis of the case, allows one to easily consider whether this prevailing 
understanding of post-unification Germany, explains its behaviour.  Whereas rationalist 
viewpoints hold “political discourse serves to justify, not orient state action”, the credibility of 
constructivist tendencies remains inextricable from demonstrating not merely the existence of 
a rooted identity, but also, “demonstrat[ing] its effects” upon the orientation of policy.159  For 
this reason, and as will be shown in the following chapter, the prevailing understanding within 
literature of post-unification Germany as a constructivist-inspired, civilian power, will be 
embraced as the theoretical lens through which to consider the relationship, amidst these 
wider, and critical debates. 
 
With a proliferation of literature concerning the subject of potential normalisation, and 
questions regarding the enduring relevancy of norms and identity for post-unification 
Germany, analysis of Germany’s relationships in this context appears increasingly imperative.  
Moreover, notwithstanding a robust school of literature focusing on post-unification 
Germany, and its approaches to policy, most analytical and theoretical perspectives advanced 
concerning Germany, contextually premise themselves upon Germany’s foreign policy vis-à-
vis the European Union, and European states, while neglecting to address case studies beyond 
this limited geographic scope.  This limitation, in turn, raises profound questions regarding the 
extent to which scholarship can accurately capture broader German foreign policy dynamics, 
interests, and identity, from one region of policy focus.  In other words, not only are these 
questions increasingly imperative, but there is a dire need for consideration of German foreign 
policy, identity, and interest, beyond the European geographic realm.  For this reason, a case 
study such as German foreign policy towards Iran appears to offer a particularly valuable 
angle from which to consider these wider, and essential questions of post-unification 
Germany.  But what does literature on Germany’s relationship with Iran suggest about its 
foreign policy, identity, and interest? And to what extent does this relationship appear to offer 
particular value in terms of addressing underlying explanations of German foreign policy?  
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With these questions in mind, it is now appropriate to consider the body of literature directly 
addressing Germany’s relationship with Iran, in order to demonstrate the unique value such a 
case study of German foreign policy, identity, and interest holds. 
 
1.4 A Curious German Foreign Policy Towards Iran 
 
According to literature on post-unification German foreign policy towards Iran, the 
relationship is exceptional in its indulgence,160 and appears more akin to a “strange love 
affair.”161 Notwithstanding a previously referenced understanding that a civilian power 
Germany is expected to avoid establishing close relationships with authoritarian governments, 
literature is nevertheless fairly unanimous in its understanding that Germany maintains so 
strong a desire to cultivate ties with Iran, that it constitutes a high-profile example of 
“disunity” amongst Western states concerning Iran policy.162 With starkly differing 
approaches in foreign policy towards Iran, such disunity has, in turn, engendered vocal 
opposition from the United States (U.S.) and other allies since unification, and complicated 
many of Germany’s other relationships.163  In this respect, when taken from the viewpoint of 
civilian power explanations of Germany, its desire to pursue close relations with Iran, 
including at the expense of anticipated norms of cooperation, leads one to ponder several key, 
and insufficiently resolved issues on the subject of German foreign policy towards Iran.  
These include: identifying the underlying interest behind Germany’s cultivation of this 
particular relationship, and relatedly, determining the extent to which Germany’s relationship 
with Iran, may in fact, challenge prevailing understandings of Germany, as an ostensibly 
constructivist-inspired, civilian power in its foreign policy, identity, and related interest.  In 
this regard, at its most basic level, Germany’s policy towards Iran is a particularly valuable 
case study to consider, in that at its essence, the relationship as presently characterised across 
literature, appears to largely problematize many core assumptions, and understandings of 
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post-unification Germany, which similarly, factor in to wider, ongoing questions of German 
foreign policy, identity, and interest. 
 
Despite sufficient accounts within literature to indicate a presently unrecognised, and 
unstated problematizing of Germany’s civilian power role concept in this case, as noted by 
prominent scholars on the subject, academic literature on German foreign policy towards 
Iran, including its antecedents, remains strikingly limited.164  In fact, prior to the publication 
of Seyyed Mousavian’s seminal, albeit controversial text in the field, Europe-Iran Relations: 
Challenges and Opportunities, no substantive account of the contemporary relations between 
Germany and Iran appeared in any language.165 This void is similarly noted by Matthias 
Küntzel, another prominent author on the subject, who posits that the publication of his 
critical text on the subject, constitutes a profoundly original investigation, in the absence of 
any “scholarly works” addressing the ties.166 Notwithstanding recurrent allusion to gaps in 
literature on the subject, limitations to existing literature have largely endured over the years.  
Current academic works referencing the topic are principally restricted to a small number of 
books, and a handful of articles.  Moreover, as a general trend, scholarship largely limits itself 
to addressing Germany’s relationship with Tehran, from the perspective of broader, E.U. 
relations, and policy vis-à-vis Iran, including particular emphasis upon negotiations 
surrounding Iran’s nuclear program167 preceding the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA).168  In this manner, consideration of the relationship from the original 
perspective envisaged in this thesis, serves to add much needed analysis of a key relationship 
for Germany, which has largely escaped a bilateral level of analysis, and is yet to be 
considered in the valuable context of broader, fundamental debates concerning post-
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unification Germany, as a civilian power.  That being said, how do existing accounts within 
literature explain Germany’s policy towards Iran?  Do these accounts suggest Germany 
conforms to, or diverges from civilian power expectations?  And based upon present 
explanations, to what extent does the approach envisaged in this thesis represent a viable, and 
beneficial approach to considering the relationship? 
 
To answer such questions, it is helpful to begin with emphasis upon the fact that literature 
pinpoints differing policies towards Iran in the years following German unification, as the 
source of fundamental strain upon Europe’s relations with the United States.169 Although the 
United States sought, in the words of Martin Indyk, to pursue a policy of “containment,” 
towards Iran,170 Germany and Europe instead developed a policy seen as a “rejection [of] the 
hard-line approach […] by Washington […] no matter how compelling the evidence of 
Iranian misbehavior.”171 The manifestation of this rejection is consistently referenced within 
literature as “the European Union’s policy,” of […] ‘dialogue’”,172 in which rather than contain, 
or isolate Iran, Germany and its European partners sought engagement.173  However, although 
literature has often chosen to frame the policy as multilateral, European, and noted its 
formation under the formal auspices of the European Union in 1992,174 scholars have 
nevertheless acknowledged the profoundly bilateral nature of arrangements and relationships 
between Iran and individual European states, particularly Germany.175  In this manner, there 
is clear recognition within accounts of Europe-Iran relations, that amidst Europe’s inability to 
develop “a concerted […] approach”176 at critical junctures, policy was, in fact, often dealt 
with on a “unilateral basis”,177 meaning “bilateral initiatives were taken under the heading of 
‘critical dialogue’,”178 or other ostensibly multilateral forums, rather than actually occur as 
policies of cooperation.  Moreover, and of profound significance, literature recognises 
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Germany as the principal force behind development of this allegedly “European” policy of 
dialogue, or engagement,179 entailing patent German criticism at times towards European 
partners for not embracing its subjective policy stance,180 and a general propensity of 
Germany to act distinctly more lenient towards Iran than “other EU member states.”181 
 
In this regard, despite a tendency of literature to simply merge analysis of German policy 
towards Iran with that of Europe’s, many accounts nevertheless acknowledge this policy as 
emblematic of Germany’s personal interest, and subjective policy aims.  The implication being: 
it is Germany’s foreign policy efforts towards Iran which engenders strain upon Germany’s 
relationship with the U.S., as well as Germany’s policy which ostensibly occurs with 
indifference to the state of Iranian behaviour.  This not only evidences the particular necessity 
of considering Germany’s relations with Iran from a bilateral perspective, but it imperatively 
serves to highlight that if anything serves to problematize civilian power expectations of post-
unification Germany in relations with Iran, this is highly attributable to its own policy efforts, 
rather than Europe’s.  With this in mind, what does literature accordingly suggest regarding 
the rationale behind this distinctive approach spearheaded by Germany?  And to what extent 
does literature suggest this approach reconciles with, or diverges from prevailing theoretical 
and analytical perspectives of German foreign policy, as a civilian power? 
 
Critically, some accounts within literature attribute Germany’s choice of rejecting “isolation 
[…] and pursuing constructive engagement,” to a divergent, underlying “philosophy” towards 
international relations.182 For Charles Lane, such a philosophy conforms to an intrinsically 
German belief in the perceived efficacy of alternative methods of foreign policy, including 
Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik.183  According to this perspective, a policy of engagement is 
considered superior to “military and political containment”,184 since isolation of states cannot 
induce change, as there is no promotion of, or exposure to the other state’s position on 
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issues.185  In this respect, such a philosophy suggests there may be a normative impetus for 
Germany’s policy towards Iran –both in its underlying philosophy and promotion of values– 
consistent with civilian power expectations.  Consequently, although some accounts within 
literature imply a fundamental challenge to civilian power expectations –without actually 
referencing it as such– others, in fact, suggest Germany’s interest in this relationship may be 
largely consistent with expectations of the civilian power role concept, including diplomacy, 
advancement of norms, and ultimately, non-rationalist, non-materialist aims. 
 
Although literature in this manner has noted the perception of an underlying philosophical 
calculus behind Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran, existing accounts have nevertheless 
failed to clearly define this philosophy in theoretical terms, or attempted to explain its 
relevancy to prevailing understandings of post-unification Germany.  Despite literature 
appearing vague on the subject of underlying theoretical rationales, it does, critically, provide 
essential clues in this regard, by elaborating upon the policy differences of Germany and the 
U.S., concerning Iran. 
 
According to some, Germany’s policy aspired to provide a stage for addressing “areas of 
explicit concern,” including: human rights, terrorism, the Middle East peace process, as well 
as weapons proliferation and procurement,186  in addition to “equally important […] unstated 
goals,” such as attempting to engender political moderation in Iran through contact.187  Thus, 
although some discern, and contend, German and U.S. aims ultimately strived to achieve 
similar goals, such as preventing nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, and facilitating 
Middle East peace, the policy approaches are nonetheless considered within literature to 
fundamentally contrast with one another.188 Attempting to explain these foundational 
dissimilarities, Matthias Struwe offers the most substantive advancements regarding any 
underlying theoretical components of the relationship, by framing this particular divergence in 
terms of contrasting understandings of foreign policy.  For Struwe, not only does Germany’s 
policy constitute a counter-position from the United States’ more realist, and accordingly, 
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rationalist approach towards Iran,189 but many of its features appear more consistent with a 
constructivist understanding to foreign policy.190 Expanding upon this interpretation, Struwe’s 
account of Europe-Iran relations argues this dialogue-based approach aspired not only to 
engender moderation and facilitate regional peace efforts, but aimed to “persuade Iran to 
adhere to internationally accepted norms,” particularly concerning improvement of human 
rights and rule of law.191  Consequently, for Struwe, the intent of such action predicated itself 
upon a non-rationalist, non-materialist determination to “make clear the EU did not tolerate 
Iranian human rights abuses […] and help steer [Iran] […] back into […] the international 
community”192 –something he interprets as compelling evidence to corroborate an increasing 
relevancy of normative interests within Germany and Europe’s respective foreign policy 
agendas.193  In this respect, Struwe views aspects of Germany’s relationship with Iran, as 
indicative of a constructivist interpretation of foreign policy, given his interpretation the 
policy sought to advance normative aims, under largely multilateral auspices,194 through 
“dialogue […] not by military or sanctionary pressure.”195  However, here again, one sees an 
understanding of Germany’s policy, being inextricably linked by literature with that of 
Europe’s.  Struwe’s investigation of the relationship does not exist on a bilateral level, and 
accordingly, it in no way attempts to explain Germany’s relationship based upon prevailing 
understandings of a civilian power Germany.  In this manner, and given Struwe addresses 
dialogue from a perspective that German and European policy efforts are, more or less, one 
and the same, it is both presumptuous, and hasty to embrace the validity of this explanation 
when considering Germany’s personal relationship with Iran. 
 
Moreover, and of profound significance, despite Struwe’s inference of at least some normative 
considerations in Europe’s contemporary approach towards Iran, as well as a perceived 
theoretical inability of traditional, rationalist interpretations to account for all such 
considerations,196 he nevertheless finds his own hypothesis challenged by a relationship he 
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concedes: “produced little tangible results” in normative realms, including human rights.197  
This, according to other accounts of the relationship, constitutes a profound challenge to 
critical dialogue, and by extension, the ostensible significance of normative interests behind 
such policy.198 Although the efficacy of Germany’s strategy is less significant for this thesis 
than its underlying explanation, the inability of literature to demonstrate tangible, much less 
substantive examples of normatively-based results, has resultantly precipitated, and bestowed 
greater legitimacy to differing explanations of Germany’s interest in relations with Iran.   
 
In addition to such challenges, other factors cited within literature as corroborating evidence 
for normative, and identity-based interests, have similarly faced notable criticism.  For 
example, some contend Germany and Europe’s decision to temporarily cease a policy of 
dialogue –following the Iranian government’s implication in the killing of four individuals at a 
Berlin restaurant199 – constitutes proof they were willing to sever ties on the basis of 
normative interests, when presented with incontrovertible evidence of Iranian misdeeds.200 
However, others interpret this supposed proof point, as merely “symbolic” in nature, and 
highlight the inability of European states to forge a united front against Iran, “no matter how 
compelling the evidence”.201  This resulted in the quick re-implementation of a dialogue, albeit 
under a new name,202 and engendered claims of alleged moral indifference towards Iranian 
behaviour.203 In this manner, for differing accounts within literature, Germany’s policy actions 
on a given issue are seen to either problematize, or substantiate, normative interests behind 
the relationship.  Accordingly, what this discrete example demonstrates, is that many 
supposed validations for a constructivist explanation, in fact, remain greatly disputed within 
literature.  In this regard, notwithstanding a palpable sense across literature that explaining 
the relationship requires a fundamentally theoretical lens, the absence of clear theoretical 
expectations concerning Germany’s behaviour in its relationship with Iran, has allowed 
contradictory interpretations of events to emerge. 
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The implication of such ambiguity surrounding Germany’s behaviour –in a theoretical sense– 
means that although some posit non-rationalist, non-materialist interests explain key aspects 
of the relationship, another prominent position within literature attributes a lack of progress 
in the area of human rights, and other normative dimensions of the relationship,204 to 
economic interests, and the related “unwillingness to use […] economic ties to exert 
leverage.”205  Citing the fact Germany’s contemporary relationship with Iran emerged from 
highly robust trade relations during the period preceding dialogue, and a belief these would 
only improve with time,206 this alternative perspective accordingly argues, it is, in fact, 
commercial and trade interests, that constitute the preeminent basis for establishing post-
unification relations with Tehran,207 as opposed to normative, or identity-based interests.  For 
such accounts, a nexus of trade, German credit guarantees, debt restructuring, and robust 
interest from prominent German firms to ink deals in Iran,208 is not only patently obvious, but 
its wider implication holds such interests supersede non-rationalist, non-materialist 
considerations, given the apparent “reluctan[ce] to threaten the use of an economic stick”.209  
Thus, for some critical observers, far from affirming normative interests, German foreign 
policy towards Iran represents “a morally objectionable policy that is having little positive 
impact on Iran.”210   
 
Overall, this alternative interpretation of the relationship suggests a more rationalist, or 
materialist explanation of Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran –rather than a constructivist 
one– and in doing so, serves to further highlight the critical manner in which a dichotomy of 
interpretations concerning the relationship, has emerged along fundamentally theoretical 
lines.  In this manner, what literature makes clear, is that explaining the relationship, and 
resolving the dichotomy, requires consideration from an original perspective: one of 
Germany’s underlying theoretical and analytical rationale, as well as corresponding interest.  
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This is particularly imperative, given that at the essence of this unresolved dichotomy 
concerning Germany’s relationship with Iran, is a potential problematizing of prevailing 
understandings of Germany as a constructivist-inspired, civilian power.  In this regard, the 
unique approach of this thesis is not only original, and ideal for resolving the contradictions 
inherent in existing accounts, but essential, in that the essence of ongoing debates concerning 
this relationship, fundamentally mirror wider debates of significance for post-unification 
Germany.  Consequently, approaching the relationship from this perspective will further 
allow for consideration of the manner in which this particular case study of post-unification 
German foreign policy, identity, and interest, may, in fact, challenge prevailing 
understandings of Germany. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As evidenced by this chapter, although existing literature establishes essential progressions in 
knowledge concerning both post-unification Germany in general, and its relationship with 
Iran specifically, imperative gaps to these areas endure, which hold wider implication for 
existing thought on Germany. 
 
This chapter began by demonstrating how prevailing explanations of post-unification 
Germany are viewed as largely consistent with a constructivist account of foreign policy, 
rather than a rationalist, or materialist one.  By first presenting the differences inherent in 
these theoretical, and analytical perspectives, and later, addressing their pertinence to present 
understandings of post-unification Germany, the chapter evidenced that a constructivist 
explanation of foreign policy, ostensibly underpins Germany, and its identity, as a civilian 
power.  Expanding upon this, the chapter ultimately demonstrated that a constructivist-
inspired, civilian power role concept, constitutes the prevailing understanding of post-
unification German foreign policy, identity, as well as interest, and accordingly, ostensibly 
serves to account for Germany’s behaviour in clearly identifiable ways.  With this in mind, the 
chapter further established that as the prevailing explanation of post-unification Germany, a 
constructivist-inspired, civilian role concept represents a clear, and efficacious theoretical 
framework for this thesis. 
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Despite the prevalence of this understanding, the chapter critically evidenced that a 
preeminent, and fundamental question has emerged within literature on Germany, concerning 
whether this explanation, does in fact, remain consistent with German foreign policy and 
interest, or, if there is a process of normalisation occurring.  In this regard, consideration of 
existing literature on the subject demonstrated that approaching case studies of German 
foreign policy from the prevailing, civilian power explanation of post-unification Germany, 
remains imperative, and will make a valuable contribution to a growing body of literature 
concerned with this fundamental question. 
 
Having established the importance, and efficacy of this approach, the chapter then evidenced 
how the case study of German foreign policy towards Iran is not only profoundly under-
evaluated, but particularly well suited to this wider question of ostensible continuity as a 
civilian power.  The chapter indicated that not only has literature failed to adequately 
approach the relationship from the perspective of Germany –preferring to consider it at a 
multilateral level, and with focus on nuclear negotiations– but no accounts to date have 
meaningfully addressed the underlying theoretical explanation of the relationship, and 
certainly not from the perspective of prevailing theoretical explanations of post-unification 
Germany, as a constructivist-inspired, civilian power.  As shown, this gap within existing 
literature is of particular implication, in that notwithstanding an inability of current accounts 
within literature to explain Germany’s relationship from a theoretical perspective, literature 
nevertheless indicates contradictory, and antithetical explanations of the relationship have 
emerged along fundamentally theoretical lines.  One perspective suggests an affirmation of 
constructivist assumptions, meanwhile another bespeaks a validation of rationalist and 
materialist explanations.  In other words, not only is this unresolved dichotomy of 
explanations, at its essence theoretical, but the theoretical dispute regarding German foreign 
policy towards Iran, mirrors the wider, and fundamental question of continuity in post-
unification German foreign policy, as a civilian power. 
 
In this manner, not only is the originality of this thesis apparent, but the particular value, and 
broader, potential impact of the approach, as well.  In approaching this relationship as such, 
not only will this thesis overcome present contradictions in literature concerning the 
relationship –through contextual understanding of the relationship’s features– but in doing so, 
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it will be possible to comment upon the wider issue of Germany’s civilian power status in this 
case, by means of a wholly original perspective. 
 
But bearing in mind this chapter identified the civilian power role concept as the prevailing 
understanding of post-unification Germany, and in turn, the theoretical framework 
underlying this thesis, what approach and methodology should be utilised for such an 
investigation?  Moreover, how, precisely, would this theoretical framework be operationalised 
for those purposes?  To answer these questions, it is now necessary to turn to consideration of 
the theoretical framework and methodology. 
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Chapter Two: A Methodology and Theoretical 
Framework 
	
Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter, it was established that leading characterisations and understandings 
of post-unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest, are best captured by 
Germany’s orientation as a civilian power.  Nevertheless, within literature concerning 
Germany’s relationship with Iran, it was noted two distinctive, and presently conflicting 
interpretations of Germany’s interest in relations exist.  Specifically, this conflict was 
evidenced to suggest a problematizing of Germany’s ostensible foreign policy, identity, and 
interest, as a civilian power, and in doing so, it indicated the relationship’s unresolved 
contradictions mirror wider debates concerning post-unification Germany.  Accordingly, it 
appears the key to both resolving this present dichotomy, and explaining the relationship from 
a perspective of critical value, is at its essence, based upon determining the impetus of 
Germany’s relationship, and the extent to which this may problematize assumptions of post-
unification Germany.  In other words: does the relationship appear consistent with, or 
divergent from, assumptions of German foreign policy, identity, and interest, as a civilian 
power?  By answering this question, it then becomes possible not only to better understand 
the relationship amidst conflicting interpretations, but further, to consider how this puzzling, 
single-case study of German foreign policy, fits within a wider field of thought concerning 
post-unification Germany. 
 
With this in mind, it is clear from the preceding chapter, that a constructivist-inspired, civilian 
power role concept constitutes the theoretical framework of this study.  However, with both 
that key premise, as well as broader intentions stated, to what extent is such an undertaking 
feasible?  How would a study be approached and implemented to reach these ends?  And 
what kind of methodology –alongside this theoretical framework– would underpin an 
investigation into Germany’s relationship with Iran?  Taking these essential considerations 
into account, the following chapter aspires to demonstrate how a qualitative investigation of 
Germany’s relationship with Iran can be implemented to address the research questions of 
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this thesis.  Specifically, it will show that by considering whether outcomes of the relationship 
conform with clearly identifiable expectations of Germany as a committed civilian power, this 
research project is not only feasible, but fundamentally optimal for addressing its questions of 
interest, and explanation.   
 
To demonstrate this, the chapter will firstly establish basic parameters of the research project, 
by explicitly considering the research questions and commenting upon the efficacy of a single-
case study in qualitative investigations.  After determining these essential parameters, it then 
aims to show how a process-tracing methodology is ideally suited to address the questions and 
aims of this thesis, by not only leveraging consideration of narratives and discourse, but above 
all, through comparison of evidenced outcomes against diagnostic criteria.  In this regard, by 
having already established the underlying theoretical framework in the preceding chapter, 
chapter two will actually begin with consideration of the methodology, before expanding upon 
the preceding chapter’s illumination of constructivism –which as previously noted, is the 
analytical perspective underlying a civilian power role concept.211  Following this, the chapter 
will further address the civilian power role concept itself, by showing how four distinct facets 
of the constructivist-variant, civilian power interpretation of Germany, allow for clear 
identification of expected role behaviour criteria, in accordance with the diagnostic approach 
of a process-tracing methodology.  Although unorthodox, this is why articulation of the 
methodology necessary proceeds further consideration of the constructivist-inspired, civilian 
power role concept within this chapter.   
 
Ultimately, through this wholly original approach to considering Germany’s relationship with 
Iran, the chapter will show determining Germany’s conformance with civilian power 
expectations is possible, and in doing so, this will address the research aims of this thesis, and 
finally resolve existing differences of opinion concerning Germany’s relationship with Iran. 
 
2.1 Questions, Causality, and a Single-Case Study  
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Given the myriad questions, themes, and debates surrounding Germany’s relationship with 
Iran, it is helpful to begin by clarifying the specific research questions of this study, as well as 
articulating how the various parts of this investigation are conceptualised to address these 
questions.  In this manner, it is vital to note, for purposes of this study, the timeframe will be 
limited to the period between German unification in 1990, and the United States’ decision to 
withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.  This time period 
not only captures the essence of post-unification Germany’s policy efforts towards Iran, but it 
prevents one from drawing definitive conclusions from ongoing negotiations, which may, in 
fact, merely reflect political posturing, rather than signify actual policy.  Additionally, it 
should be noted, that aside from mentioning its intersections with Germany’s behaviour and 
interest at a bilateral level of relations, this thesis will not meaningfully address negotiations 
over Iran’s nuclear program within the aforementioned timeframe.  Such negotiations are in 
many respects distinct, and an intrinsically multilateral extension of Germany’s relationship 
with Iran, rather than an aspect of its personal relationship –which remains the focus in this 
study. 
 
With these imperative considerations said, as noted in the introduction, there are two research 
questions guiding this thesis –one primary research question, and another secondary– with 
the latter of these two ultimately serving to address the primary question. 
 
Firstly, the primary question inquires:  
 
• To what extent does Germany’s bilateral relationship with Iran challenge fundamental 
assumptions of contemporary German foreign policy, identity, and interest (as encapsulated by the 
civilian power role concept)?   
 
However, in order to answer this, one must recognise both the essence of this question, as 
well as the basis of existing differences in understandings of the relationship, ultimately rest 
upon how one explains Germany’s interest, and corresponding policy behaviour.  Critically, as 
established in chapter one, and as will be evidenced in-depth later in this chapter, there is an 
assumed causal relationship between Germany’s identity as a civilian power, and interest 
formation, which in turn, ostensibly explains, or accounts for, post-unification German foreign 
		 45	
policy.212  Thus, to determine whether this relationship confirms, or challenges such 
assumptions of German foreign policy, identity, and interest, this necessitates upgrading or 
downgrading confidence in an explanation consistent with such assumptions, and a true 
explanation must always concern itself with causality behind a phenomenon.213  With this in 
mind, to consider whether the cause of Germany’s relationship is consistent with, or divergent 
from, fundamental assumptions underlying post-unification Germany, the secondary question 
of this study, and the one structuring the investigation, asks:  
 
• How does one explain post-unification Germany’s bilateral relationship with Iran?   
 
In other words, what impetus accounts for Germany’s desire to cultivate a “strange love 
affair”214 of intimate ties with Iran, which appear to challenge key assumptions of post-
unification Germany? 
 
Bearing these questions and overall ambitions in mind, it is critical to appreciate two 
fundamental facts concerning the design of this research project.  Firstly, a methodology is 
needed for this thesis which can address underlying causality in Germany’s relationship with 
Iran, and secondly, it must be consistent with the theoretical framework of this thesis –a 
constructivist-variant civilian power role concept. 
 
In this manner, it is imperative to caution this thesis neither aspires to test the validity of 
constructivism, nor the civilian power role concept itself.  Rather, it aims to consider if such a 
concept can, indeed, explain a particular case of German foreign policy, with assumed validity 
in mind.  In approaching it as such, this thesis is pursuing a single-case study, which means 
considering whether outcomes and narratives of a particular case, appear consistent with 
expectations.215  This means assumed validity of the civilian power role concept is necessary, 
given that for such an investigation, “validity of [a theory’s] assumptions” is not the concern 
per se, rather it ponders: does the concept of interest in this case “operate if the conditions that 
it claims to require for its operation are present?”216  But to what extent might such an 
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approach appear limited?  And what form of methodology can be implemented to achieve 
these ambitions?  Helpfully, by considering the potential shortcomings and strengths of this 
approach, a potential methodology of interest emerges. 
 
While it would appear this approach to a single-case study is ideal for addressing the research 
questions, it is critical to note, case studies often face criticism for alleged “weakness of […] 
methods”, and come with a caveat that a discrete case study “cannot be generalised to other 
cases”.217  These are important limitations to consider.  Yet, it is helpful to note, this thesis 
does not aspire to make generalisations that other cases of German foreign policy are 
interpretable based upon the results of this specific relationship.  What it does aspire to, is 
explanation of a particular case, albeit one that potentially stands to impact wider assumptions 
concerning post-unification Germany.  Thus, although concerns about strength may exist in 
terms of certain research aims, it is nevertheless helpful to recognise the key strength of 
single-case investigations exists in the very “within case” analysis being sought in this study, 
particularly if a “process tracing methodology”218 can be utilised.  In this regard, it is from the 
possible limitations of such an approach, that one in fact recognises a potential methodology 
of value.  But although the research aims of this thesis suggest a single-case analysis is a 
strong approach, what exactly is a process-tracing methodology, and does such a methodology 
truly fit the ambitions of this research project?  To consider this matter, it is therefore 
necessary to turn attention towards the methodology itself. 
 
2.2 A Process-Tracing Methodology  
 
Finding its antecedents in cognitive psychology,219 process-tracing represents a prominent 
approach in social science to “explain a particularly interesting and puzzling outcome”,220 for 
qualitative research projects.221  With such aspirations in mind, this methodology is considered 
ideally suited for developing compelling explanations of single-case studies,222 by facilitating 
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“strong within case inferences […] not possible with other […] methods”.223   At a basic, 
fundamental level, it seeks “evidence that a given stimulus caused a given response”,224 or, in 
other words, that something served to “produce an outcome” of interest.225  By considering a 
particular component within a wider “causal mechanism”, or “complex system, which 
produces an outcome by the interaction of […] parts”,226 a process-tracing methodology 
works to “update the degree of confidence […] a theorised”227 causality produced the outcome 
under consideration.228  Critically, this means the operative word for process-tracing is 
causality, just as it is for purposes of addressing the secondary research question of this thesis.  
However, in order for process-tracing to develop compelling explanations of a single-case of 
interest, this necessitates considering evidence “to make inferences about causal explanations 
of that case”.229  Thus, researchers implementing a process-tracing methodology are actively 
weighing evidence from a case to determine whether a hypothesised causal mechanism in fact 
accounts for the known outcome.230  In doing so, process-tracing is, at its essence, 
fundamentally an effort to evidence a hypothesised “causal mechanism in action”,231 does 
explain the outcome of interest. 
 
Considering this thesis ultimately seeks to develop a compelling explanation behind a puzzling 
case of German foreign policy, through within-case analysis of causality, it would therefore 
appear that a process tracing methodology is strikingly consistent with the research project’s 
aims.  But in order to fully establish the appropriateness of such a methodology, it remains 
imperative to demonstrate the methodology is epistemologically and ontologically consistent 
with the aspirations, assumptions, and approach of this study. 
 
2.2.1 The Explaining-Outcome Approach 
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In consideration of such consistencies, it is firstly critical to recognise there are, in fact, three 
forms of process-tracing –all with different ambitions.  Best characterised as “theory-testing”, 
“theory-building”, and “explaining-outcome process tracing”,232 of these three variants –and 
given this thesis aspires to explain a puzzling outcome, rather than test the wider validity of an 
existing theory, or construct a new one– the explaining-outcome process-tracing methodology 
is the most appropriate for this study.  Rather than concern itself with ambitions of a purely 
theoretical nature, the explaining-outcome approach instead operates “to craft a minimally 
sufficient explanation of a puzzling outcome in a specific […] case”,233 by “account[ing] for all 
the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts”.234  
 
Once again, such a definition appears highly consistent with the overall approach being 
utilised in this thesis.  Nevertheless, a potential challenge to embracing this methodology 
appears, in that process-tracing is often viewed as consistent with “scientific realism”, which is 
closely related to a positivist epistemology.235  This point is quite significant, considering this 
chapter previously reiterated the necessity of embracing a theoretical framework adhering to a 
constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept, and such a theoretical framework remains 
intrinsically non-positivist by nature.236  It would therefore appear on the surface, that a 
compatibility issue may exist for utilizing a process-tracing methodology.  However, of 
profound significance, it is also recognised that a case-explaining form of process-tracing, 
holds “ambitions [that] are more case-centric than theory-oriented”.237  This means, in 
contrast with the other two forms of process-tracing –which embrace a “neo-positivist and 
critical realist” epistemology and ontology– the explaining-outcome form possesses an entirely 
“different ontological understanding”238 altogether, since the interest is limited to explaining a 
particular case.239 Hence, although certain forms of a process-tracing methodology may 
present compatibility issues with this study, the particular form of process-tracing being 
utilised, fortunately mitigates such an issue.   
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In fact, for within-case, process-tracing, this form is even noted to embrace a belief that 
“events […] are […] social constructions […] they are not simply given […] but defined by 
our concepts, and much contestation”.240  In accepting this belief, a case-explaining form of 
process-tracing adheres to a non-positivist belief that non-observable causal forces,241 
particularly of a social nature,242 occur, and are often arrived at through contestation.  This is 
significant not only in its obvious, non-positivist sense, but further suggests particular 
compatibility between a process-tracing methodology and constructivism, in that it recognises 
the causal capacity of ideas,243 particularly emergent from historical lessons, in accounting for 
outcomes beyond the scope of rationalist or materialist explanation.244  The significance of this 
point cannot be emphasised enough, given that as the preceding chapter noted, and will also 
be elaborated upon further in this chapter, ideas remain at the core of any constructivist, and 
relatedly, civilian power role concept explanation.245  With this in mind, process-tracing 
methodologists have ultimately recognised a particular basis of compatibility with 
constructivist assumptions, in that “we do not [directly] observe causal mechanisms […] we 
make inferences” about them to establish “confidence”, and since “constructivis[m] […] 
aspire[s] to causal explanation […] [,] process tracing [indeed] figures prominently in […] 
conventional constructivis[m]”.246 
 
Indeed, this is very encouraging for purposes of determining a process-tracing methodology’s 
appropriateness, as it would appear process-tracing methodologists do not surmise any 
substantive conflict with the constructivist assumptions underpinning this study’s theoretical 
framework, should a case-explaining form be utilised.  However, it is further important to 
acknowledge, the notion of causality itself is sometimes considered a challenge to 
constructivism.  In fact, it is stated by some that embracing a constructivist theoretical 
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framework effectively transfers focus “from the causes of state action—interests—to the 
nature, or constitution, of such interests.”247  With this in mind, it might appear a fundamental 
conflict arises between a methodology seeking to ascertain underlying causality, and one 
utilizing a constructivist framework.  Yet, if this is accurate, how does one explain the noted 
ability to seek causal explanations with process-tracing for constructivist accounts?  Critically, 
to this point, the very notion and definition of causality in a process-tracing sense, and 
relatedly, this thesis, “differs from […] other understanding[s] of causality […] prevalent in 
social science.”248  In this sense, it is vital to clarify the ambitions of determining causality 
comes after such constitutive processes occur, meaning although constructivism is indeed 
constitutive –as will be detailed later in this chapter– the interest in causal dynamics with this 
methodology is one that occurs in a different sense altogether.  Instead, it is essentially seeking 
to establish the causal effects of something already constituted.  Thus, although a divide 
between constitutive and causal may be advanced in a context other than its meaning here, it 
is stated by prominent constructivists, that ultimately, notwithstanding the constitutive 
process, “constructivism subscribes to a notion of […] causality” in that the constitutive 
interest is operationalised as a causal force in effect,249 just as this methodology premises itself.  
Consequently, in regards to epistemological and ontological appropriateness underlying this 
methodology, it is essential to recognise constructivism “endorse[s] the scientific project” of 
weighing evidence of outcomes against theoretical perspectives in a causal sense, it just 
necessitates establishing a clear understanding.250 The significance of such an understanding will 
be addressed later in this chapter, but for purposes of determining the appropriateness of this 
methodology, despite a sometimes assumed positivist orientation to “explanation and 
understanding”,251 in this particular case, there is no discernible challenge in the intersection 
between the methodology of interest, and the theoretical framework to be further elaborated 
upon. 
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Bearing these characterisations and stipulations in mind, it appears from an epistemological 
and ontological standpoint, a process-tracing methodology not only works in this case, but 
exhibits many surprising parallels with a constructivist theoretical framework, including an 
interest in explaining beyond the scope of rational choice theoretical and analytical 
perspectives.252  It would therefore appear, despite potential challenges, given this “case-
centric” process-tracing variant seeks to determine the most compelling explanation of a 
discrete case within a socially contested world253, otherwise legitimate concern over 
limitations, such as generalisability to other cases, or epistemological and ontological aspects, 
do not manifest themselves in this investigation of Germany’s relationship with Iran.  Having 
said that, given a particular form of process tracing has been identified, and deemed 
appropriate, how would a researcher actually operationalise and implement this methodology 
to achieve the research goals?  What steps and methods are involved? And how are these 
utilised to reach well-evidenced findings? 
 
2.2.2 Implementing the Methodology 
 
To address such questions, this section intends to outline the key processes and methods of 
relevance to process-tracing in this study.  Specifically, this thesis envisages a five-step plan to 
implement the methodology, and by presenting these steps, it will then be possible to 
understand how this methodology allows for well-evidenced findings that support the 
research aims and questions herein.  With that in mind, the first key step in implementing an 
explaining-outcome, process-tracing methodology, simply necessitates stating what the case 
is.254 In this particular instance: post-unification Germany’s curious relationship with Iran.  
Although this may appear overly logical, in a fundamental sense of causality, one must clearly 
recognise and define the effect itself, before one can attempt to pinpoint a causal mechanism in 
action.255  Once the case is clearly stated, the second step of an explaining-outcome approach, 
requires a substantive investigation of secondary literature.256 This critical step occurs not only 
to better understand and define the puzzling outcome itself, but importantly, to identify any 
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previously recognised causal mechanisms,257 or causal theories, that may be capable of 
explaining the case.258 As an explaining-outcome, process-tracing methodology inherently 
features a theory of causation,259 this means hypothesised causes exist within the facts of the 
case itself, and identifying a potential cause is essential for the third step.  In this particular 
case, the hypothesised theory of causation was identified in the form of the civilian power role 
concept, which as the prevailing explanation of post-unification Germany, similarly 
constitutes the theoretical framework of this study. 
 
Once a hypothesised causality is noted, an imperative third step involves the clear statement 
of assumptions and expectations based upon this hypothesised theory of causation, including 
potential counterfactuals.260  This means a well-specified conceptual framework for the 
hypothesis is necessary, in order to “defin[e] […] central concepts […] form[ing] the basis for 
theoretical propositions”.261  Importantly, in a case where ideational factors are ostensibly 
involved in causation –as in this case– specifying expectations is even more important, so as to 
better evidence how these ideas may have operated, or failed to operate, in producing the 
outcome.262 By identifying and stating these assumptions, this in turn, allows for the critical 
establishment of more “case-specific observable implications”,263 which establish what will 
occur if a hypothesised causal explanation is indeed true.264  In other words, this third step 
begins with a clear “conceptualisation of the mechanism[‘s]”265 more generalised assumptions, 
but ultimately, culminates in a highly-specified statement of expectations in the form of 
diagnostic evidence, or diagnostic criteria.266  This is why –bearing in mind chapter one already 
established that a constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept is the theoretical 
framework for this study– it was essential to articulate the appropriate methodology, before 
returning to deeper consideration of the theoretical framework.  The embraced theoretical 
framework must be operationalised in the form of diagnostic criteria, and the importance of 
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this approach can only be understood from consideration of the methodology.  The notion of 
diagnostic criteria is fundamental to process-tracing, in that by establishing very clear 
diagnostic expectations as part of this step, researchers are later able to determine the validity 
of a hypothesised explanation, similar to how a physician makes medical diagnoses: through 
comparison of observable symptoms, against diagnostic criteria.267  Based upon this approach, 
a crucial implication is: with greater specificity of diagnostic criteria, there is increased 
accuracy of the methodology, because it allows researchers to diagnose based upon very 
distinct observable symptoms,268 when the methodology runs tests269 of “hypothesised causes 
and observed effects”270 for research questions of interest.271 In approaching it this way, a 
testing of causality effectively determines whether “theory-based predictions for what we 
should see in the empirical record are matched in reality”,272 and evidence that contradicts 
expectations, or supports counterfactuals, would serve to downgrade confidence in such an 
explanation.273 
 
Once expectations and diagnostic criteria are noted, the methodology’s fourth step involves 
“mak[ing] an inferential leap” from the observed events of the case, to draw conclusions 
regarding the causality.274  This means there needs to be a consideration of evidence in order 
to reasonably justify a leap, by which the process leverages something known as Bayesian 
logic.275  Succinctly put, Bayesian logic constitutes a “logic of inference”, whereby evidence 
from a case can be utilised to either upgrade, or downgrade confidence in a potential 
explanation.276  This is where the value of having previously established diagnostic criteria 
becomes apparent, in that a Bayesian logic approach posits, if “a strong match between 
predicted and found evidence” is evident, then it is possible to draw an inference with a high 
“degree of confidence”, that indeed, the hypothesised explanation is valid.277  Thus, although it 
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is never truly possible to determine with one-hundred percent certainty that a given cause was 
responsible278 –particularly when embracing a non-positivist approach as this thesis does– 
based upon a Bayesian logic, compelling conclusions regarding a hypothesised causality are 
nevertheless attainable, by relying upon the “probative value of evidence”,279 to “empirically 
validate” the underlying theory involved.280 Consequently, for process-tracing, “update[ing] 
[…] confidence in […] the hypothesi[s]”281 by demonstrating a “non-trivial causal effect”,282 
necessitates quality evidence,283 which can legitimise a leap through Bayesian logic.  This 
means diagnostic criteria are not simply being considered against circumstantial evidence, or 
in an ill-defined manner, as this would hardly instil confidence in the findings of this study.  
Instead, the methodology strives to “maximise […] inferential […] power” by leveraging 
substantive empirical evidence –in this case: clear observable events and outcomes, as well as 
discourse– to establish higher degrees of confidence in the findings.284 
 
With this in mind, it is essential to consider both the form of evidence being utilised, and its 
value for this study.  The investigation of empirical evidence, such as “archival documents, 
interview transcripts” and similar forms285 of primary source evidence –which ostensibly reflect 
the views and policies of participants–286 will naturally be central to this end.  Although 
secondary evidence –such as accounts within existing literature– remain particularly valuable for 
explaining the outcome287 in this case, it is nevertheless important to expand upon a specific, 
core aspect of evidence in this case-explaining methodology.  Specifically, how it seeks to 
leverage discourse, to further the evidentiary value of its findings.  For process-tracing, it is 
noted empirical evidence concerning a hypothesised causality, often exists within discourse, 
such as speeches,288 as well as official policy documents, which can then allow for contextual 
interpretation.289  Consequently, although this thesis does not aspire to conduct Discourse 
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Analysis in a technical sense of the term, or limit its empirical evidence to discourse alone, 
before discussing the fifth, and final step of this case-explaining methodology in action 
(sufficiency), it is important to briefly consider the unique value derived from discourse, and 
how this may increase confidence in the findings of this thesis. 
 
2.2.3 Discourse as Evidence in Process-Tracing 
 
Critically, in a general, non-process-tracing-specific sense, discourse, including policy debates, 
remain helpful when investigating a potential explanation for a case,290 because discourses of a 
policy nature are believed to “produce […] the common sense of […] phenomena and […] 
how public officials should act”.291  In this manner, just as with a constructivist explanation of 
foreign policy,292 there is a presumed logic of appropriateness intrinsic to policy discourse, and 
based upon this, discourse of a political nature effectively serves to “structure the spectrum of 
foreign policy opinion within a country”.293 In doing so, political discourse not only operates as 
a constraining force on foreign policy choices,294 and establishes limitations, but also, critically, 
“foreshadows state behavior”.295  As a result, “narratives that involve analysis of agents and 
their reasons” are accordingly considered valuable evidence for questions of underlying 
causation in state action. 296 
 
Importantly, a political discourse manifest as such, is not only helpful for evidencing 
underlying causality, but does so based upon a “structure of meaning”,297 which “interprets the 
world” beyond the scope of material explanation alone.298  The implication of this point is 
significant, in that discourse, as a form of evidence, and key component of this methodology, 
reflects an acceptance of evidentiary value beyond positivist assumptions,299 and one focused 
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upon the causal effect of “language and […] beliefs”.300  Thus, ideas, and related beliefs, or 
understanding,301 remain central to explanation, because discourse evidences how factors such 
as invocation of a historical narrative,302 as well as social interaction, are directly related to 
accounting for actions.303  After all, language, as the fundamental aspect of discourse, is 
intrinsically social, and therefore derives its meaning based upon a social component.304  
Ultimately, by embracing these assumptions, discourse as a form of evidence, mirrors core 
beliefs central to constructivism, as established in the preceding chapter. 
 
But although this is both helpful, and essential to consider, to what extent can a researcher 
expect discourse to evidence causation of an ideational and social nature, given speakers, and 
sources are individuals themselves?  This concern is imperative, as one of the greatest 
challenges to discourse as evidence, is a belief that statements may contain the bias of a 
speaker’s individual opinions, therefore concealing actual motivations,305 and accordingly, fail 
to accurately explain a case.  This concern is most prominently advanced from rationalist 
perspectives, which point out there may be inherent value in misleading others at times,306 
meaning discourse necessitates a degree of scepticism in terms of evidence.307  Taking these 
challenges into account, however, it is also critical to recognise much of the alleged weakness 
inherent in discourse as evidence, emerges from a researcher’s focus upon “individual beliefs” 
rather than a crucial “totality of the beliefs”, within their context.308  In other words, if the 
weakness of discourse is largely a consequence of focusing upon individual, rather than social 
beliefs, then seeking discourse from a socially-focused sphere can increase the confidence of 
such narratives.  Helpfully, in this regard, and particularly so in the case of post-unification 
Germany, it is noted that analysis of German policy discourse in the Bundestag, and other 
government policy documents –as will be utilised to evidence discourse throughout this 
thesis– are quite effective at capturing the essence of wider policy positions for researchers, 
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because of its inherently collective nature, and public-facing quality.309 Thus, although 
discourse can present challenges to researchers, these issues do not appear to manifest 
themselves as prominently in this case. 
 
Establishing this is of profound significance for two reasons.  Firstly, presupposing there is an 
intrinsic social nature to political discourse being utilised, this bestows much credibility upon 
discourse as evidence, in that a public-facing discourse is presumed to be more emblematic of 
wider, societal or collective understandings, rather than a mere reflection of individual beliefs, 
and bias.310  But secondly, provided this can be accomplished, a central advantage of utilizing 
discourse as evidence, is that “foreign policy representations by governments […] not only 
define [a] […] space for International Relations, but also [ultimately] create subject positions 
of identities […] to identify with and to ‘speak from’.”311 In doing so, discourse critically 
aspires to evidence identity as a causal factor underlying policy decisions,312 and given 
discourse facilitates “analysis of ‘interest formation’”,313 leveraging discourse as a form of 
evidence effectively seeks to prove interest, in relation to identity.  Bearing in mind chapter 
one demonstrated that a constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept assumes interest 
is a function of identity,314 once the expectations and diagnostic criteria of Germany adhering 
to a civilian power role concept are stated in this chapter, discourse can then be utilised to 
help determine whether statements, and corresponding actions within the relationship, 
evidence Germany’s civilian power identity, as the basis of interest, and ultimate explanation 
of, its relations. 
 
Critically, and as this chapter will ultimately expand upon, the intersection between a socially 
influenced formation of identity, and interest, is a central argument, that mirrors many of the 
assumptions at the core of a constructivist, and relatedly, civilian power theoretical 
framework.  In doing so, it is key to recognise that utilizing discourse as a form of evidence is 
not only effective for process-tracing, it is a form of evidence fundamentally valued for its 
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shared assumptions with constructivism.315 Based upon these considerations, it appears the 
research questions in this case are bolstered, empirically speaking, by use of discourse, in that 
it seeks to address causality, based upon assumptions which match a constructivist theoretical 
framework.  Having said this, however, it is similarly critical to appreciate that discourse is 
but one facet of a much larger body of empirical evidence, which includes secondary sources 
of material as well.  Consequently, having noted the particular value of discourse, it now 
becomes necessary to return to consideration of the case-explaining methodology in practice, 
so as to understand how leveraging such evidence in the fifth, and final step of the process-
tracing methodology, can allow one to determine a sufficient answer. 
 
2.2.4 Determining Sufficiency for an Answer 
 
What should be reasonably clear from the substantive consideration of evidence, and its 
application in a Bayesian logic, is that far more important than the amount of evidence itself, 
is the capacity for evidence being utilised to meaningfully address the hypothesis of interest, 
against competing alternatives.316  The importance is quality, and appropriateness of evidence, 
rather than quantity.  Based upon this, a question becomes apparent: at what point is the 
evidence being used in this methodology sufficient for determining causality, and accordingly, 
answering the research questions? As a result, the fifth, and final step of the case-explaining 
process, as envisaged by this thesis, requires a clearly defined point at which such a 
determination can be made.   
 
Indeed, pursuant to the Bayesian logic, there is a systematic upgrading and downgrading of 
confidence throughout an investigation, by weighing evidence against expectations.  But as a 
definitive, end goal, process-tracing aspires to establish what is considered “a minimally 
sufficient explanation”, whereby, “all […] relevant facets of the outcome have been accounted 
for while ensuring that the evidence” most strongly points to a particular explanation, rather 
than “plausible alternatives”.317  Hence, regarding the question of when there is enough 
evidence to reach a conclusion, for social theories in particular, this requires that “no 
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important aspects of the outcome” are unaccounted for.318  There can be no loose ends of 
consideration.  As a consequence, this thesis is structured, so as to ensure chapters three 
through six, each address a distinct facet of the civilian power role concept.  As will be shown 
in this chapter, these facets not only constitute the specific manifestation of a constructivist-
variant theoretical framework, but also, represent the diagnostic criteria underpinning the 
study.  In approaching it as such, this thesis will systematically consider each distinct facet of 
the civilian power role concept, in the context of Germany’s relationship with Iran, to ensure a 
particular explanation occurs, without neglecting consideration of all facets.  This also means 
imperative consideration of counterfactual explanations will similarly occur throughout the 
study, at which point, events that might serve to challenge a civilian power explanation are 
given due examination.  Based upon this approach, sufficiency through a process-tracing 
methodology is attainable, by analysing whether the hypothesised causality is deemed to 
account for the outcome, beyond the scope of alternative explanation.319  For example, in this 
particular case, sufficiency of explanation could be established if it was determined Germany’s 
identity as a civilian power, was the ultimate arbiter, or influencer, of German interest and 
policy towards Iran, beyond the scope of alternative explanations.   
 
But how can this be accomplished, given that upgrading confidence in one theory based upon 
diagnostic criteria, is not in and of itself, elimination alternative explanations?  What if certain 
aspects of diagnostic criteria are disconfirmed, but others confirmed?  This could present a 
challenge.  To address this dilemma, it is helpful to conceptualise several distinct sets of tests 
utilised within this fifth step, that allow one to determine sufficiency of an explanation, while 
systematically eliminating alternative explanations, based upon evidence.  Of particular 
relevance to this thesis, are hoop tests and doubly decisive tests.320  As implied by its name, a hoop 
test effectively operates as a hoop, through which an explanation must pass in order for it to 
be valid, and failure to do so disqualifies it.321  In this sense, such a test is particularly effective 
in that it eliminates alternative explanations that are clearly incapable of explaining the case, 
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by establishing progressively smaller hoops through which a potential explanation must 
pass.322 That is to say, if evidence were to suggest trade and commercial relations account for 
German interest, creating further hoops through which this explanation, and this explanation 
alone must pass through in order to be confirmed, not only eliminates alternatives which fail 
to pass the test of evidence, but does, in a sense, increase confidence in its validity if true, 
given the hypothesised explanation is further scrutinised.  Yet, critically, in this 
conceptualisation, is implicit recognition that although passing through a single hoop, or even 
several, certainly eliminates alternatives failing to pass, and may indirectly upgrade confidence 
in its validity, passing through a hoop nevertheless does not, in and of itself, establish 
sufficient confidence in an explanation.323  For this reason, it is necessary to leverage a doubly 
decisive test, which utilises facts that are not only unique to one explanation, but also very 
certain.324  This not only eliminates alternative explanations, but clearly demonstrates which 
explanation is true. 
 
With these in mind, in order to make a determination, this thesis will consider which 
explanation accounts for the outcome of interest, based upon an ability to systematically 
eliminate alternative theories, which fail to account for known facts of the relationship, or 
contradict fundamental premises and expectations.  Although it will not actually implement a 
literal test, it will utilise the conceptual basis of these tests to consider whether evidence 
supports a civilian power explanation, or an alternative.  Further, even though it remains an 
accepted fact that unassailable evidence of causality is never truly attainable in this non-
positivist methodology,325 successfully eliminating “all plausible alternatives” means the 
remaining one should be true,326 and helpful to this approach, are clear diagnostic criteria of 
the hypothesised explanation itself.  After all, ultimately, a hypothesised explanation must be 
evidenced to operate in the expected sense if true for a particular case.327  Consequently, now 
that the methodology’s five steps are noted, it now becomes necessary to establish the clear 
expectations and diagnostic criteria of the hypothesised explanation –a constructivist-variant, 
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civilian power role concept.  In doing so, it will then be possible to implement a study of the 
relationship itself, by updating confidence in clearly identifiable expectations and criteria, 
should the explanation be true. 
 
2.3 A Constructivist-Inspired Theoretical Framework 
 
As noted previously, this thesis necessitates acceptance of a constructivist-inspired theoretical 
framework, in order to determine whether the hypothesised explanation –the prevailing 
civilian power understanding of post-unification Germany– can, in fact, account for the 
outcome of Germany’s relationship with Iran.  Accordingly, this section will further expand 
upon chapter one’s consideration of core beliefs and assumptions underlying constructivist 
accounts of foreign policy, which as noted previously, ostensibly underpin Germany’s civilian 
power role, and supposedly account for its foreign policy outcomes.  It should also be 
cautioned, however, this section does not intend to provide a comprehensive discussion of 
constructivism, but instead, to present the core premises which are relevant to the civilian 
power variant of constructivism utilised in this thesis –much as they are for other strands of 
constructivism.  Once this is accomplished, it will then be possible to better consider how 
these more general assumptions of constructivism are understood to apply towards the 
specific case of a civilian power Germany, including, what should be expected, provided such 
an account of its policy proves accurate. 
 
With this in mind, a schism between rationalist accounts of foreign policy and ones that 
emphasise non-material, and identity-based factors, is not merely a case of differing 
assumptions, it is one of epistemological and ontological difference, in which rationalism’s 
positivist approach to explanation, means considering causes of state action based on norms, 
ideas, and identity, are not possible.328  In order to account for German interest and behaviour 
beyond the scope of rationalist thought, and in accordance with civilian power assumptions, 
this necessitates both an analytical perspective transcending these key rationalist limitations, 
as well as one predicated upon the intersection of “state identity, […] interests and […] 
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action”.329 Helpfully, as evidenced in chapter one, the answer to these parameters is apparent 
in constructivism, as an analytical perspective, and theoretical framework for this thesis. 
 
Not only is constructivism considered a fundamental challenge to rationalist accounts from an 
ontological perspective,330 but above all, from an explanatory one, in its rejection that 
traditional explanations of materialism, power, and its related basis of interest,331 capture the 
impetus of state action.  Although constructivism is a diverse field, in which nuanced 
interpretations332 have accordingly prevented consensus, and even produced disagreements 
over definition,333 there are nevertheless shared, core beliefs, underpinning constructivism, 
that remain central to all its forms, in which rationalist and materialist accounts are 
understood to be lacking. 
 
Namely, in this regard, are fundamental beliefs that a material world is shaped by, as well as 
profoundly contingent upon, the ideational,334 and these ideational processes reflect “normative 
[…] dimensions [and] express not only individual but also collective intentionality”.335 This 
means foreign policy is a “mutually constitutive” process,336 in which an interplay of both 
substantially domestic,337 as well as international normative influences,338 ultimately determine 
“‘what is called for on the basis of ‘norms and rules emerging in historical and cultural 
circumstances’”.339  For constructivist explanations, collective sentiments,340 and “collective 
understandings” derived from experiences, shape foreign policy calculation, in accordance 
with socially-developed “normative frames of reference”.341 As a consequence, a state’s 
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subjective conceptualisation of the world is best viewed as occurring through a social 
process,342 entailing intersubjective343 understandings.  In this regard, constructivist thought 
reflects a Weberian philosophic notion of verstehen, or, understanding,344 in which a subjective 
understanding is considered paramount to overall explanation of behaviour.  Specifically, in 
regard to constructivism, however, this philosophic dynamic occurs, as a socially-forged 
understanding manifests itself in a normative orientation, which in turn, shapes behaviour.345  
In this manner, for a constructivist account of foreign policy, “shared understandings, 
expectations, or knowledge”,346 resultantly shape the course of policy, and determine 
acceptable action,347 through a “logic of appropriateness”.348 
 
The implication of this is profound, in that constructivist accounts therefore attribute foreign 
policy action to a subjective conceptualisation “of the meanings that […] [somethings] have 
for them”,349 and such meanings “do not merely constrain or empower actors […] [they] also 
define their […] reality.”350 As a consequence, “far from being exogenously given [as 
rationalist accounts would posit], the intersubjective knowledge […] [serves to] constitute […] 
identities and interests”351 themselves,352  as subjective, “role specific understandings and 
expectations”, rooted in collective understandings of the past and present,353 ultimately 
converge to “determine the identity of a state”.354 This subjective “state identity […] [in turn, 
becomes] constructivism’s core explanatory concept”355 regarding the cause of foreign policy 
action,356 in that for matters of interest and causality within constructivism, “collective 
understandings [alone] are not sufficient cause for action”, rather, policy outcomes are a 
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reflection of identity.357 Thus, imperatively, it is this socially and normatively forged identity 
itself which “shape[s] actors’ […] interests”, as well as behaviour.358  Consequently, and of 
utmost significance, for constructivist accounts of foreign policy, the underlying causality of 
state action is identity,359 in that interest of states is considered a function of, or, reflection of, 
state identity itself.360 In turn, based upon this, the underlying explanation of foreign policy in a 
given case, is itself a reflection of identity, rather than inherently rationalist, or materialist 
calculation. 
 
The implication of this perspective is significant for purposes of this thesis, in that explanation 
of causality, the relationship, and ultimately, the primary research question, all accordingly 
necessitate a preeminent focus upon the ostensible civilian power identity underpinning post-
unification German foreign policy and interest.  With this in mind, for purposes of this thesis, 
and determining whether the hypothesised variant of constructivism can account for 
Germany’s relationship with Iran, constructivist accounts require a first essential step involve 
clear “specification of state identity”.361 There is a fundamental “implication –state behavior 
should not contradict state identity”,362 which means by establishing a clear definition of state 
identity, it is then possible to determine whether the outcome of a given case of foreign policy 
conforms with the “behavioral aspect”363 necessary for validating a constructivist account.  
Confirming a constructivist explanation of foreign policy necessitates evidencing identity’s 
impact on policy, by addressing “whether and how […] identity constrains foreign policy 
behavior […] [and] interests”.364 This naturally requires showing both the “content of state 
identity […] [and] demonstrat[ing] its effects”.365 
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With this in mind, it is clear confirming such an explanation of foreign policy not only 
necessitates clear articulation of the particular constructivist-variant under consideration in 
this case –as chapter one did– but a tracing of the underlying normative elements, and above 
all, a demonstration of how the identity, ostensibly underpinning post-unification Germany, is 
expected to function.  Here, it is possible to recognise the particular value –in accordance with 
a process-tracing methodology– of establishing diagnostic criteria for the constructivist-
inspired, civilian power role concept, in that doing so, will allow for critical analysis of the 
relationship based upon expectations, and accordingly upgrade confidence in the findings of 
this thesis.  With these considerations in mind, it is now essential to turn consideration back 
towards the case of post-unification Germany itself, in order to better define the civilian 
power identity, and related assumptions underlying it, as well as, ultimately, establish 
diagnostic criteria based upon these. 
 
2.4 Historical and Collective Memories Intersect to Forge 
German Identity 
 
As noted in chapter one, a fundamental aspect of post-war German foreign policy is 
considered attributable to the influence of normative perspectives.366  In this sense, accounts 
such as these would suggest contemporary Germany is a state in which, per a constructivist 
explanation, norms tangibly and meaningfully shape policy.  But how exactly did such 
tendencies emerge?  And what accounts for the normative understandings that supposedly 
shape the course of contemporary German foreign policy? 
 
Initially, Germany’s post-war normative orientation in foreign policy can be attributed to 
exogenous factors, particularly the “post war expectations” of others within the international 
environment, that Germany never return to the atrocities of National Socialism, or power 
politics.367  In this regard, it was the influence of expectations which initially engendered 
Germany’s contemplation of a historical memory concerning the past, and in doing so, this form 
of memory emerged as a more significant “organizing principle in the making of [Germany’s] 
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foreign policy”, than for any other country.368 This normative influence of a historical memory, 
or, “an externalised and objectified process” regarding shared understanding of the past,369 
became inextricably linked with the overall basis of foreign policy and identity in Germany, in 
stark contrast with a pre-war foreign policy largely consistent with rationalist tendencies.370 In 
doing so, this dispositional shift, based upon understandings of the past, forged contemporary 
German foreign policy, identity and interest, into an apotheosis of historical memory in action.   
 
Yet, for all its significance, it is imperative to recognise that for post-war German foreign 
policy, identity, and interest, the externally shaped, and objective nature of historical memory, 
is complimented with a more subjective, and particularised, collective memory, that gives 
salience, as well as meaning, to present conceptualisation of the past.371  This means, that 
although external normative expectations indeed matter, there is another, equally important, 
internal, or domestic, normative understanding, shaping post-war German foreign policy, and 
identity.  As a consequence, historical memory, and collective memory are both central 
components of a wider normative process, in which domestic, as well as international 
understandings, concurrently shape foreign policy, as historical memory intersects with a 
subjective, shared understanding of the past within the present.372  Ultimately, through this 
intersection, collective memory functions to allow normative understandings of the past to 
serve as the preeminent influencer of contemporary German foreign policy.373  In doing so, 
Germany’s post-war foreign policy is considered a principle example of how collective and 
normative understandings can define foreign policy and interest, given these understandings 
are not only said to account for post-war Germany’s decision to eschew traditional, rationalist 
aims of power, interest, and assertiveness,374 but specifically, serve to forge its identity.375  Thus, 
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beginning with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), historical and collective memories 
were understood to constitute the basis of its “national identity”,376 as a civilian power,377 and 
this identity, was further accepted to explain post-war German foreign policy and interest,378 
as per constructivist accounts.379 
 
This point is of profound significance, in that notwithstanding widespread expectations that 
such an identity, and foreign policy would fundamentally change with unification of a 
previously divided Germany,380 the appearance of continuity in post-unification German 
foreign policy, identity, and interest,381 served to empirically382 bolster constructivist 
explanations.383 Hence, as noted previously, at the core of perceived continuity in post-
unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest, is a strong validation of 
constructivist explanations, in which a surprising desire to reject traditional notions of power 
and interest, not only fundamentally challenge rationalist explanations,384 but in doing so, 
accentuate Germany’s adherence to a civilian power interpretation.385  Put succinctly, the 
“consensus […] [is] Germany has remained a civilian power”,386 and this consensus predicates 
itself upon the belief that continuity is, in and of itself, embodied by Germany’s adherence to 
the civilian power role concept.387  But what exactly defines such a civilian power role concept? 
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And to what extent does the term role concept itself have significance and meaning for this 
study? 
 
2.4.1 A Role Concept 
 
At its simplest level, a civilian power adheres to a “foreign policy role concept […] [or] a 
complex bundle of norms, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions”, which ultimately dictate 
behaviour,388 beyond the scope of material interest.389  Accordingly, in order to fully 
understand this dynamic, and before elaborating upon the specific facets of a civilian power 
Germany, it is beneficial to recognise envisaging a state within a role concept, actually benefits 
the very aims of this thesis.  This occurs because a role theory is, in fact, “a framework for 
describing national role performance and role conceptions and for exploring the sources of 
those […] conceptions.”390 In other words, role theory is effectively a clear statement of how 
the normative understandings for a state such as Germany, should result in specific, expected 
behaviour, against which actual behaviour can be assessed.  Although role theory is largely 
featured within rationalist, and materialist foreign policy accounts391 –which therefore may 
suggest a non-constructivist epistemology and ontology– this in fact appears more a 
coincidence of appropriation, given role theory features “a natural affinity with 
[constructivist] […] theory”.392 Intriguingly, seminal work in the area of role theory by Kalevi 
Holsti demonstrates a strong parallel with core constructivist assumptions of the 
intersubjective, normative, and related conceptualisation of self.393 In doing so, these seminal 
considerations bespeak an acceptance amongst scholars that role is increasingly pertinent in 
constructivist accounts, and critically, inherently related to the process of “identity formation”, 
and its shaping of foreign policy.394   
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In this regard, it would appear there is significant value in a role concept’s clear statement of a 
national role conception, in which definitive, diagnostic like, expressions of acceptable actions for 
states, reflect a specific identity.395  Thus, roles manifest themselves as a diagnostic criterion, 
or “ ‘mental maps’ which guide […] decisions on appropriate policies”396, and reflect “notions 
of actors about who they are”, as well as “how they therefore should” act,397 within a finite 
scope of allowed behaviour for a role.398 Based upon this, national roles further constitute very 
tangible expectations concerning assumed “causal variables […] in explaining the foreign 
policies of […] nations”, which in turn, may explain action.399  What this means is: in parallel 
to the secondary research question of this thesis, and consistent with the methodology being 
utilised, role theory aspires to explain foreign policy through analysis of causation, and does 
so by “provid[ing] the link between identity and behavior”.400 It does this by taking clear role 
expectations of a state adhering to a given role concept,401 and by considering actual role 
enactment, and role performance,402 or, the actual behaviour of the state itself in a given foreign 
policy case,403 it may establish causality of policy to the identity within national role 
conceptualisation.  The implication is: simply because a state envisages a role concept, does 
not mean a state’s policy axiomatically reflects the values and norms one identifies with, and 
expectations are analytically separate from outcomes.404 Hence, establishing a clear correlation 
between policy expectations, and policy outcomes is central to determining causality, and 
explanation. 
 
With this in mind, based upon role theory, provided one can establish clear expectations to 
compare events against, a role concept represents a straightforward path to determining 
whether causality of state action is indeed attributable to assumed role.  Helpfully, it is noted 
in the specific case of post-unification Germany, that constructivist assumptions said to be 
																																																						
395 Holsti,  246. 
396 Maull, "German Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a ‘Civilian Power?’," 14. 
397 Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, 1. 
398 Ibid., 23.; Holsti,  239. 
399  234-35. 
400 Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, 16. 
401 Ibid., 8. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Holsti,  245-46. 
404 Ibid., 238. 
		 70	
underlying the civilian power role concept,405 as well as salient normative understandings, 
establish almost “prescriptive expectations and criteria” for Germany’s civilian power role 
concept.406  This means the case of post-unification Germany, and its civilian power role 
concept, presents a coherent means of determining causality, and relatedly explanation.  In 
order to do so, however, this requires the specific diagnostic criteria, and expectations of a 
civilian power Germany, be established. 
 
2.5 The Four Facets of a Civilian Power Germany 
 
As the result of a myriad of events, and influences from the past, the civilian power role 
concept naturally exhibits numerous facets.  This, in turn, requires elaboration, and 
consideration, in order to demonstrate how diagnostic criteria are derived from a role concept 
reflecting a wide range of normative understandings and interests.  Accordingly, this section is 
not to be considered an in-depth explication of each facet of the civilian power role concept –
the minutiae of these facets will be elaborated upon in respective chapters– rather, it aspires to 
clearly articulate how this thesis conceptualises the various facets of the civilian power role 
concept.  It will then capture the essence of each key facet being utilised, as well as the basic 
expectations of Germany’s enactment of a civilian power role concept pursuant to these.  In 
doing so, this section will ultimately identify four distinct facets of the civilian power role 
concept, from which a list of diagnostic criteria can be established. 
 
2.5.1 Multilateralism and Cooperation 
 
The first of Germany’s four civilian power facets is best captured by a “‘Never alone’: integration, 
[and] multilateralism”,407 commitment.  For post-unification Germany, a core 
acknowledgement that cooperation is necessary for “the pursuit of international objectives”, 
results in a German foreign policy “beyond the [conceptual] world of the nation-state”, and 
one reflecting a commitment to the development of supranational structures, or, multilateral 
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institutions, within which to pursue policy.408  In this respect, integration, and interdependence are 
central to a civilian power Germany.409 Importantly, however, the civilian power form of these 
concepts, exists in fundamental contrast with rationalist notions of interdependence,410 
because the desire to cultivate an international cooperative structure, with high levels of 
interdependence,411 is predicated upon profoundly “normative […] concerns”, in which 
unilateral policy efforts are largely beyond moral justification.412   Hence, a committed civilian 
power rejects the pursuit of unilateral policies,413 when these can be achieved through “effective and 
socially just” multilateral means,414 because this is considered more acceptable from a 
normative perspective.  As a consequence, there is a core belief for an “ideal-type civilian 
power role concept”, that unilateral means are no longer effective at achieving policy goals, 
and the rejection “of achieving ‘power and plenty’ through unilateral means”, is as much about 
legitimacy, as it is about efficacy.415  Either way, core to the civilian power role concept is an 
understanding that multilateralism is fundamental, and therefore constitutes a necessary 
“criteria for a civilian power”416. 
 
2.5.2 Human Rights, Rule of Law, and Democratisation through 
Foreign Policy 
 
The second facet of a civilian power Germany, is “‘Never Again’: […] moralism and democracy”417, 
whereby, as part of this role concept, these norms are assumed to “define interests […] 
identity and foreign-policy objectives” for Germany.418  Specifically, these interests are said to 
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be captured in “powerful core political values”, including a fundamental belief in the 
importance of advancing “universal democratic values in foreign policy”, a commitment to 
ensuring respect of human rights,419 and strengthening rule of law.420 
 
It is said one of the “two most important parts of a civilian power” is represented by its 
unwavering commitment to democratic principles.421  Importantly, as a result, this core value 
is assumed to extend beyond the scope of domestic policy interest, because a true civilian 
power promotes democratic values through foreign policy, “even if this would lead to a 
deterioration in bilateral relations.”422 Hence, it is expected that a civilian power demonstrates 
a clear foreign policy goal of promoting democratic values in bilateral relations, with countries 
exhibiting a democratic deficit.423  Relatedly, by advancing these democratic values, this facet 
entails a parallel, core, foreign policy ambition of civilian powers, to encourage strengthening 
the rule of law,424 both to facilitate desired democratisation, but also, as part of another key 
concern for human rights, social justice, and humanitarian interests.  For a civilian power, 
human rights are “the highest global values”, and therefore need “to be one of the most 
important aims” of a civilian power’s foreign policy agenda.425 As part of this, a civilian power 
is expected to encourage “social equity and sustainable development”,426 or, “social justice”,427 
to the extent that ideally, a civilian power’s foreign policy reflects interests based upon 
“humanitarian arguments, rather than on calculations of power and interest.”428 
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Consequently, although the constructivist-variant, civilian power role concept is inherently 
normative, and underscores a “value-based” foreign policy429 across its facets, this one in 
particular encapsulates many of the specific normative beliefs, as well as values underlying a 
civilian power foreign policy.  In doing so, these values are understood to bespeak a 
fundamental belief of a civilian power, that through advancement of these norms and values, 
“it may be possible to ‘civilize’ […] [and] transform, international relations”.430 The 
implication is: an ideal civilian power “must […] actively pursue [these] goals and attempt to 
implement their agenda”,431 rather than acting passively.  Accordingly, this core premise is of 
profound implication for a civilian power, in that it supposedly engenders an almost 
“missionary element” in its foreign policy,432 as the very definition of an ideal civilian power is 
one demonstrating a clear willingness to encourage these values, by seizing every opportunity 
to do so,433 even if this requires the civilian power to “forego […] [other] national interests”.434 
Taking these interests, and premises into account, there is accordingly an assumption that true 
adherence to the civilian power role concept necessitates states avoid “coddling up to 
dictators”435 in their relationships, as this would appear antithetical to the active promotion of 
core values. 
 
Based upon these parameters, it is clear that an ideal civilian power would place preeminent 
interest in the advancement of democracy, human rights, and rule of law, through active 
foreign policy measures, even if this comes at the expense of wider interests.  Relatedly, it 
would be anticipated that a civilian power would therefore demonstrate this commitment, by 
ensuring the normative basis of interest comes before other, rationalist, or material interests. 
 
2.5.3 Norms and Values Supersede Material Interest 
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As an extension of the core constructivist belief that rationalist, and materialist interests are at 
most, secondary, ideally, a civilian power’s economic features of foreign policy are understood 
to “reflec[t] values and forms of social organisation”, as opposed to a strictly rationalist 
economic valuation,436 in which state “behavior represents the purposive pursuit of 
prosperity”.437  Although traditional material interests are allowed for, it is accepted that to a 
civilian power, these remain predicated, and contingent upon, “distinct […] norms and values 
embodied in the […] role.”438 Consequently, the normative and value-based definition 
underlying civilian power foreign policy interest, dictates both “pursu[ing] […] norms even if 
[…] no significant […] material interests” exist, as well as prioritizing the normative, if 
material interests are apparent, and would be compromised by doing so.439  In this manner, the 
initial momentum of foreign policy is presumed to be normative in basis, and a supremacy of 
normative, over material, is maintained throughout a relationship, because material interest, 
albeit allowed, remains contingent upon, or curbed by, the former.  The implication is: 
economic features of a relationship, beyond a normative and identity-based explanation, are 
understood to present a challenge to the manner in which a civilian power ostensibly defines 
interest in foreign policy.440 Furthermore, this is considered a particular challenge, should the 
economic relations occur with a partner not conforming to a civilian power’s normative 
expectations on issues such as human rights.441  
 
2.5.4 Political Solutions are Optimal, Use of Force is Detested 
 
Rooted in historical and collective memories concerning Germany’s past legacy of 
militarism,442 post-war Germany has cultivated an “anti-militarist political culture […] known 
as the ‘culture of restraint’”.443 Considered one of the “two most important” components of a 
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civilian power Germany, a commitment to peace, and pacifistic tendencies,444 manifests itself 
in a determination to use political solutions, rather than use military force.445  Of critical 
importance, for a civilian power Germany, it is understood that more than seek to constrain its 
own use of force, this identity-based commitment to “national and international norms”, is a 
central feature of its international relationships.446  This results in a broader foreign policy 
orientation, in which Germany actively encourages “non-violent forms of conflict management 
and conflict resolution”,447 with the ultimate aim of civilizing international relations.448 
Consequently, for a civilian power Germany, use of force is only considered acceptable, in 
exceedingly limited instances, in which other core values of the civilian power role concept, 
including multilateralism,449 defensive action, stabilizing a state, or human rights and 
humanitarian concerns, are at stake.450 Even then, such action is only deemed acceptable for a 
civilian power, once all peaceful alternatives “have been exhausted”.451 
 
2.6 Diagnostic Criteria and Interpretation 
 
Based upon these four distinct facets of a civilian power Germany, ideally, its bilateral 
relationship with Iran would feature the following attributes: 
 
• A commitment to multilateral, and cooperative solutions towards Iran –where relevant 
and applicable– even at a bilateral level. 
 
• Promotion of normative concerns –including human rights, rule of law, 
democratisation, and social justice– through bilateral relations, even if this stymies 
other interests. 
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• A subservience, or curbing, of economic interests, based upon normative concerns, or 
other facets of the civilian power role concept. 
 
• A determination to seek political solutions to conflict and dispute, as well as 
abhorrence of potential use of military force by any parties.  
 
• A willingness to act, and desire to civilise the international environment through its 
relationship. 
 
However, since these criteria are based upon an ideal civilian power in action, and this role 
concept includes many facets, at what point would a civilian power such as Germany be 
considered in minimal conformance with expectations?  To answer this imperative question, it 
is important to recognise the civilian power role concept is predicated upon a Weberian notion 
of an ideal type,452 “which cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality”, and requires but 
adequacy of explanation.453 In this regard, the value of an ideal notion underlying a civilian 
power role concept, exists in the ability of a researcher to compare this against “empirical 
reality”, to consider “divergences or similarities”.454 In exemplification of this, although an 
ideal type civilian power is expected to actively seize opportunities to promote its normative, 
and value-based interests,455 it is conceded that a state can still be a civilian power, and on 
occasion, not actively promote certain elements of the civilian power role concept in a 
particular case.456 This scope for flexibility in interpretation is often attributed to the fact that 
a civilian power role concept is so multifaceted, it is entirely possible that one facet will 
emerge in conflict with another for a given case.457 For example, and as will be considered in 
chapter four of this thesis, a civilian power may be faced with a foreign policy dilemma, in 
which a genocide could be stopped in support of humanitarian interests, but to do so, would 
require the very use of military force it abhors.458  In this regard, it is important to understand 
a civilian power role concept does not exhibit a hierarchy in the normative, and value-based 
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concerns,459 meaning all facets are equally important in an abstract sense.  Instead, certain 
norms may appear more important in a particular case, based upon what is at stake, and how 
the salience of the issue is perceived to impact upon overall civilian power interests.  Hence, 
the importance is merely that a facet of the civilian power role concept be evidenced to shape 
interest in a foreign policy case, and if it is, the hierarchy reflected in that case may inform 
something about the actor’s wider conceptualisation of interest.  The fact is, based upon 
constructivist thought, normative understandings in the present, inevitably change over time, 
and with it, so change identities, interests, and behaviour.460 This dynamic is part of what 
makes consideration of Germany’s relationship with Iran so significant for questions of 
contemporary German foreign policy, identity, and interest: assumed continuity in civilian 
power understandings largely endure,461 but questions of potential change, and claims of 
contradictory interests for post-unification Germany in relations with Iran, abound.  
Ultimately, notwithstanding these potential challenges, the coherence of expectations, and 
assumptions underlying a civilian power Germany are clear.  It is recognised that a state is 
only a true civilian power, provided there are active efforts to abide by the principles 
underlying the role concept,462 and the effects of such an identity, must at the very least, be 
evidenced to “constrain foreign policy behavior”,463 if not fully account for it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with the intent of elaborating further upon the theoretical framework, and 
presenting a methodology sufficient to address the research questions of this thesis.  Bearing 
in mind chapter one already established the critical premise that a constructivist-inspired, 
civilian power role concept, constitutes the theoretical framework for this thesis, the chapter 
chose to address the methodology, before returning to consideration of the theoretical 
framework.  It demonstrated that for a single-case study of foreign policy, a process-tracing 
methodology represents a particularly efficacious approach to overcoming noted limitations of 
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single-case studies.  It was further established that a case-explaining, process-tracing 
methodology, in particular, not only fits with the epistemological and ontological assumptions 
of the theoretical framework, but specifically, operates to address questions of causality, and 
related explanation, which are central to this thesis.  In order to answer to these questions, 
through such a methodology, the chapter outlined a five-step plan, allowing for a high-degree 
of confidence in the findings.  To accomplish this, however, it was noted the methodology 
requires careful selection of evidence.  In this manner, the chapter gave due consideration to 
the value of considering discourse and narratives for purposes of empirically bolstering the 
findings of this thesis.   
 
As part of this five-step plan, the chapter also addressed a critical need for diagnostic criteria –
derived in this case from the theoretical framework– which is why further consideration of the 
previously established theoretical framework was delayed until addressing the methodology.  
With this need demonstrated, the chapter briefly expanded upon the manner in which a 
constructivist analytical perspective is understood to account for foreign policy behaviour, 
through identity-based, interest formation.  The chapter then addressed the specific 
expectations of Germany’s adherence to a constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept, 
with particular elaboration upon what a role concept is, and how this concept is particularly 
beneficial for determining expected behaviour. 
 
With these fundamental considerations in mind, the chapter articulated four distinct facets of 
a civilian power Germany, from which a clear set of diagnostic criteria were derived.  In doing 
so, the chapter demonstrated how the theoretical framework can operate in accordance with a 
case-explaining, process-tracing methodology, to ultimately allow for well-evidenced findings 
concerning the research questions of this thesis.  Specifically, it noted that although the 
civilian power role concept is, indeed, multifaceted, it can nevertheless be affirmed as an 
explanation, provided at least one facet of the civilian power role concept is evidenced to have 
demonstrable effects upon post-unification Germany’s relationship with Iran.  Having 
established these critical points, it is now possible to turn to consideration of the relationship 
itself. 
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Chapter Three: Cooperation, Multilateralism, and 
German Foreign Policy Towards Iran 
 
Introduction 
 
The ability for Germany and others to reach a degree of consensus regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program, appears in many respects, emblematic of Germany’s transition from a once power-
political actor, to a staunch advocate of cooperation and diplomacy.  Specifically, Germany’s 
participation in P5+1 negotiations, and the resulting Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA),464 can easily be referenced as prominent examples of multilateralism and 
cooperation for post-unification Germany.  Furthermore, as Iran’s former Ambassador to 
Germany, Seyyed Mousavian, states, in his personal experience, Germany’s commitment to 
partnerships with the United States, Europe and Israel, endure not only as fundamental 
aspects of Germany’s foreign policy in general, but remain central themes in German foreign 
policy towards Iran in particular.465  With such sentiments in mind, it would appear that 
German foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran remains consistent with a civilian power commitment to 
multilateralism, and a rejection of unilateral initiatives.466  
 
However, notwithstanding such features of cooperation in the context of Iran, as noted 
previously, beyond negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program –which are inherently 
multilateral and outside the scope of this thesis– post-unification German foreign policy 
towards Iran appears to largely problematize civilian power role expectations concerning 
multilateralism and cooperation, amidst Germany’s often unilateral, and occasionally assertive 
approach.467  Although civilian power proponents highlight Germany’s tendency to avoid 
unilateral policy initiatives,468 post-unification German foreign policy towards Iran, 
nevertheless, appears at times primarily driven by Germany’s own initiatives and underlying 
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interests,469 resulting in claims that as Germany solidified closer relations with Iran,470 it 
concurrently deviated from a cooperative policy position with the United States and other 
Western nations.471  Critically, these are states which ostensibly comprise central aspects of its 
identity as a multilateral and cooperative actor.472  Accordingly, Germany’s relationship with 
Iran has emerged as one of the most contentious issues of post-unification Germany’s 
relationships with the U.S. and Israel,473 and in turn, it provokes fundamental questions 
concerning civilian power explanations of German foreign policy towards Iran. 
 
But to what extent does Germany’s policy towards Iran actually challenge civilian power 
expectations regarding multilateralism and cooperation?  Does German foreign policy 
towards Iran truly evidence indifference towards a cooperative approach in this case, or does 
interest in cooperation occur elsewhere?  And if indifference does occur, then what explains 
Germany’s underlying interest in more unilateral policy efforts?  With such questions, and the 
overall aims of this thesis in mind, the following chapter will be addressing the multilateral 
and cooperation facet of Germany’s civilian power role concept, in order to determine the 
extent to which this facet can account for post-unification German foreign policy towards 
Iran.  In other words, the chapter to follow –similar to all forthcoming chapters– is assessing 
one facet of the broader civilian power role concept, in order to ultimately determine, by 
degrees of confidence, an underlying causality, and explanation, of German foreign policy 
towards Iran. 
 
To accomplish this, the following chapter will address three relationships –the United States 
(U.S.), the European Union (E.U.), and Israel– ostensibly central to both post-unification 
Germany’s multilateral identity as a civilian power,474 as well as Germany’s foreign policy 
towards Iran.475  By addressing the manner in which Germany’s policy towards Iran intersects 
with these core relationships, this chapter will demonstrate how such dynamics, in turn, 
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provide evidence regarding Germany’s conformity with the cooperative and multilateral facet 
of the civilian power role concept, as an explanation of its foreign policy towards Iran.  
 
The chapter will begin by briefly addressing the underlying premise of cooperation and 
multilateralism, for a civilian power Germany.  Once established, the chapter will first 
consider transatlantic (U.S.) intersections with German foreign policy towards Iran.  In doing 
so, it further demonstrates how this relationship, in particular, accentuates the essence of 
Germany’s unique approach and philosophy in foreign policy towards Iran.  Following this, 
the chapter considers how Germany’s approach towards Iran fits within ostensibly 
multilateral and cooperative European policy efforts towards Iran.  In addressing this aspect, 
the chapter once again affirms the particular value and necessity of investigating Germany’s 
relationship from a bilateral perspective.  Lastly, this chapter considers the manner in which 
Germany’s policy towards Iran impacts upon its espoused commitment towards Israel.  In 
approaching it as such, this chapter ultimately aims to demonstrate that notwithstanding 
Germany’s voiced support for multilateral and cooperative initiatives vis-à-vis Iran, the 
multilateral and cooperative facet of Germany’s civilian power role concept, is nevertheless 
largely challenged by its foreign policy actions in this case, and often appears subservient to 
other interests. 
 
3.1 Cooperation, Multilateralism, and a Civilian Power 
Germany 
 
Before proceeding to consideration of multilateralism and cooperation in this particular case, 
it is vital to recall that a prevailing understanding exists within literature, which holds 
Germany’s historical memory –rooted in a National Socialist past– produced a determined 
avoidance of unilateral policy initiatives,476 as well as engendered what many characterise as a 
“reflexive” or “axiomatically multilateral” German political culture .477 In this regard, 
Germany’s commitment to multilateralism and cooperation in foreign policy, is attributed to a 
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normative forging of contemporary German identity,478 through a coalescence of both 
historical, as well as collective memory.479 The resulting manifestation of this identity appears in 
Germany’s constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept, which as evidenced in chapters 
one and two, ostensibly accounts for Germany’s interest in foreign policy, and relatedly, 
explains its outcomes.480  But with this understanding in mind, how exactly is such a 
commitment to multilateralism and cooperation expected to function for a civilian power 
Germany in its policy towards Iran?  
 
Consequently, before addressing Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran, in the context of 
multilateralism and cooperation, it is imperative to clarify the expectations of a civilian power 
Germany, in order to focus consideration upon whether the multilateral and cooperative facet 
is, indeed, evidenced in this case.  In this regard, it is essential to recall that for a civilian 
power Germany, there is a core understanding that foreign policy aims are only possible 
through collaboration,481 and any German Sonderweg, or unilateral exercise of power, is 
wholeheartedly rejected.482  This “never alone” mentality of a civilian power Germany483 is not 
simply a matter of perceived efficacy, but above all, a reflection of the aforementioned 
normative considerations, by which, unilateral efforts are beyond moral, and social 
justification.484  Based upon this understanding, for post-unification Germany, supranational 
integration with the E.U., a desire to maintain robust transatlantic relations with the U.S., and 
a determination to affirm a unique bond with Israel, are all considered, to varying degrees, 
particularly emblematic of Germany’s commitment to cooperation and multilateralism in 
foreign policy485 as a civilian power.  The implication being: evidence of unilateral initiatives, 
and divergences from cooperative or multilateral positions in this case, presents an inherent 
challenge to civilian power explanations of German foreign policy towards Iran –and nowhere 
more so than with respect to its relationships with the U.S., E.U. and Israel.  Accordingly, in 
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the case of Iran specifically, assumptions of German foreign policy and identity would 
anticipate Germany’s policy to reflect convergence, or at least, the avoidance of interference 
with these core relationships.  Helpfully, this means addressing Germany’s relationship from 
such a perspective is particularly instrumental for purposes of considering whether the 
multilateral and cooperative facet of the civilian power role concept, can explain Germany’s 
policy in this case.  With that in mind, it is now possible to consider the case of Germany’s 
foreign policy towards Iran. 
 
3.2 Transatlantic Ties and the Schism of Iran Policy 
 
For post-unification German foreign policy towards Iran, no external, or third-party 
relationship, has figured as prominently in the narrative, as that of the U.S.  Not only has Iran 
represented a central theme, and source of strife within the German-American relationship 
over the last several decades,486 but it remains a core issue of enduring relevance, as evidenced 
by prominent disputes in recent years between German policymakers, and U.S. President 
Donald Trump.487  In this manner, German foreign policy towards Iran has a clearly 
identifiable impact upon its cooperative relationship with the U.S.  But how exactly does 
Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran intersect with, and impact upon its transatlantic 
relationship?  And most importantly: to what extent does such an impact appear to confirm, 
or challenge, civilian power assumptions in the case of its foreign policy towards Iran? 
 
To address such questions, and fully understand the significance of Germany’s Iran policy for 
civilian power assumptions of cooperation and multilateralism, it is critical to appreciate that 
German-American relations are not only “a pillar of […] the post-Cold War era,”488 but a core 
component of post-unification Germany’s identity as a civilian power.  For a West Germany 
in need of alliances following the Second World War,489 robust transatlantic ties were not 
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simply a matter of necessity, but a reflection of its underlying identification as a civilian 
power, based upon normative understandings, and historical experiences.490  In other words, 
although Germany’s semi-sovereign status was an undeniable incentive for multilateralism 
and cooperation with the United States,491 its purposive assumption of a civilian power 
identity, featuring cooperation with a transatlantic partner, extends beyond rationalist 
explanations alone.  The outcome was a post-war Bonn Republic, from its inception, 
consciously pursuing cooperation and multilateralism vis-à-vis the United States, and the 
sustained invocation of Germany’s transatlantic partnership in present-day Berlin Republic 
policy narratives, has in turn, served to evidence its continued relevancy to post-unification 
German foreign policy.  In exemplification of this point, successive coalition governments 
have invoked Germany’s transatlantic commitment in a myriad of foreign policy situations, 
ranging from former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel’s argument that Germany needed to 
demonstrate “solidarity” with Washington in its Balkans policy during the 1990s,492 to 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder espousing “‘unlimited solidarity’” with the United States 
“drawn from history”,493 in affirming Germany’s support for the U.S. following the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  In this manner, there is not only strong evidence to suggest 
post-unification continuity in Germany’s civilian power commitment to cooperation and 
multilateralism vis-à-vis the United States, but major policy divergences between the 
transatlantic partners over Iran relations, would in turn, appear to challenge expectations 
concerning this commitment. 
 
With this in mind, it is fairly unsurprising that in the years preceding Iran’s 1979 Islamic 
Revolution –as West German foreign policy strived to convey its reliability as a partner of the 
U.S.–494 Bonn had assumed a relatively consistent policy with Washington towards Tehran.495  
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In doing so, many of the antecedents concerning Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran 
would appear to confirm a committed transatlantic partner, and suggest its conformity with 
civilian power expectations.  However, despite initial convergences over Iran policy, following 
the Islamic Revolution, Iran in fact appeared to represent something of a catalyst for West 
Germany to express its growing assertiveness, independence, and at times, divergent policy 
interests.  In 1984, Werner Marx, then head of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, went 
so far as to argue, digression from the U.S. position towards Iran serves to “make it clear to 
the Iranians that we are not a passive satellite of the Americans but their close ally of our own 
free will.”496 More than simply representing a means of conveying free will, however, 
Germany’s growing disregard for American interests in its Iran policy appeared emblematic of 
its keen determination to show Tehran that Germany possessed a subjective geopolitical 
understanding.  This included prominent examples within discourse, ranging from former 
German Foreign Minister Hanns Dietrich Genscher –a key architect of Germany’s Iran 
policy–497 emphasizing his sympathy towards Iran, and a rejection its perceived historic 
“domination by the colonial powers”,498 to German Ministers explicitly chastising what they 
saw as “American […] antagonism toward Iran and their hostility to […] warm relations 
between Germany and Iran”.499  These were ultimately narratives that Tehran took note of.500 
 
Such narratives notwithstanding, during the early years of unification, the tendency of Berlin 
to exhibit support for U.S. foreign policy endeavours in the wider Middle East region,501 
initially engendered optimism for Iran, that Germany –a historically robust partner of 
Tehran–502 could serve as an arbiter of disputes between Tehran and Washington.503 In fact, 
some key collaborations to this effect were witnessed, including the George H.W. Bush 
administration’s use of German backchannels with Tehran, to seek the release of American 
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hostages held by Lebanese militants.504  Despite initial optimism over collaboration, however, 
Iran emerged as a key, and recurrent issue between unified Germany and American 
officials,505 with striking, and sometimes acrimonious differences, accentuating deep divisions 
between the two countries regarding underlying policy approaches, as well as foreign policy 
philosophies.506  In this sense, German foreign policy towards Iran is particularly significant 
within the transatlantic context, for accentuating differences, rather than similarities, between 
the U.S. and Germany.  And, these differences gained further salience, as the noted “conflict 
of goals between the primacy of transatlantic relations and Germany’s fundamental interest in 
a policy of non-exclusion”507 came to the forefront of its Iran strategy. 
 
3.2.1 Divergent Tactics and Foreign Policy Perspectives 
 
In this manner, to fully appreciate the extent to which German-American relations are 
impacted by Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran, and may in turn, evidence a challenge to 
civilian power expectations, it is vital to both understand the precise manner in which 
Germany and the U.S. have pursued different policies, as well as consider what these differing 
approaches inform about their underlying interests in foreign policy.  As noted in chapter one, 
during the early years of German unification, the United States pursued a policy of 
containment towards Iran508 –aimed at isolating them over concerns including support for 
terrorism, as well as suspected proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)–509 and 
the manifestation of this policy, largely occurred through implementation of a myriad of 
unilateral, as well as multilateral sanctions.510  For the United States, its Iran policy was 
essentially focused upon preserving regional security, and stability, as well as mitigating 
Tehran’s projection of influence in the region,511 by which, the approach found itself largely 
predicated upon a rationalist theoretical perspective of foreign policy,512 in contrast to the 
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constructivist perspective known to underpin prevailing understandings of post-unification 
Germany as a civilian power.513 In this sense, the essence of policy differences largely exist 
along theoretical lines, and disagreement between the two states over Iran policy does not, 
intrinsically, evidence a rejection of civilian power explanations of Germany’s policy towards 
Iran.  In fact, surprisingly, it may even serve to confirm such an explanation.  With regard to 
the question of cooperation and multilateralism vis-à-vis the U.S. over Iran, however, whereas 
the foremost concern for the U.S. centred upon preserving the status quo of regional security, 
amidst preoccupations including proliferation, Germany and its European cohorts instead 
chose a strategy of dialogue, ostensibly aspiring to modify Iranian behaviour and policy, as well 
as empower moderate Iranian political factions through contact and engagement.514 
 
The difference in tactics was striking, notwithstanding the fact many noted Germany and the 
United States shared similar long-term goals and interests in the region.515  President Clinton 
and successive U.S. administrations attempted to highlight these fundamentally shared 
interests –particularly during the 1990s when the policy disagreements escalated for the first 
time– in order to encourage Germany to cooperate in isolating Iran through sanctions 
efforts.516  According to former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the 
administration “constantly prodded [Germany] to distance themselves from Iran”.517  
Nevertheless, Germany’s resolve to diverge from this partner –so central to its civilian power 
legacy of cooperation and multilateralism– over Iran, endured, seemingly “no matter how 
compelling the evidence of Iranian misbehavior”.518 In fact, and most insightfully in this 
regard, rather than merely avoid collaboration with Washington in its policy of isolation, 
Germany instead emerged as a flag-bearer of opposition to U.S. strategy, and actively 
encouraged its European allies to avoid bowing to U.S. pressure over Iran.519   
 
																																																						
513 Refer to chapters one and two. 
514 Reissner, 33-44. 
515 Lane,  77.; Pinto,  103.; Perthes,  18.; Struwe,  34. 
516 Küntzel, 169.;  
517 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford University Press, 
1998), 442. 
518 Pinto,  101. 
519 Ibid., 103. 
		 88	
But what exactly underpinned this ardent determination by Germany to pursue such an 
approach towards Iran? And what does this, in turn, inform about the significance of 
multilateralism and cooperation vis-à-vis the U.S. for Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran?  
To answer such questions, it is particularly helpful to begin with consideration of Germany’s 
reaction to a U.S. escalation of its containment strategy in the 1990s, as this reaction not only 
accentuates Germany’s determination to pursue its own approach, but further highlights 
potential underlying interests behind Germany’s efforts in this regard. 
 
With this in mind it is critical to note that in the 1990s, the U.S. containment approach further 
escalated with passage of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) –also known as the “D’Amato” 
bill520– in 1996, as well as sharpened rhetoric, such as Warren Christopher’s prominent 
characterisation that Iran constituted an “international outlaw”, and pariah worth isolating.521 
The significance of this escalation for Germany was twofold.  Firstly, the bill implied a 
determination by the U.S. to further isolate Iran going forward, in stark contrast to 
Germany’s emerging approach of engagement and dialogue.  And secondly, U.S. sanctions 
could now potentially impact third-party countries such as Germany.522  Bearing these 
implications in mind, it is revealing to consider intensification of this U.S. strategy, in fact, had 
the effect of infuriating German policymakers, and leading both Chancellor Helmut Kohl as 
well as German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, to threaten, in person, “sharp retaliatory 
measures” against Washington, provided the Act’s sanctions were applied to German firms.523 
In the eyes of Germany, the ILSA was “extraterritorial” in its application, and Germany, in 
partnership with its European allies, even sought legal arbitration with the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) before reaching eventual resolution of the matter with Washington 
personally.524 
 
Accordingly, and notwithstanding the patent transatlantic disagreements that came with it, 
“Germany’s fundamental interest in a policy of non-exclusion”,525 or Nichtausgrenzen,526 was 
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consistently maintained, or at most, marginally reformulated, in its Iran policy.  In this 
manner, it is particularly revealing that implementation of the ILSA, in fact resulted in a 
marked increase of Germany’s trade and commercial relations with Iran –in clear defiance of 
its core, multilateral and cooperative partners in Washington– and ultimately conveyed 
Germany’s resolve to pursue its own interests in foreign policy towards Iran.527  In other 
words, it was not simply a further entrenchment of Germany’s “engagement plus trade” 
strategy, in contrast with Washington’s “isolation plus sanction”,528 but a clear indication that 
Germany’s subjective interests in foreign policy towards Iran, could potentially come before 
the transatlantic relationship itself. 
 
Although Germany’s underlying interests in this sense, appear somewhat ambiguous, the 
centrality of economic ties to its strategy, in turn, engendered further narratives within the 
transatlantic context, suggesting economic interests of questionable morality accounted for 
Germany’s approach.529  Speaking at George Washington University in August 1996, 
President Clinton conveyed his belief on the subject, in stating that: 
 
“you cannot do business with countries that practice commerce with you by day while funding or 
protecting the terrorists […] by night. That is wrong. I hope and expect that before long our allies 
will come around to accepting this fundamental truth.”530 
 
 
As a consequence, one of the most significant implications of Germany’s policy conflict with 
the U.S. over Iran, is further encouragement of an economic hypothesis of Germany’s 
underlying interest in the relationship, and related suggestions of moral indifference.  
However, despite the appearance of economic themes within this transatlantic context, it is 
also critical to note, Germany’s disagreement with the U.S. over Iran, extends well beyond a 
strictly economic theme alone, and illuminates other potential explanations of post-unification 
German foreign policy towards Iran as well. 
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In this regard, although negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is nevertheless important to note that Germany’s transatlantic differences over 
isolating Iran, also manifested themselves in such a context as well.  In the early 2000s, as 
Western concern and preoccupation with the subject of WMDs increased, revelations of 
Iran’s nuclear program emerged as a preeminent issue of global policy.  Despite mutual 
concern between the U.S. and Germany on the subject, rather than serve as a basis for policy 
cooperation, the result was, revealingly, further disagreement over appropriate action and 
response towards the issue.531  In other words, even when the goal of their respective policy 
approaches concerning a particular issue was shared, and economic interests less readily 
apparent, the schism dividing the two actors only widened further.  While the United States 
strived to refer suspected violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) –of which Iran is a signatory– to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), in hopes of further isolating Iran through sanctions, Germany conversely, 
intensified its discussions with Tehran, and even expanded trade relations during the key 
negotiating years of 2003 and 2005.532 
 
The result being: notwithstanding Germany’s previously espoused “unlimited solidarity” with 
Washington,533 Berlin’s approach towards Iran only escalated in this context as well, and 
bespoke continued indifference to U.S. efforts.  Most striking, Germany’s subjective policy 
positions again extended beyond an agree-to-disagree type scenario, and entailed outright 
opposition towards U.S. attempts to isolate Iran over its nuclear program, despite ostensibly 
shared interests on the issue.  In exemplification of this dynamic, in December 2006, as the 
U.S. managed to see passage of UNSC Resolution 1737,534 Germany assumed a conspicuously 
dissenting voice –despite their ultimate vote in favour of the Resolution.  Furthermore, when 
Tehran failed to establish compliance with the Resolution,535 and the permanent members of 
the UNSC, as well as Germany debated over how to proceed, Germany assumed the single 
dissenting position amongst Western parties, on the grounds that stronger sanctions were not 
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conducive to resolving underlying issues with Iran.536 Nearly a year later, Germany still 
opposed U.S.-backed attempts to implement further sanctions against Tehran for its nuclear 
program,537 and established thereby, a penchant for serving as the lone Western sanctions-
buster at the United Nations (U.N.).  According to some observers, the calculus for Germany 
in this regard is simple: “rebut the charge of appeasement and abide by its fundamental 
position of non-exclusion.”538 Nevertheless, simple or not, and underlying interests aside, the 
implication is undeniably a lack preoccupation with the transatlantic relationship when 
assuming such an approach.  Moreover, the symbolic significance of Germany’s dissent from 
the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom, in a forum epitomizing multilateralism and 
cooperation, is highly revealing, and speaks volumes about the manner in which Germany’s 
policy towards Iran appears to challenge civilian power commitments to multilateralism and 
cooperation. 
 
What then, do such divergences from the United States, inform about German foreign policy 
towards Iran in general, and the significance of multilateralism and cooperation in particular?  
As noted, narratives concerning this impassioned pursuit of policy independent from 
Washington, have advanced hypotheses of commercial and economic interests, as well as debt 
owed to Germany539 –a subject to be addressed in greater detail in chapter five.  As a result, a 
refusal to embrace sanctions could, despite manifesting beyond an explicitly economic context 
at times, still suggest Germany’s opposition is based on preserving existing, or future interests, 
of a more rationalist and materialist nature.  Given many U.S.-led sanctions in the case of Iran 
legally prohibit, or constrain economic transactions, such a policy, on the surface, would 
appear consistent with narratives implying that an underlying trade or commercial interest, 
explains the consistent aversion to supporting such measures.  Importantly, considering 
previous chapters established a key premise that the civilian power role interests are expected 
to come before rationalist, and materialist considerations,540 should Germany’s opposition to 
multilateral efforts be attributable to strictly rationalist and materialist considerations, this 
would not only challenge expectations concerning multilateralism and cooperation, but also 
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that of the civilian power role concept, as an overall explanation for German foreign policy 
towards Iran.  But to what extent might this aversion to cooperation with the U.S. over 
sanctions be explained by non-economic factors as well? 
 
With this question in mind, it is insightful to recognise that core to Germany’s sanctions 
aversion vis-à-vis the U.S., is a quintessentially German reluctance to pressure states in such a 
manner, based upon “historical, cultural, and psychological” factors.541  During the Cold War, 
Germany’s pursuit of détente and dialogue towards East Germany, through Ostpolitik, 
underscored not only a German determination to avoid isolation of target countries in foreign 
policy, but an overarching desire to induce substantive political “change through 
rapprochement,” or, Wandel durch Annäherung.542  Critically, many in Germany believe this 
intrinsically German strategy –initially formed independent of cooperation with Western 
partners such as the U.S.– was essential to positively shaping relations with Eastern Bloc 
countries, and even facilitated the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse –something many 
Germans deemed impossible by relying upon traditional power machinations, or isolation 
alone.543  In this regard, an Ostpolitik-inspired approach from Germany appears to convey a 
cultural affinity for “détente and constructive engagement”, as a key underlying “philosophy” 
of German foreign policy.544 As others have noted, Germany’s pursuit of Ostpolitik, in a historic 
sense, was not only quintessentially German, but further emblematic of a desire to establish 
some degree of policy independence from the United States, in a time and place in which 
West Germany was incapable of doing so.545  Accordingly, such a foreign policy perspective is 
not only ostensibly emblematic of underlying German interest, but also predicated upon 
demonstrating a capacity to act in pursuit of such interests, independent of the transatlantic 
cooperative framework. 
 
As a consequence, there is profound significance in the unmistakable parallels between West 
Germany’s historic Ostpolitik, and what is characterised as post-unification Germany’s 
assumption of a “new-Ostpolitik” foreign policy towards Iran,546 entailing “engagement rather 
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than coercion”.547 Even more significant still, when appreciating that such an Ostpolitik-
inspiration for Germany’s Iran policy, ostensibly entails “strong moral overtones”, far beyond 
rationalist and materialist explanations alone.548  In this regard, although Germany’s 
determination to pursue an Ostpolitik-inspired strategy in this case might challenge 
assumptions of a civilian power in terms of cooperation and multilateralism, the 
implementation of such a policy does not inherently evidence a rationalist and materialist basis 
of interest.  The implication being: although Germany’s philosophical aversion to sanctions 
and isolation is not, in and of itself, sufficient for determining whether Germany’s underlying 
interest towards Iran is more rationalist, or consistent with civilian power assumptions, it 
does, however, critically evidence that Germany’s interests, as such, clearly take precedence 
over cooperation and multilateralism with the U.S.  In this sense, when viewing German 
foreign policy towards Iran from the perspective of its core relationship with the U.S., what 
one sees evidenced conclusively, is a unified Germany, from its inception, acting as a 
determined, and even somewhat assertive state. 
 
Despite a myriad of attempts by Washington to entice Germany to follow its strategy in the 
years preceding Barack Obama’s election in 2008, Berlin held fast throughout this period, and 
never exhibited any meaningful convergence with Washington in conceptualisation, or 
implementation of its foreign policy toward Iran.  Whereas changing U.S. administrations 
underscored an ebb and flow of measures against Iran, Germany conversely, exhibited 
striking continuity across its post-unification coalition governments, by never advocating a 
complete severance of its diplomatic efforts, or tangible change in overall strategy preceding 
Obama’s election as President.  It is imperative, however, to note, that for purposes of 
considering multilateralism and cooperation, following Barack Obama’s 2008 election –and 
preceding the Trump administration– Germany and the U.S. exhibited a surprising 
convergence in strategies.  This even entailed an exceedingly rare German endorsement of 
certain sanctions against Iran, culminating in a 2012 Iranian oil embargo.549 Given an 
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established tendency on the part of Germany to avoid sanctions at nearly all costs, such a rare 
willingness by Germany to support sanctions against Iran during the Obama administration, 
appears as a profound challenge to, and perplexing deviation from, Germany’s otherwise 
consistent strategy.  In occurring as such, despite clear evidence that Germany often acted 
with indifference to its transatlantic relationship in the context of Iran policy, it nevertheless 
suggests there may, in fact, be some capacity for it to shape Germany’s policy toward Iran.  
With this in mind, what does Germany’s apparent convergence with the U.S. over Iran during 
the Obama-era actually inform about Germany’s commitment to multilateralism and 
cooperation?  And did this apparent convergence factually portend a change in Germany’s 
foreign policy, or interests toward Iran? 
 
Critically, in this regard, inferring that Germany’s “‘dual track’ approach of diplomacy and 
sanctions”550 during this period evidences a German movement towards the U.S. strategy, 
appears to reflect analysis from an incorrect vantage point.  Bearing the timing of an apparent 
convergence of strategies in mind, the approximation corresponds to the election of Barack 
Obama, and the winding down of the Bush administration.  President George W. Bush’s 
administration took a hard line towards Iran –which it considered to be a cornerstone of the 
“axis of evil”551– in stark contrast to Germany’s Ostpolitik-inspired dialogue.552  The Obama 
administration, however, assumed an entirely different mentality concerning Iran from the 
outset.  Obama stated on the campaign trail that should he be elected President, his 
administration would be willing to hold substantive negotiations with Iran, in a dialogue-like 
format553 –a development that understandably provoked excitement in Berlin.554 In fact, 
analysis published by the German government took particular note of then candidate Barack 
Obama’s explicit scepticism regarding the efficacy of a sanctions-based approach, referencing 
a statement that unlike his democratic rival Hillary Clinton, he personally felt sanctions could 
inadvertently precipitate use of military force, by limiting options.555 With expression of this 
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sentiment, not only did the Berlin Republic’s long-held strategy of dialogue appear validated 
by emerging political forces in the U.S., but an underlying German concern that isolation of 
Iran could precipitate use of force and result in another Iraq War,556 was significantly 
reduced.  With this sense of validation in mind, Germany in fact increased its interface with 
key Iranian policymakers, leading former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to visit Tehran as a 
high-profile envoy,557 and following Obama’s election, the U.S. approach became one of 
engagement and diplomacy, to complement existing pressure-based mechanisms.558  Thus, in 
reality, the apparent convergence of strategies towards Iran by the transatlantic partners, 
more accurately underscored a philosophical approximation of the U.S. strategy under 
Obama, towards that of Germany’s, rather than the other way around.  In this manner, 
although more deeply embracing a dual track approach might imply a shift in Germany’s 
strategy on the surface, in truth, Germany’s foreign policy efforts merely entailed an 
intensification of its existing dialogue and diplomacy, rather than indicated a reduction in such 
efforts, occasional sanctions notwithstanding. 
 
In exemplification of this dynamic, when asked in the Bundestag “what interests the 
government is pursuing” by a perceived movement towards entertaining sanctions during the 
Obama era, the reply was “to move Iran back to the negotiating table, to reach a diplomatic 
solution.”559  In this manner, Germany appeared more willing to entertain implementation of 
sanctions and embargoes of oil, amidst what they viewed as an administration in Washington 
more closely aligned with its interests, and not aspiring to wholeheartedly isolate Iran, but 
rather, to surgically pressure Tehran towards further negotiation, and a prevention of non-
diplomatic alternatives.  In other words, it was a convergence predicated upon Germany’s 
perception of cooperation uniquely beneficial to its own interests, including the prevention of 
an escalation capable of impacting economic and non-economic interests alike.  After all, post-
unification Germany had demonstrated a willingness to apply sanctions in a myriad of other 
instances, ranging from calls by Kohl for sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro,560 to 
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Merkel’s coalition government advocating sanctions against North Korea.561  Accordingly, an 
aversion to Iran sanctions is less emblematic of opposition to sanctions per se, and more 
indicative of a German determination to sustain a policy of dialogue and Nichtausgrenzung in its 
foreign policy toward Iran, even provided this challenges multilateral cooperation with the 
U.S. 
 
3.2.2 A First Instance of German Foreign Policy Assertiveness 
Toward the U.S. 
 
The significance of Germany’s determination to forge its own policy towards Iran in the post-
unification era, not only captures it behaving as a unilaterally capable, foreign policy actor, 
but critically, demonstrates a key, initial instance of German foreign policy independence from 
the U.S.  Presently, literature, and even official German policy documents, characterise 
Schröder’s disinclination to support a U.S. invasion of Iraq as a “first strong sign of foreign 
policy independence” from the U.S.562  However, this distinctive German strategy towards 
Iran, emerging in clear contrast and defiance of its transatlantic relationship in the early years 
of unification, evidences German foreign policy independence vis-à-vis the U.S. occurred far 
earlier than currently accepted.  Although an appearance of convergences emerged between 
Germany and the U.S. during the Obama era, these policy approximations are not, in fact, 
attributable to any meaningful change in Germany’s strategy or interest, but instead serve to 
further validate German interest in Iran relations beyond the scope of multilateralism and 
cooperation with the U.S.  This is further bolstered by the manner in which Germany’s 
differences with the U.S. over Iran strategy were evidenced to increase under the Trump 
administration.  Accordingly, with regards to the transatlantic intersection of German foreign 
policy toward Iran, it would appear expectations of Germany’s commitment to a cooperative 
facet of the civilian power role concept is far from confirmed, and, in fact, greatly challenged.  
With this in mind, it is essential to turn consideration towards Germany’s other key 
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relationships in the context of Iran, to see if this challenge extends beyond the U.S. context 
alone. 
 
3.3 German and European Unity Over Iran? 
 
Having demonstrated in the transatlantic context that Germany is capable of pursuing a 
foreign policy towards Iran which challenges civilian power assumptions of cooperation and 
multilateralism, it now becomes essential to consider another key relationship in this context: 
the E.U.  As noted in chapter one, German foreign policy is largely assumed within existing 
literature, to fall under the auspices of multilateralism with the European Union,563 and 
narratives within German policy documents reference Iran as a key realm of collaboration for 
E.U. member states.564 In this regard, although one aspect of Germany’s core, cooperative and 
multilateral relationships was not evidenced to meaningfully affect its foreign policy towards 
Iran, expectations are particularly high concerning cooperation and multilateralism with 
Europe.  Moreover, if Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran –despite underscoring a 
quintessentially German strategy– is truly emblematic of collective European policy efforts, to 
what extent is a bilateral level of investigation truly necessary, or even legitimate?  With such 
questions in mind, analysis of European intersections with the relationship are paramount, not 
only for determining whether civilian power assumptions of multilateralism and cooperation 
can, in fact, explain Germany’s relationship with Iran, but also, for confirming the particular 
legitimacy of the approach envisaged in this thesis. 
 
3.3.1 European Cooperation and Germany’s Civilian Power 
Identity 
 
In order to address these questions, however, it is firstly essential to appreciate that following 
the Second World War, multilateralism vis-à-vis Europe became accepted as a central 
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“normative value”,565 or “value informing”566 feature of German foreign policy.  The resulting 
establishment of an “identity around a European vocation”,567 in turn, was understood to 
constitute a fundamental basis of interest for Germany, leading former Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl to posit: “German interests [occur] self-evidently within the framework of our European 
responsibility.”568  Indeed, a European identity, and related interest, not only commanded 
public respect, but led to consensus across party lines in the Bundestag.569  The resulting 
“culture of restraint”, and “leadership avoidance reflex” in German foreign policy efforts,570 
accordingly meant for many, that Germany’s desire for European cooperation and 
multilateralism represented an inherent, and arguably, most central aspect of Germany’s post-
war foreign policy identity as a civilian power.571 Although notable differences between 
Germany and other E.U. states have occurred at times, Germany’s dedication to European 
cooperation and multilateralism, as an ostensible civilian power, is considered most discernible 
in the realm of foreign and security policies.572 In this manner, unilateral German foreign 
policy efforts toward Iran, at the expense of collective European initiatives, would present a 
particularly severe challenge to assumptions of post-unification German foreign policy, 
identity, and interest, as a civilian power. 
 
3.3.2 An Emerging “European” Approach Toward Iran? 
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With these premises in mind, ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992573 –which aspired to 
forge a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)574 by all member states– appeared as a 
significant development, both with respect to Germany’s assumed interest in post-unification 
policy collaboration with Europe, and the future of German foreign policy toward Iran itself.  
For a Germany ostensibly committed to furthering European cooperation in its foreign policy, 
such events suggested the increasing likelihood that Germany would pursue its relationship 
with Iran, within a largely European effort.  Indeed, features of German foreign policy toward 
Iran have, in turn, led many to frame the relationship as a component of “European” 
relations,575 in which Germany, albeit prominent, is often assumed preoccupied with, or 
potentially subservient to, supranational considerations in its diplomatic endeavours.576  As a 
result, some have posited European interests constitute a fundamental aspect of Germany’s 
interest formation in Iran relations, by which a perceived willingness to collaborate with E.U. 
states over Iran, supposedly evidences both Germany’s interest in further integration, as well 
as prioritisation of normative considerations in the implementation of its foreign policy.577 
 
Regardless of whether a civilian power commitment to European multilateralism and 
cooperation can account for Germany’s behaviour in this case, it is well evidenced that Iran 
constituted an original test case for collective foreign policy action of the ascendant E.U.  The 
E.U., as demonstrated by its foreign policy integration efforts, such as the CFSP and other 
mechanisms, sought not only to emerge as a central advocate for normative-based foreign 
policy,578 and “non-proliferation” globally,579 but above all, and through such advocacies, it 
aimed to establish its competency as a global political actor, proportional to its economic 
influence.580  Meanwhile, Iran’s role as a suspected proliferator of WMDs, and a major 
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preoccupation for U.S. policymakers, made them an ideal goal for any state, or collection of 
states, desiring to establish their credentials as a capable actor and negotiator.  With these 
factors in mind, as stated by a key figure in Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time: 
“EU involvement in […] talks with Iran [was] an example for the Union’s ambition to 
become involved in big issues.”581 
 
To bring such goals to fruition, however, leveraging existing relationship networks with 
countries or regions of policy interest remained essential.582  Considering Germany had 
already cultivated robust ties with Iran, Berlin was well positioned to spearhead E.U. policy 
endeavours in the region, and going forward, Germany could serve as a preeminent liaison 
between Europe and Iran.  This similarly meant, however, that Germany held many of the 
E.U.’s cards concerning Iran, and would wield significant influence over the design and 
implementation of an ostensibly “European” policy.  In this manner, if one is to establish 
confidence that Germany’s commitment to European cooperation and multilateralism remains 
a factor behind its policy towards Iran, this necessitates establishing Germany’s interests and 
policy efforts are at least consistent with the E.U.’s, if not ultimately subservient to them.  
Conversely, if Germany’s interests appear to exist beyond the explanatory capacity of E.U. 
interests, this would downgrade confidence in European cooperation as a key influence upon 
German policy efforts toward Iran. 
 
3.3.3 Whose Policy and Interests? 
 
With this in mind, it is imperative to recognise the official establishment of a “dialogue” 
approach with Tehran, resulted from the European Council’s 1992 Edinburgh meeting, in 
which E.U. members collectively espoused a desire for such a strategy, “given Iran’s 
importance in the region.”583  In this manner, it would appear on the surface, that a dialogue-
based policy, albeit based upon a quintessentially German strategy, is nevertheless consistent 
with European interests.  Of profound significance, however, the E.U.’s official decision to 
pursue this approach, is attributed within literature to German inspiration for “Europe’s” 
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strategy,584 and statements in the Bundestag have explicitly declared this as first and foremost 
Germany’s policy.585  Accordingly, the parallels between German and E.U. policy appears less 
coincidental, and more indicative of Germany’s noted position as both the central player, and 
lead architect of E.U. policy towards Iran.586 Although the E.U. desired to pursue foreign 
policy issues beyond the European realm, the specific manner in which dialogue with Iran 
emerged as a preeminent policy initiative by Europe, appears largely consistent with an 
“agenda-setting”587 approach by Germany towards the E.U.  This interpretation is further 
bolstered, not only by Germany’s emergence as the central advocate for developing and 
sustaining Iran relations –even when other E.U. states dissented– 588 but in the prescription of 
an Ostpolitik-inspired strategy, which as noted earlier in this chapter, is conducive to 
Germany’s subjective foreign policy interests towards Iran. 
 
On this note, it is illuminating to consider that when German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher made a high-profile trip to Tehran in 1991, preceding the Edinburgh declaration, 
the event’s narrative and implication was clear: multilateral backing or not, going forward, 
Germany aspired to develop relations with Iran according to this strategy.589 In this sense, 
Edinburgh merely served to upload and “embe[d] Germany’s Iran policy in the EU’s […] 
Common Foreign and Security Policy”,590  and given the allegedly European policy, from its 
inception, approximated Germany’s previously articulated strategy towards Tehran, this fails, 
in and of itself, to evidence multilateral compromise or subservience by Berlin.  Such 
behaviour, however, similarly does not refute civilian power interest as a multilateral and 
cooperative actor vis-à-vis Europe in this case.  As Phillip Gordon argues, “if Germany is to 
remain a civilian power, it will have to convince others to be ‘more like Germany’ and to 
convince them that compromise, multilateralism and civilian solutions are always best.”591  
Bearing this in mind, convincing Europe to approximate its position could, in fact, serve to 
affirm a civilian power commitment.  Accordingly, for purposes of assessing the extent to 
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which multilateral assumptions of a civilian power Germany are apparent in this case, this in 
turn, necessitates considering a fundamental question: to what extent do shared policy 
positions between Germany and Europe towards Iran, factually evidence any German 
convergences with Europe, as opposed to a mere European convergence upon Germany’s 
subjective policy interests? 
 
3.3.4 Leveraging Cooperation  
 
In regard to this question, amidst E.U. backing for Germany’s foreign policy approach 
towards Iran, it is of little surprise that following Edinburgh, a myriad of cooperative efforts 
between Germany and other E.U. members occurred.  When the U.S. attempted to 
implement sanctions against German firms in accordance with the ILSA, Germany’s reliance 
upon a unified European position was instrumental to the continuation of its policy, by having 
the European Union collectively declare such acts extraterritorial and illegal.592  Critically, 
however, central to European opposition on this matter, were narratives emergent from 
German members of the European Parliament (EP), including Peter Kittelmann –a member 
of the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU)– who actively sought “to enlist the 
support” of the E.U.’s robust institutional mechanisms, and proclaimed that any hesitation 
would call into question the E.U.’s ability to act in the face of U.S. pressure.593  Given the 
E.U. was determined to establish itself as a capable actor, the characterisation was compelling.  
The E.U. chose to present a united front with Germany in this case, and the European 
Commission prepared to sue the U.S. over proposed sanctions.594 As in all litigation, 
presenting a unified front through class action tends to pose a more formidable claim, and 
unity and collaboration bore fruit for Berlin, resulting in a legal settlement between the U.S. 
and E.U. members concerning the issue of sanctions.  In other words, collaboration both 
occurred, and facilitated resolution of Germany’s subjective interests.  This makes the issue 
more challenging, as beneficial foreign policy outcomes for Germany regarding Iran in a 
multilateral format, not only insufficiently establishes multilateralism as a shaper of Germany’s 
approach, but may even evidence a profoundly self-serving, and unilateral disposition. 
																																																						
592 Struwe,  34-35. 
593 Mousavian, 72. 
594 Pinto,  105. 
		 103	
 
In this manner, a key question is whether Germany’s ability to leverage collaboration with 
E.U. members toward Iran, entails deliberate efforts to serve its personal interests.  If so, this 
suggests a subservience of European policy to Germany’s in the case of Iran, and this would 
in turn, lower confidence that German collaboration with the E.U. over Iran evidences a 
civilian power commitment to multilateralism and cooperation.  On the other hand, 
confirming such a commitment, amidst the existence of inherent benefits for Germany, 
necessitates demonstrating Germany’s position serves the benefit of multilateral and 
cooperative ends, rather than merely its own.  Helpfully, in this regard, consideration of 
German and European positions regarding Iran’s targeting of opposition figures in Europe, 
remains an illuminating case for addressing Germany’s willingness to adjust its policy 
interests, and converge, for cooperative ends. 
 
3.3.5 German and European Disunity Over Iran 
 
Following Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iranian intelligence and security forces began 
targeting opposition figures in Europe.595  Although by the time of German unification, this 
behaviour was hardly a new phenomenon, the targeting of opposition figures markedly 
escalated around German unification, with over a dozen opposition figures assassinated in 
Europe between the latter part of the 1980s and 1990s.596  This issue was of significant 
transnational controversy for European states, and given a key legitimizing factor for a 
dialogue-based approach by the E.U., was that Iran appeared destined for “moderation” in its 
behaviour following the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khomeini, and the ascendency of 
Iranian President Rafsanjani,597 an escalation in Iran’s targeting of opposition groups on 
European soil presented a crucial challenge for Europe’s strategy.  Moreover, Iranian security 
and intelligence officials were said to be using their embassy in Germany as a headquarters for 
these European operations, including the cross-border assassination of former Iranian 
Minister Reza Mazlouman in Paris.598 In this regard, such high-profile assassinations, 
transcending European borders, necessitated collaboration between Germany and other E.U. 
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states.  Yet, despite efforts by authorities from other E.U. countries to develop a unified 
approach with Germany, no collaborative enforcement mechanism emerged, and member 
states “ultimately chose to deal with the problem on a unilateral basis.”599 Of profound 
significance, key to this disunity, was not simply a determination on the part of coalition 
governments in Germany to avoid taking meaningful action against Iran and its intelligence 
officials –despite cognizance of alleged misdeeds– but a further willingness by Germany to 
engage in friendly bilateral talks with Iran’s top intelligence official at the time, who 
previously boasted of Iran’s targeting of opposition figures in Europe.600  Although the high-
profile nature of Iranian opposition targeting engendered negative public opinion in Germany, 
and led critics of the coalition government to call for renewed efforts to crack down on Iran,601 
there was, nevertheless, no meaningful action taken at the time despite espousal of outrage.602  
The result was an emboldened Iran that markedly increased its targeting of opposition figures 
thereafter,603 while Germany’s coalition government continued to defend its bilateral basis of 
dialogue with Iranian intelligence officials.604  In this manner, optics aside, Germany’s 
behaviour on the matter evidenced a clear preference for sustaining its policy bilaterally, when 
presented with opportunities to instead, demonstrate solidarity with key European allies. 
 
Particularly illustrative of this dynamic, in September 1992, two assassins stormed the Berlin 
restaurant Mykonos, killing four members of the Kurdistan Party of Iran (KDPI), including its 
exiled Secretary-General.605 Although some within German opposition parties were eager to 
capitalise upon the emerging controversy, leading a Social Democratic Party (SPD) member 
to even argue, “should Iran’s interference in the Mykonos murders be proven, political 
relations must end”,606 amazingly, the mainstream position, transcending party lines, 
underscored Germany’s determination to sustain a form of dialogue, despite the highly 
inflammatory nature of Iranian government culpability in assassinations on German soil.  This 
position is captured well by a statement from Dieter Scheuer, a Green Party official, and 
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member of the opposition at the time, who noted, “no one wants the complete severance of 
diplomatic relations […] reduc[ing] [relations] to a minimum […] is necessary [simply] as a 
diplomatic gesture.”607 In other words, the mainstream German political reaction to a worst-
case scenario of clear Iranian responsibility for assassinations on German soil, was one of 
symbolic protest, rather than meaningful reconsideration of a long-standing German policy 
approach. 
 
Indeed, by 1997, not only had legal proceedings in Berlin established Iranian culpability, but 
the central figure of Germany’s bilateral discussions with Iranian intelligence officials, Ali 
Fallahian, was directly implicated, along with other senior Iranian officials.608 Following these 
revelations, and speaking on behalf of the E.U., the European Union President not only 
denounced Iran and its actions, but called for a suspension of the ministerial visits central to 
its dialogue-based approach, amidst wider questions regarding the viability of Europe’s Iran 
policy going forward.609 In this sense, the narrative at the supranational, European level, 
subtly, but surely, shifted towards questions regarding faith in the German-designed strategy 
towards Iran.  The European Council’s rhetoric was harsh, leading to a conclusion that “there 
is no basis for the continuation of the Critical Dialogue between the European Union and 
Iran.”610 Meanwhile, some of Germany’s E.U. partners explicitly questioned the efficacy of 
Germany’s strategy, with then Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini concluding Mykonos 
evidenced a dialogue-based policy towards Iran was a failure, and “proved not to be 
successful”.611 
 
Insightfully, however, although then Iranian Ambassador to Germany, Seyyed Mousavian, 
argued that “when the court in Berlin pronounced its verdict, there followed the most serious 
disruption, which had ever taken place in relations between Iran and Germany”,612 in truth, 
evidence shows doubts about a dialogue-based policy, and relations with Iran, largely 
emerged from Germany’s European partners, rather than Germany’s coalition government or 
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opposition parties.  Not only had the Kohl-led German government hoped that a reduction of 
ties would never occur, but when it became necessary to implement the symbolic reduction in 
ties following the court ruling, Germany nevertheless still conspicuously expressed a desire to 
maintain contact, albeit on a reduced level for the time being.613  In stark contrast to the 
position of many of its European partners, Klaus Kinkel boldly proclaimed that 
notwithstanding setbacks, Germany’s policy remained fundamentally sound, and any 
perceived aversion by Germany to continue referencing its “critical dialogue” was merely a 
matter of appeasing unnamed partners.614 In this regard, and despite alluding to appeasement 
of European allies, Germany remained strikingly defiant towards E.U. doubts, and exhibited 
a clear determination to protect the legacy of its strategy, rather than contemplate a change of 
its approach for the benefit of European cooperation.  Although Kinkel conceded to 
preferring unity on the subject of Iran, mainstream elites never voiced doubts about 
Germany’s approach, choosing instead to mirror consensus amongst parties in Germany 
regarding the merits of dialogue and non-isolation.615  The implication being: German and 
E.U. differences over Iran policy were not simply pronounced at times, they ultimately 
conveyed Germany’s fundamental willingness to pursue its own interests vis-à-vis Iran, 
despite clear conflict with the interests expressed by core E.U. institutions and states. 
 
This is a significant revelation, as existing accounts have often argued Germany’s 
determination to temporarily reduce its relations with Tehran, implied a German 
reconsideration of its dialogue-based strategy.616 As a result, among the greatest, albeit largely 
under-evaluated implications of the Mykonos case, were both an emergent intra-E.U. 
disagreement concerning the merits of sustaining Germany’s strategy, and Germany’s 
resulting incapacity and unwillingness to partake in reconsideration of its dialogue-based 
strategy, for the sake of cooperation.  In doing so, Germany’s unwillingness to reconsider its 
policy establishes that European cooperation and multilateralism toward Iran, remains 
subservient to interests underlying Germany’s continuation of the approach. 
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3.3.6 European Solidarity with German Interest 
 
As a consequence, suggestions of a German embracement of “European solidarity”,617 
following Mykonos, or a potential subservience of German interests to convergence and 
cooperation with Europe, seem largely inconsistent with behaviour.  In this regard, of greatest 
importance, is the extent to which solidarity, if occurring, manifests itself largely by European 
convergence to the German position, rather than the other way around.  In the end, it was 
ultimately Germany that won in its dispute with European partners, with a mere “symbolic 
package of measures” implemented,618 and E.U. policy towards Iran once again approximated 
Germany’s subjective interests, under the title of “constructive dialogue”,619 following 
Mohammad Khatami’s election as Iranian President. 
 
Following the Mykonos ruling, Iran insisted Germany’s diplomatic mission be the last of the 
European states to return –ostensibly as punishment for allowing its judicially independent 
court to establish Iranian complicity.620  Revealingly, however, when faced with the prospect, 
the E.U. endeavoured to show its solidarity with Germany, by coordinating the return of its 
diplomatic missions, including a symbolic restoration of the French mission at the same time 
as Germany’s.621  According to Dini, and despite his previous scepticism regarding Germany’s 
strategy, even the initial recall of E.U. diplomatic missions from Iran itself, was to be 
understood as “a sign of solidarity with Germany.”622  Insightfully, this narrative and dynamic 
of ultimate European convergence with Germany’s Iran policy, following initial differences, 
appears to endure in the present era.  Preceding the Trump administration’s withdrawal from 
the JCPOA, French President Emmanuel Macron was noted to initially assume a divergent 
position from Germany and other European allies, engendering fear of potential disunity over 
how to respond.623 Following discussions with Paris, however, Germany was able to see a 
position of unity emerge, in which explicit recognition of a “constructive dialogue” was cited 
as the key method for “bring[ing] about the end of destabilizing [Iranian] activities through 
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negotiated solutions.”624 In this sense, evidence throughout the post-unification time period of 
German foreign policy toward Iran, indicates an E.U., albeit lacking harmony with German 
policy at times, nevertheless consistently acquiescing towards Germany’s subjective position, 
and interests.  In other words, when European solidarity towards Iran occurs, it manifests 
itself less in a German preoccupation with cooperation and multilateralism towards its 
European partners, and more in a European convergence with an uncompromising Germany, 
by which civilian power assumptions of cooperation and multilateralism as a central interest, 
or constraint of German behaviour towards Iran, is greatly challenged. 
 
In this sense, one of the most intriguing legacies of “European” dialogue policies towards Iran, 
is the profoundly “bilateral” basis upon which relations take place, albeit “under the heading” 
of multilateral policy.625 Accordingly, although some have depicted dialogue as a paragon of 
European collaboration, and a fundamentally “multilateral policy”,626 official numbers imply 
otherwise, with Germany involved in over 300 official visits of a bilateral nature with their 
Iranian counterparts between 1990 and 1996.627  Whether E.U. dialogue was truly consistent 
with the spirit of Edinburgh or not, dialogue for Germany was undeniably occurring at a 
profoundly bilateral level.  This, in turn, was ultimately cited as a key shortcoming of 
multilateral efforts, as the inability of Germany and its E.U. parties to converge at critical 
junctures, meant “national interests” stymied collective progress.628 But if Germany’s interests 
exist beyond European cooperation and multilateralism, why even advocate collective policy 
towards Iran in the first place? 
 
One compelling explanation emerges from Germany’s domestic landscape at the time.  When 
dialogue was initially being implemented, public opinion regarding Iran relations appeared 
divided.  On the one hand, there existed relative consistency in German political discourse 
that dialogue represented the mechanism needed to induce political moderation and change in 
Iran.629 Conversely, outside the political class, despite public acceptance of an Ostpolitik-
inspired policy, many feared Germany’s approach was overly lenient towards an authoritarian 
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regime, and perhaps insufficient for inducing change in this particular case.630  The narrative 
appearing throughout German media frequently called for a revision of Germany’s policy, and 
the SPD and Green opposition –despite advocating some semblance of dialogue– espoused a 
rhetoric at times, highly critical of Kohl’s policy during the 1990s.631  As a result, amidst very 
real concern over the viability of a policy facing scepticism at the public level, Kinkel and 
others made a case that its policy toward Iran was not only Germany’s own Nichtausgrenzung 
approach in action, but critically as such, a policy commanding “strong support of all fifteen 
foreign ministers of the European Union.”632 At the time of dialogue, debates within the 
Bundestag demonstrated undeniable consensus regarding “supranational European identity,”633 
and the merits of maintaining consensus and cooperation with Europe.634  In this manner, by 
portraying dialogue with Iran as a policy garnering unanimous support of European partners, 
German elites were capable of drawing parallels between its subjective policy efforts, and 
conformity with domestic expectations of cooperation and multilateralism vis-à-vis European 
partners.  Since leveraging identity through invocation of historical memory “in public 
settings”, is recognised as being conducive to the legitimation and “support of particular 
policies in the present”,635 an ability to frame dialogue as an affirmation of civilian power 
expectations, was therefore a compelling narrative.  Bearing such logic in mind, whether a 
genuine interest or not, establishing parallels between Germany’s civilian power identity, and 
Iran relations, served the interest of elite policymakers. 
 
Although it is impossible to establish unequivocally that elites consciously intended to 
leverage a civilian power identity to legitimise the relationship, it is clear that European 
cooperation in name, entailed tangible benefits for Germany, where occurring.  Accordingly, 
and most importantly in this regard: participation in “European” policy efforts towards Iran, 
does not itself offer any evidence that Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran was attributable 
to civilian power interests of multilateralism and cooperation with Europe. In fact, on the 
contrary, analysis of narratives concerning this theme upgrades confidence that it was not a 
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tangible influence upon its policy interests.  In other words, consistent with the transatlantic 
aspect of Germany’s cooperative and multilateral disposition in Iran policy, the European 
aspect similarly evidences a German determination to defiantly pursue its own policy, and to 
seek multilateral cooperation towards Iran, only when beneficial to its subjective interests. 
 
3.4 Germany’s ‘Special’ Relations with Israel and the 
Challenge of Iran 
 
Having downgraded confidence in both the transatlantic, as well as European, multilateral 
and cooperative relationships as explanations of Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran, it 
would appear expectations of a civilian power Germany, in this regard, are greatly challenged 
by its determination to pursue interests beyond the scope of cooperation.  Nevertheless, in her 
historic 2008 speech before the Knesset, German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke of an 
undeniable linkage between Germany and Israel, rooted in collective memory of the 
Holocaust.636 Citing a “responsibility” on the part of Germany concerning relations with 
Israel,637 Merkel’s remarks captured well the ostensible influence of historical and collective 
memories upon present-day German identity and foreign policy interest,638 which supposedly 
result in a cooperative German actor, committed to a process of reconciliation with Israel.639 
According to German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier: “‘with no other country are we 
linked so inseparably through our history’”,640 and this inseparability, leads to a particularly 
“‘special’”, and “‘unique’” relationship.641  Israel accordingly factors prominently within official 
German reports addressing its Middle East regional policy, which not only reference a 
perceived “moral responsibility” towards Israel as a nation of “special meaning”,642 but also 
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explicitly articulate “solidarity with Israel” as Germany’s preeminent interest in the region.643 
In this regard, despite challenges to Germany’s other cooperative relationships in its foreign 
policy towards Iran, one would not only anticipate Germany’s relationship with Israel to have 
a particular influence upon its Iran policy, but also, expect Germany to prioritise relations 
with Israel, over those with Iran.  This means intersections between the two are instrumental 
for addressing whether cooperation and solidarity with key partners functions as an 
explanation of Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran, in accordance with the expectations of 
a civilian power Germany.  However, considering Germany’s foreign policy toward Iran was 
evidenced to fundamentally challenge many civilian power expectations of cooperation and 
multilateralism: to what extent does Germany’s unique and special relationship with Israel 
appear to meaningfully shape its foreign policy towards Iran? 
 
3.4.1 A Conflict of Interests 
 
To address this question, it is firstly essential to understand that Iran’s foreign policy position 
regarding Israel –as characterised by Tehran’s former Ambassador to Germany– entails 
“rejecting Israel’s right to exist, and […] oppos[ing] […] the peace process”,644 by which, for 
Israel, Iran in turn, represents “its most formidable enemy and an existential threat.”645 These 
foreign policy positions of the two countries have accordingly factored prominently into their 
respective relationships with Germany since unification, leading prominent media accounts in 
the post-unification era to characterise Germany’s relationship with Iran as a key “point of 
difference between Germany” and Israel.646 However, despite unease from the Israeli side, it is 
insightful to note that Iranian officials directly involved in relations with Germany, have 
conversely claimed Germany’s foreign policy exhibits favouritism towards Israel.647  In this 
manner, Germany’s desire to pursue relations with both states –amidst the conflictual nature 
of Israeli and Iranian foreign policy positions– has appeared highly problematic for Germany, 
and led both countries to voice objections, as well as decry favouritism on the part of Berlin. 
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Notwithstanding Israel’s preoccupation with German foreign policy towards Iran, it is vital to 
note that in the early years of unification, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and other key 
policymakers in Tel Aviv, expressed optimism that Germany might positively influence Iran 
through its relationship, and potentially mitigate Iranian obstructions to the Middle East 
peace process.648 Given the Berlin Republic exhibited an unambiguous “consensus” regarding 
support for “Israel’s security and right to exist”, and Israeli policymakers were cognizant that 
“across all the parties represented in the Bundestag Israel’s interests and security are clearly 
favoured”,649 Israel appeared less concerned about Germany’s implementation of a dialogue 
approach towards Iran.  In this sense, it appears there were assumptions that Germany’s 
civilian power commitment to cooperation, and the appearance of unanimous support for 
Israel by German policymakers, would in turn, shape Germany’s policy towards Tehran.  In 
fact, there were prominent indications during the early, post-unification years, that Israel 
placed a great deal of trust in Germany’s overtures toward Iran, including its possible 
mediation over Ron Arad –an Israeli pilot believed to be held by Hezbollah in Lebanon at the 
time.650  However, the initial trust and optimism held by Israel was quickly supplanted with 
profound suspicion, following prominent accounts in the German media, which publicised 
Berlin’s role in the clandestine talks over Arad.651  To some in Israel, the leaking of the story 
appeared tied to the coalition government, and Israeli policymakers accordingly accused 
Berlin of leaking it to advance and legitimise German interests in relations with Iran, at the 
expense of Israel.652 In the eyes of Israeli policymakers, the implication was clear: “ 
‘[Germany] definitely exploited the fact […] to explain away the intimate relationship they 
are developing with Iran’”.653 
 
The setback in Arad negotiations, notwithstanding, key instances of collaboration and 
mediation between Berlin and Tel Aviv regarding Iran and its regional affiliates transpired. 
This included Germany’s 2006 deployment of naval forces off Lebanon as part of the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), its continued efforts in support of the Middle 
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East peace process,654 and a 2008 exchange of prisoners and remains between Israel and 
Hezbollah.655 Despite such continued collaboration, however, the narrative had undoubtedly 
shifted away from the initial one of trust and confidence in Germany’s commitment to 
cooperation with Israel, towards one underscoring Israeli suspicion of Germany’s relations 
with Iran.  In exemplification of this shift, Israeli officials, such as former Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Olmert, increasingly invoked narratives to remind Germany of its “moral 
obligation to confront Iran”, while concurrently denouncing “German government support” 
for the trade and commercial interests seemingly apparent in German foreign policy toward 
Iran.656  In doing so, the manner in which Israeli policymakers drew attention to a German 
identity predicated upon close cooperation with Israel, in parallel to its criticism of Germany’s 
policy with Iran, served to underscore a strong belief on its part, that Berlin’s behaviour 
remained inconsistent with the essence of this identity, and related interest.  Israeli efforts to 
encourage German reconsideration of its Iran relations notwithstanding, German policy 
exhibited relative consistency, perpetuating Israeli distrust of Germany’s policy towards Iran 
into the present.657  But although Israel has inferred an explanation of Germany’s relationship 
with Iran that exists beyond the scope of cooperation with Israel, to what extent might 
evidence indicate otherwise? 
 
3.4.2 Narratives of Solidarity 
 
In regard to this question, it is revealing to consider that within the context of its relationship 
with Iran, Germany has never wavered in its espousal of support for Israel and its right to 
exist.  When former Iranian President Ahmadinejad called for the destruction of Israel in 
October 2005, the German response was swift and supportive of Israel, leading a member of 
the CDU to go so far as to proclaim: “a country that wants to destroy Israel cannot be a 
partner for Germany.”658 Comments supportive of Israel, in the face of disparaging remarks 
from the Iranian side, have transcended party lines, leading former SPD leader, and former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, as well as CDU politician Norbert Lammert, to 
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emphasise in the context of Germany’s relations with Iran, that “the existential right of Israel 
is non-negotiable.”659 Moreover, and of critical importance for purposes of determining 
whether Germany’s commitment to cooperation with Israel can explain its policy toward Iran, 
the record further implies, at times, a contingency of relations with Iran, upon recognition and 
respect of Israel.  In exemplification of this, at an inaugural meeting between Iranian and 
German parliamentary groups following the JCPOA, it was stated by German officials that 
despite optimism for a “new beginning”, Holocaust denial and threats against Israel constitute 
a “red line” for Germany.660 This position was further reiterated by Sigmar Gabriel, who 
captured the centrality of the Israeli theme in ongoing talks with Iran, by stating: “normal and 
friendly relations [between Germany and Iran] will only be possible if Iran accepts the 
existential right of Israel”.661  Critically, that policy position definitively strained Germany’s 
relations with Iran at the time, and resulted in a high-profile snub by senior Iranian officials, 
including Speaker of the Iranian Majles, Ali Larijani, during Gabriel’s subsequent visit to 
Iran.662 In this sense, the narrative of post-unification German foreign policy towards Iran 
appears largely indicative of unabashed German support for Israel, in which Berlin’s 
determination to affirm its support for Israel’s right to exist, has even at times, strained its 
wider relationship with Tehran.  Nevertheless, despite relative consistency in words, and an 
effect, do deeds by Germany evidence a real contingency of relations upon recognition and 
respect of Israel? 
 
3.4.3 Words and Deeds 
 
Speaking before the Knesset, Merkel noted her belief that historical and collective memories 
concerning the Shoah and Israel, must extend beyond a mere remembrance, and serve to 
tangibly shape the direction Germany’s foreign policy.663  In this sense, for Merkel, and 
consistent with civilian power expectations, a genuine pertinence of collective memory in 
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Germany’s foreign policy identity, dictates “thoughts must become words, and words must 
become deeds.”664  That is to say, a mere invocation of narratives does not appear to 
sufficiently establish confidence that Germany’s commitment to cooperation with Israel 
meaningfully shapes German policy towards Iran.  Bearing Merkel’s remarks in mind, true 
determination of this identity’s influence upon Germany’s relations with Iran necessitates 
establishing its actions are consistent with its rhetoric.  But what do its actions indicate? 
 
To address this, it is helpful to begin by considering Germany’s reaction vis-à-vis Iran, to both 
the 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin –himself a critic of German relations 
with Iran– and Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s characterisation of his death as a 
“divine punishment.”665 The inflammatory nature of Rafsanjani’s comments, coinciding with 
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati’s scheduled visit to Germany, engendered profound 
controversy within Germany, and provoked scrutiny of Germany’s relationship with Iran in 
the Bundestag.666  Concern over the matter led to an “emergency meeting” among high-level 
German officials on the subject, and opposition groups sought to have Velayati’s invitation 
rescinded following Rafsanjani’s remarks.667  Revealingly, however, although a subsequent 
Bundestag vote revoked the invitation, rather than embrace the symbolic rescindment, Kohl 
and Kinkel instead chastised the opposition in a closed-door meeting for endangering “the 
government’s carefully planned long-term policy on Iran”.668  For Kinkel, allowing 
“emotional” reactions to risk damaging the coalition’s Iran policy was “a differ[ing] 
opinion”.669  Consequently, when presented with a clear opportunity for Germany to 
demonstrate support for Israel in its relationship with Iran, Germany’s elite policymakers 
instead characterised the largely symbolic deed of affirming Germany’s support for Israel as 
an “emotional” and imprudent course of action, inconsistent with the underlying interests of 
their policy.  In this regard, one of the most prominent examples of debate within the 
Bundestag concerning Germany’s relationship with Iran, and its impact upon cooperation with 
Israel, resulted in a clear indication that Germany’s long-term policy interests vis-à-vis Iran, 
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exist largely beyond the realm of affirming support for Israel, despite the espousal of such an 
interest. 
 
Following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election as Iranian President in 2005, anti-Semitic 
remarks and Holocaust denial became standard comments from the Iranian President.670  
With Ahmadinejad repeatedly flaunting Germany’s ostensible “red line” issue of Israel, such 
behaviour again represented a prime opportunity for determining if deeds followed words.  
Merkel’s response to Ahmadinejad’s initial comments was largely consistent with 
expectations, and resulted in a strong letter of protest, as well as the summoning of Iran’s 
Ambassador.671  Speaking at the Munich Security Conference the following February, Merkel 
expanded upon her outrage, and made clear that: “a president who questions Israel’s right to 
exist, a president who denies the holocaust cannot expect Germany to show any tolerance at 
all on this issue. We have learned the lessons of our past.”672 Nevertheless, despite the strong 
rhetoric directed at Ahmadinejad, the fallout from his remarks produced an even more 
subdued response policy wise, than witnessed during the “‘Black Friday’” vote over Velayati’s 
invitation in 1995.673 Naturally, the Bundestag voiced its support for Israel, and once again 
emphasised Israel’s right to exist in no uncertain terms, but analysis of Germany’s actions 
highlight a curious determination to maintain its policy of dialogue,674 much as Germany did at 
the expense of its other multilateral and cooperative relationships.  But what appears to 
account for this German tendency to prioritise through actions, its approach in relations with 
Iran, over wholehearted solidarity with Israel?   
 
Interestingly, on this note, analysis of narratives addressing German-Israeli intersections with 
Iran policy, offers a potential rationale for such behaviour: concern over potential Israeli use 
of force against Iran.  Although preventing use of force is one of the civilian power role 
concept’s four facets as envisaged in this thesis,675 and will accordingly be addressed in-depth 
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in chapter six, it is nevertheless critical to appreciate the facet features prominently in 
reference to Israeli intersections with Germany’s foreign policy toward Iran.  Merkel for her 
part, has stated threats against Israel constitute “a threat to us”,676 implying not only that 
Iranian military action against Israel would constitute a point of German intervention, but 
also, that concern over use of force is not, in fact, an ultimate limitation to Germany’s support, 
provided that it occurs for defensive purposes.677  To this point, for some, Germany’s support 
of Israel with UNIFIL did serve to corroborate a German commitment to cooperation with 
Israel, even in a military context.678 However, German support for Israel in the context of its 
defence against imminent Iranian military threats, appears to be an entirely different matter 
from support for Israel that might precipitate a non-defensive strike against Iran, or collapse 
of dialogue.  In illustration of this distinction, it is noted that for Germany, a surprising 
willingness at certain times to support multilateral sanctions against Iran in support of Israel 
as well as others,679 is explained by its determination to “impose as few sanctions as possible 
but as many as are strictly necessary to […] avoid an Israeli military attack”.680  This sense 
that preventing use of force against Iran is of greater interest for Germany than supporting 
Israel is similarly underscored in a prominent Wall Street Journal article, in which a “senior 
German politician” chose to characterise use of force against Iran as: “the worst of all 
scenarios –worse, even, than nuclear weapons in the hands of a regime that denies the 
Holocaust and threatens to launch another holocaust against Israel.”681  
 
In other words, despite a perception that support for Israel does occur through German 
actions, it would appear the calculus behind such occasional convergences, may be 
attributable to wider, non-cooperative interests underlying Iran relations, be them a civilian 
power-based interest in preventing use of force, or a rationalist and materialist calculation to 
sustain long-term trade interests through preservation of ties.  Needless to say, it is too early 
to establish confidence in Germany’s underlying interests, and explain the relationship with 
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Iran.  Regardless, though, what does appear clear from analysis of Germany’s actions in this 
context, and remains critical for purposes of determining Germany’s expected commitment to 
Israel as a civilian power in its relations with Iran, is that Germany’s interests exist beyond the 
scope of cooperation with Israel.  When facing a perceived dilemma of interests, in which 
Germany feels it must choose between unwavering support for Israel, and potential use of 
force against Iran, the Israeli identity appears subservient, and there is no evidence to suggest 
Germany adapts its strategy for any reason other than to advance its subjective interests with 
Iran.  As a consequence, in regard to whether espoused words translate into tangible deeds for 
Germany, it would appear confidence in cooperation with Israel is downgraded, albeit the 
strongest and most compelling of cooperative relationships for Germany in the case of its 
foreign policy toward Iran.  Although Germany clearly maintains a strong bond with Israel, 
analysis of this aspect of multilateralism and cooperation demonstrates notable limitations to 
its applicability in the context of Iran policy, and in turn, this evidences a subservience of 
support for Israel, to other interests in Germany’s relationship with Iran. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the context of German foreign policy toward Iran, analysis of three key aspects of 
Germany’s ostensible civilian power commitment to cooperation and multilateralism, provide 
critical insights into Berlin’s relationship with Tehran.  Notwithstanding widespread 
acceptance that Germany’s core, transatlantic, European, and Israeli relationships have 
shaped German identity, and in turn, encouraged its avoidance of unilateral interests in 
foreign policy, Germany’s relationship with Iran presents critical challenges to this prevailing 
understanding.  Although instances of cooperation and multilateralism do, in fact, occur 
between Germany and these parties regarding Iran, evidence demonstrates a low degree of 
confidence in this facet of the civilian power role concept, as an explanation of Germany’s 
policy approach towards Iran.  
 
After establishing the manner in which a civilian power Germany was expected to 
demonstrate cooperative, and multilateral tendencies in its foreign policy toward Iran, the 
chapter began by considering transatlantic intersections with the relationship.  In doing so, 
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this chapter evidenced that German foreign policy toward Iran was largely formulated in 
direct opposition to the strategy set forth by Washington, preceding President Obama’s 2008 
election, and following the election of President Trump.  In this manner, the chapter not only 
showed how consideration of the differences between the two approaches serves to 
accentuate, and define Germany’s strategy, but also how this tendency to pursue its own 
approach, evidences an assertive Germany, driven more by its subjective interests in foreign 
policy, than by an interest to affirm transatlantic cooperation.  In demonstrating this, the 
chapter critically established that contrary to prevailing characterisations and understandings 
–which posit Schröder’s unwillingness to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq represents the 
initial instance of post-war German dissent vis-à-vis the transatlantic relationship– German 
foreign policy towards Iran, in fact, constitutes the first instance of post-unification German 
foreign policy defiance of Washington. 
 
Having noted the existence of a quintessentially German approach towards Iran, as well as a 
capacity to assertively pursue this, the chapter turned to consideration of Germany’s 
cooperation and multilateralism with Europe.   In addressing this aspect of Germany’s 
ostensible commitment to multilateral policy towards Iran, the chapter showed that although 
Germany indeed chose to collaborate with European partners on foreign policy toward Iran, 
the approach was undeniably shaped by Germany’s interests, and remained consistent with 
the articulated policy aspirations of Berlin preceding multilateral initiatives in Edinburgh.  
Moreover, the manner in which Germany demonstrated a clear preference for sustaining its 
approach, rather than converge with its European partners at critical junctures, bespoke 
interests for Germany in relations with Iran well beyond the scope of cooperation with E.U. 
partners.  Accordingly, this not only downgrades confidence that an affinity for European 
cooperation meaningfully shapes, or explains German policy towards Iran, but it further 
serves to reaffirm the necessity of considering the supposedly “European” relationship, from a 
German perspective. 
 
Lastly, the chapter indicated that Germany’s determination to affirm its special relationship 
with Israel appears to constitute the strongest aspect of Germany’s civilian power identity as a 
cooperative actor in relations with Tehran.  Despite a propensity for Germany’s support of 
Israel to, at times, problematize its relations with Iran, Germany has nevertheless expressed 
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unwavering and unabashed support for Israel’s right to exist.  In this manner, of all 
relationships said to shape Germany as a cooperative foreign policy actor, evidence shows the 
Israeli facet thereof, has the greatest impact upon Germany’s relations with Iran.  
Nevertheless, it is imperative to recognise the extent to which affirming support for Israel has 
manifested itself in German policy towards Iran, appears largely restricted to rhetorical 
support, with tangible instances of policy action conspicuously lacking.  In fact, there are 
numerous instances in which Germany’s policy approach endured, despite Iran espousing 
rhetoric towards Israel that challenges Berlin’s ostensible “red line”.  In this respect, although 
relations with Israel have definitively shaped Germany’s rhetoric in Iran policy, meaningful 
policy action by Germany to such ends is not apparent.  As noted, German concern over 
potential use of force against Iran by Israel, remains an omnipresent concern for Berlin.  And 
in evidencing that an underlying interest in preventing use of force –for reasons yet to be 
established– is considered more important than affirming unwavering support for Israel’s 
actions in the region, the chapter accordingly evidenced German policy interests towards 
Iran, beyond the explanatory capacity of this relationship as well. 
 
Considering the totality of these findings, although a commitment to cooperation and 
multilateralism remains an intrinsic feature of the civilian power role concept, German foreign 
policy towards Iran appears to challenge these fundamental assumptions, and related foreign 
policy expectations.  In this case, Germany’s behaviour evidences a state not only largely 
driven by unilateral interests of maintaining dialogue, and non-exclusion, but doing so at the 
expense of espoused multilateral and cooperative interests.  However, considering the chapter 
evidenced Germany’s determination to pursue its own approach may, in fact, evidence a 
commitment to other civilian power interests, this leads one to ponder: to what extent may 
other facets of the civilian power role concept explain these unilateral tendencies?  To answer 
this question, it is essential to turn consideration towards other facets of the role concept. 
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Chapter Four: Human Rights, Rule of Law, and 
Democratisation in German Foreign Policy Toward 
Iran 
Introduction 
 
In chapter three, analysis demonstrated prevailing assumptions of multilateralism and 
cooperation for a civilian power Germany, fail to explain Berlin’s post-unification relationship 
with Iran.  In evidencing a capacity for Germany to behave contrary to the expectations of a 
civilian power, the preceding chapter further highlighted the particular importance of 
considering the extent to which Germany’s behaviour in this case, may challenge other facets 
of the civilian power role concept as well.  Preeminent among these of course, is Germany’s 
ostensible commitment to the advancement of human rights, rule of law and democracy. 
 
Although Germany is obligated to consider human rights, rule of law and the advancement of 
democratic values in foreign policy,682 there is nevertheless an understanding that such 
normative considerations remain intrinsic to Germany’s post-unification identity as a civilian 
power, based upon memory of its National Socialist past.683  This, in turn, supposedly 
produced a determination to “‘never again’” allow a subversion of human rights, and further 
encouraged active promotion of such interests through its foreign policy initiatives.684  In this 
manner, it is unsurprising to recognise that such considerations feature prominently 
throughout the narrative of post-unification German foreign policy towards Iran as well.  
Whether it be the emergence of Germany’s contemporary relationship with Iran from bilateral 
“human rights seminars”,685 or Sigmar Gabriel’s comments that an inherent “moralistic” aspect 
of present-day “dialogue” emphasises “human rights”,686 a clear reference to human rights, rule 
of law, and democratisation has occurred throughout Germany’s dialogues and engagements 
with Iran. This has led observers to infer a preeminent focus upon such themes within the 
relationship, and Iran is accordingly cited as “the only Gulf country with which a bilateral 
																																																						
682 Struwe,  10-11.; Deutscher Bundestag, "Grundgesetz Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland," (2017). 
683 Maull, "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?," 56. 
684 Ibid., 56-66. 
685 Adebahr, 44.; Struwe,  15. 
686 Nelles and Gathmann. 
		 122	
human-rights dialogue has been conducted” by the Berlin Republic.687  In this manner, 
notwithstanding contentions that Germany may at times, only pay lip service to human rights 
in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region,688 its relations with Iran figure 
prominently in accounts proposing Germany’s foreign policy efforts underscore a genuine 
determination to advance and prioritise human rights.689  In fact, some consider human rights 
to constitute “one of the most fundamental” aspects of Germany’s relationship with Iran,690 
leading others to further explain Germany’s ardent determination to pursue dialogues and 
diplomatic engagement, as attributable to an underlying interest in improving human rights, 
and empowering “moderate” forces conducive to progress in these areas.691  In this sense, 
given a nexus of advocacy for human rights, rule of law, and democracy is posited by many to 
constitute a preeminent interest of, or leading impetus for, Germany’s relationship with 
Iran,692 it would appear such interpretations validate many prevailing assumptions of a civilian 
power Germany in this case. 
 
Yet, although one school of thought attributes Germany’s interest in relations with Iran to 
these considerations, another has countered German foreign policy towards Iran, in fact, 
demonstrates a striking marginalisation of human rights, with “one of the greatest criticisms 
[…] of” Germany’s strategy being a lack of tangible progress in this area.693  Considering 
some interpret “trade and investments”694 as a more substantive area of development in 
Germany’s successive dialogues and diplomatic engagements, some critics postulate Iran is 
merely “a market worth selling their souls for”.695  This is to say, for others, a lack of 
discernible improvement in the areas of human rights, rule of law and democratisation, in 
parallel with robust commercial and trade engagement by Germany, bespeaks prioritisation of 
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“pragmatic” or “economic” interests,696 and as such, evidences patent disregard for normative 
interests of a civilian power.697 
 
However, implicit in this argument’s logic, is a question concerning whether a lack of progress 
in human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, is indeed synonymous with German 
disinterest in such issues.  On the one hand, a deliberate marginalisation of such interests 
would undoubtedly serve to problematize many assumptions of a civilian power Germany, as 
well as downgrade confidence in this role concept as a potential explanation for Germany’s 
relationships with Iran.  On the other hand, evidencing a Germany dedicated to human rights, 
rule of law, and democratisation in this case, albeit without meaningful progress in this area, 
would actually serve to upgrade confidence in prevailing understandings of post-unification 
Germany in its policy towards Iran.  In this manner, different from existing analyses –which 
often question Germany’s interest in normative concerns towards Iran due to a lack of 
identifiable progress in the area–698 this thesis instead holds evidencing a sincere commitment 
by Germany to these assumptions in its policy, is more crucial than measuring induced change 
in Iranian human rights, rule of law, and democratisation.  In other words, even though 
substantive change in Iran did not actually occur through the relationship: do Germany’s 
actions in this case, reflect the genuine interest of a civilian power to prioritise human rights, 
rule of law, and democratisation in its relationship with Iran? 
 
With this in mind, the following chapter aims to address this overarching question, through 
analysis of discourse, as well as behaviour, to consider the extent to which human rights, rule 
of law, and democratisation, are in fact, evidenced as underlying interests, potentially capable 
of explaining Germany’s relationship with Iran.  To accomplish this, the chapter firstly aims to 
establish how consideration of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, emerged as key 
features, as well as premises, of post-unification German foreign policy, and identity as a 
civilian power.  In doing so, the chapter will attempt to establish a baseline of expectations for 
a Germany conforming to civilian power expectations in this area.  Following this, the chapter 
demonstrates the validity of these assumptions in a wider context of post-unification German 
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foreign policy.  Once evidenced, the chapter will be able to effectively address Germany’s 
engagement with Iran, and to consider the extent to which its behaviour confirms an 
underlying interest in this area.  Ultimately, through analysis of policy documents, discourse, 
and secondary sources, this chapter shows that while human rights, rule of law, and 
democratisation indeed represent central themes of Germany’s foreign policy towards Iran, a 
noted lack of progress in these areas extends beyond policy ineffectuality, and instead 
evidences conscious prioritisation of alternative interests, at the expense of key civilian power 
assumptions. 
 
4.1 Human Rights, Rule of Law, and Premises of German 
Foreign Policy 
 
Before addressing human rights, rule of law, and democratisation within Germany’s foreign 
policy towards Iran, it is essential to establish how these interests are understood to comprise 
central components of Germany’s foreign policy, and identity, as a civilian power.  Given this 
chapter aims to consider whether the relationship may, in fact, challenge assumptions 
regarding these interests, establishing how such interests are expected to explain Germany’s 
behaviour, remains a core premise for the analysis to follow. 
 
In this regard, it is vital to appreciate that for post-unification Germany, consideration of 
human rights, rule of law, and democratic values, are all considered fundamental elements of 
its foreign relations.  Whether it be the German Federal Constitutional Court’s Solange 
ruling,699 or German Basic Law’s explicit requirements,700 wider German foreign policy 
confirms at least consideration of, if not full contingency upon, respect for human rights, rule 
of law, and democratic values in foreign policy.  Bearing such precedent in mind, even 
preceding unification, Germany demonstrated a clear incorporation of human rights and rule 
of law, as central aspects of its foreign policy identity.  In this sense, Germany’s enshrinement 
of these considerations is of profound significance, as themes such as human rights are 
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generally viewed as “ahistorical, even anti-historical”, and imply objective values, rather than 
reflect a state’s own identity and experience.701  This means unlike most states, which may 
embrace norms of human rights, rule of law, and democracy independent of their subjective 
historical experiences or memories, Germany instead forged an identity committed to such 
values, because of its past. 
 
Specifically, in this regard, the manifestation of Germany’s identity as such, emerged from 
Germany’s historical and collective memories concerning the period of National Socialism, 
leading them to embrace and advance a “‘never again’” disposition and approach to foreign 
policy.702  This means consideration of human rights and rule of law, as well as seeking to 
promote “moralism and democracy”, have emerged as central pillars of German culture and 
identity, and in turn, ostensibly shaped its “foreign-policy role concept”703 as a civilian power.  
For civilian powers, the expectations are clear: not only is foreign policy assumed to be 
“value-based”, but “the promotion and realisation of […] human rights has to be one of the 
most important aims”.704  Not only does this mean Germany is expected as a civilian power to 
“strengthen rule of law”,705 and promote “democratisation”,706 but they are presumed to 
“maintain a clear distance from human rights violators” and “never give the impression to be 
uncritical towards these countries.”707 In this manner, for purposes of addressing how 
Germany’s relationship with Iran may, in fact, problematize civilian power explanations, it is 
vital to acknowledge a premise that its “‘never again’” approach to foreign policy, is 
understood to necessitate avoidance of “coddling up to dictators”.708  Given that reports note 
Iran exhibits authoritarian tendencies,709 as well as deficits in many areas central to Germany’s 
subjective interpretation of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation standards,710 this 
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relationship, on the surface, would consequently appear to challenge expectations of a civilian 
power Germany.711 However, despite the appearance of inherent challenges to civilian power 
expectations of Germany based upon its forging of relations with Iran, other interpretations, 
in fact, suggest civilian power legitimacy from such relationships. 
 
To explain this interpretation, it is essential to start with an understanding that ideal-type 
civilian powers, “would promote democratisation in a country even if this would lead to a 
deterioration in bilateral relations”.712  This is because for a civilian power, “legitimacy” is a 
preeminent concern, and legitimacy is predicated upon “laws, institutions […] rights […] and 
on the democratic values that come with them.”713 Given that “democracy” remains one of the 
two fundamental features of the civilian power role concept –the other being “peace”714 – an 
ideal-type state conforming to this role concept, is expected to prioritise values of human 
rights and rule of law, above traditional, rationalist interests, such as trade and commercial 
relations.  Accordingly, prevailing, civilian power assumptions of German foreign policy, 
advance an interpretation, whereby “‘norms define interests’ […] and norms and values, such 
as […] universal human rights” have ostensibly produced a “missionary element”, in which 
Germany works to proactively advance its values –rooted in subjective experience– through 
active dialogue and engagement with other states.715  Taking these various premises together, 
there is an argument to be made that relations with states such as Iran, actually demonstrate 
Germany’s moralistic aims in foreign policy, given the interests behind the relationship are 
presumed to be of a non-rationalist, non-materialist orientation, and aspire above all, to induce 
change.  Accordingly, based upon a non-rationalist understanding of Germany’s dialogues and 
engagements, there is profound, legitimizing significance in Germany’s selection of an 
Ostpolitik-inspired strategy, since the policy is understood to express a fundamental belief that 
“isolation […] cannot influence a target state”, and “diplomacy […] and keeping channels of 
communication open” is the only effective means of seeking change.716  This means for a 
Germany truly committed to advancing human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, as a 
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civilian power, a relationship with Iran is, in many respects, considered essential for 
realisation of such interests.  In this manner, although conformity to ideal-type expectations 
might emphasise avoidance of engaging with states such as Iran, in another sense, a 
determination to pursue dialogue, through an Ostpolitik-inspired strategy, may, in fact, 
underscore a commitment to civilian power expectations, provided Germany’s behaviour and 
interest in the relationship is attributable to these aims. 
 
However, here, there exists a potential challenge to civilian power assumptions as well: 
Germany’s conformity with civilian power assumptions of human rights, rule of law, and 
democracy in relations with a state such as Iran, necessitates both demonstrating these 
constitute leading interests behind its decision to engage, and showing that such aims are not 
marginalised by other considerations, particularly of a rationalist, and materialist nature.  By 
legitimizing dialogue and engagement as both premised upon, and a catalyst for, improvement 
in these areas, an inextricable linkage is created, and the very strength of arguments 
suggesting Germany’s policy towards Iran since unification demonstrates commitment to 
human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, is also its potential weakness. 
 
Based upon these considerations, such premises establish the relative expectations and 
assumptions of a Germany committed to prioritizing human rights, rule of law, and 
democratic promotion in its foreign policy as a civilian power.  However, before turning to the 
case of Iran, it is further helpful to consider the extent to which these assumed features are 
discernible in wider post-unification German foreign policy.  After all, if one can demonstrate 
these assumptions appear true in a broader sense, then it becomes easier to establish 
confidence in Germany’s adherence to, or deviation from such assumptions, in the case of Iran 
itself.  But to what extent have such features appeared in other cases of post-unification 
German foreign policy? 
 
4.1.1 The Continued Rise of Human Rights in German Foreign 
Policy 
 
On this note, and to fully appreciate the expected centrality of human rights, rule of law, and 
democracy promotion in Germany’s relationship with Iran, it is helpful to understand that in 
the years immediately following unification, foreign policy interest in these areas, attained 
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further prominence within German policy discourse.  To Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, this new era necessitated reaffirming Germany’s commitment to such 
considerations, leading to his public reassurance that a newly unified Germany would concern 
itself above all, with “the responsibility that grows out of the weight”.717 This was to say, issues 
such as human rights, rule of law, and democratic promotion, appeared destined for 
intensification under unified Germany’s emergent foreign policy agenda.  Genscher’s 
successor, Klaus Kinkel, expanded even further upon this moralistic foreign policy 
understanding of the Berlin Republic,718 and stated that human rights constituted “a focus of 
the whole of German foreign policy”, leading to characterisations that he aspired “to become 
the ‘foreign minister of human rights’.”719  Considering annual reports from Germany’s 
Foreign Office similarly noted “‘protection and promotion of human rights is a focal point of 
German foreign policy’”,720 it appears Germany’s official policy documents largely confirm the 
narrative espoused by elites.  In this regard, for some, these narratives, paired with 
corresponding policy efforts by Germany, constitute “empirical” evidence that German 
foreign policy on human rights, and similar areas, exhibit “continuity” with role expectations 
of a civilian power.721 
 
However, more than simply representing narratives of prominence within the early years of 
post-unification German foreign policy, concern over human rights, rule of law, and 
democracy, further engendered an existential crisis regarding Germany’s underlying interests.  
This is particularly discernible in the context of Germany’s commitment to these issues, in 
debates regarding use of force in the Balkans during the 1990s.  In exemplification of this 
dynamic, although literature and policy documents bespeak a growing tolerance for German 
participation in multilateral security efforts in the post-unification era,722 as noted in the 
preceding chapter, and consistent with expectations of a civilian power, use of force remains a 
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taboo for German policymakers and the German public at large.723  Yet, notwithstanding this 
aversion to use of force,724 the “bloody wars of Yugoslav succession”725 during the 1990s, 
served to provoke “questions that challenged fundamental assumptions” of Germany’s stance 
on the matter, even among left-of-centre parties, which historically represented the staunchest 
opponents to military participation by the Bundeswehr.726 Following the 1995 “massacre in 
Srebrenica”, debate emerged across the German political spectrum, leading future German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer to implore his Green/Bündnis 90 colleagues to reconsider 
their stance on use of force, given a clear infringement upon human rights and rule of law.727  
As Fischer presented the situation: 
  
“We are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is the renunciation of force 
as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved rationally, through recourse to laws and 
majority decisions […] On the other hand, there is a bloody dilemma that human beings may be 
able to survive only with the use of military force.”728 
 
For Germany’s right-of-centre parties, a similar narrative was presented, and explicitly 
invoked Germany’s historical and collective memories when discussing the subject of potential 
involvement in Kosovo.  Kinkel noted: “in Germany, we also lived in a situation where we 
were unable to liberate ourselves from a tyrant”, adding that “somebody who does not stop 
evil becomes responsible for it.”729  In this manner, notwithstanding suggestions a 
“‘humanitarian’ and ‘realist’” division occurred at this time in debates,730 striking moralistic 
narratives, predicated upon preoccupation with Germany’s underlying identity in foreign 
policy, transcended party lines.  Equally important, public opinion exhibited strong approval 
for German involvement,731 evidencing this moralistic and humanitarian identity held 
particular salience for the wider German public.   
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Consequently, at its essence, such debate rested upon a conflict, and ultimate resolution of 
conflicting fundamental principles underlying German foreign policy, and identity, as 
embodied by different facets of the civilian power role concept.  Specifically, in this case: 
avoiding use of force, or affirming a commitment to the condition of human rights and “rule of 
law”.732 In doing so, a critical and significant shift towards reconsideration of, and even 
“vocal” advocacy for, German participation in multilateral security efforts by traditional 
opponents on the left,733 truly captures the importance of Germany’s commitment to protect 
and advance human rights, rule of law, and democratisation in the post-unification era.  In 
this sense, the true importance of this case is not only a corroboration of Germany’s 
commitment to human rights, rule of law, and democratic initiatives in its foreign policy, but a 
clear example these interests represented the preeminent consideration of its policy efforts, by 
superseding competing facets of Germany’s civilian power role concept (abhorrence of using 
military force).  Despite the obvious conflict between these facets of the civilian power role 
concept, German concern and prioritisation of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation 
in the Balkans case, implies a nearly “ideal type of civilian power in the most important 
aspects”,734 in which “human rights were predominant.”735 
 
Following debates over German participation in Balkans peacekeeping efforts, a “moral” 
approach to German foreign policy, “in defence of victims of persecution”, only expanded, 
leading Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and his Foreign Minister Fischer, to further emphasise 
“human rights” as a source of “political coherence, direction and legitimacy to their foreign 
policy objectives.”736  However, far from being mere interests of a single coalition, or discrete 
period of time in post-unification German foreign policy, from the outset of her time in office, 
Chancellor Angela Merkel similarly invoked Germany’s historical and collective memories 
concerning the fundamental importance of “democracy” and “human rights”.737   This, in turn, 
has resulted in vocal criticism from her concerning the state of human rights in other 
nations,738 and a clear articulation of the necessity for “fight[ing] tirelessly for human rights 
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and against unjust regimes”.739  In this regard, outside the realm of Germany’s relations with 
Iran, there are not only clear examples of German foreign policy which appear to validate 
civilian power role expectations, but ones suggesting human rights, rule of law, and 
democratisation, constitute the preeminent interests for a civilian power Germany, 
transcending coalitions, as well as time.  With this in mind, it would be fully expected that 
human rights, rule of law, and democratic promotion, stand to meaningfully influence 
Germany’s relationship with Iran, throughout the post-unification era, much as it does other 
cases of German foreign policy.  As a result, instances in which Germany deviates from this 
behaviour in its relationship with Iran, not only serve to downgrade confidence in human 
rights, rule of law, and democratisation as an explanation for the relationship, but in turn, 
further challenge prevailing civilian power expectations of Germany.  With these expectations 
established, it is now possible to turn attention to the relationship itself. 
 
4.2 Critical Dialogue and Human Rights in Early-
Unification Relations with Iran 
 
Given expectations of Germany in the areas of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, 
at the time of unification, Iran posed an interesting challenge for its policymakers.  Shortly 
preceding German unification, a prominent fatwa issued by Iran’s then Supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, called for the murder of renowned novelist Salman Rushdie, 
following the release of his book, Satanic Verses.  In response, a joint declaration of leading 
German parties, characterised the fatwa as “a declaration of war against our system of rights 
and values, against international law […] [meaning] the freedom-loving spirit of our 
constitution permits no retreat in the face of such threats”.740 In this sense, there were hardly 
any illusions as to whom a newly reunified Germany would be dealing with in the 
establishment of relations, and the situation appeared exceedingly problematic for a civilian 
power Germany.  Nevertheless, amidst the sense of elation spanning a once intractably 
divided, and now united Germany, seemingly impossible policy goals suddenly appeared well 
reasoned, and for some, relations with Iran were no different. 
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Critically, during the early years of unification, a sequence of events occurred within Iran, 
implying not only the viability of intensifying relations with Iran, but advancement of human 
rights concerns in particular.  Following the death of Khomeini in 1989, and the ascendency 
of a perceived reformist in Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani,741 a palpable sense emerged 
that Iran was “moving toward moderation” in its policies.742  With these factors in mind, the 
coalition under Chancellor Kohl characterised its emergent strategy as premised upon 
engagement during a crucial juncture, in which “the human rights situation” was a preeminent 
concern, and “a policy of isolation [towards Iran] […] is neither advisable, nor promising”.743 
Allegedly central to this policy calculus, was an understanding that “ostracizing Iran would 
only serve to strengthen its ‘theocratic hard-liners’”,744 and those more inclined to Germany’s 
interpretation of human rights, rule of law, and democratic reforms, would be undermined or 
marginalised as a consequence.  Based upon this interpretation of interests, it is advanced by 
some that Germany’s policy in the early years of unification, was indeed, emblematic of a 
German commitment to human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, as evidenced by its 
desire to seek empowerment of moderates, improve human rights, and resolve the “fatwa 
against Salman Rushdie”.745   In this sense, determined efforts from Germany to pursue 
dialogue and engagement, may be attributable to such underlying interests.  In support of this 
interpretation, not only did early years of the Berlin Republic’s policy witness an overall 
“improve[ment] and […] further development” of relations between Germany and Iran, but 
imperatively, featured intensification of human rights discussions.746  With a series of “joint 
seminars on […] human rights […], conferences […] and […] meetings between the human 
rights committees of the […] countries’ parliaments”, characterisations of “a unique and 
unrivalled level of cooperation” in the area747 appeared accurate.  Accordingly, on the surface, 
policy initiatives seemed to validate Germany’s espoused commitment to engage with its 
Iranian counterparts, particularly regarding issues of human rights, rule of law, and 
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democratisation.  For example, in May 1993, with the Edinburgh Declaration’s ink barely 
dry, Germany’s “Head of the Human Rights Commission” of the Bundestag made a visit to 
Tehran to speak exclusively on the issue of human rights,748 followed up almost immediately 
with a reciprocal visit to Germany by Iran’s representative, so as to advance a “development 
towards mutual understanding […] over the difficulties on human rights issues.”749  Despite 
such overtures, however, implicit in these characterisations, was an underlying sense that 
notwithstanding gestures of interest, and attempts at engagement over these themes with Iran, 
differing interpretations of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation endured, and 
tangible progress eluded German policymakers. 
 
Nevertheless, Germany’s attempts to engage on the theme continued.  Between the “Fourth 
Conference on Human Rights in Iran and Germany” already occurring by 1995,750 and “an 
annual resolution” in the Bundestag concerning the Rushdie fatwa751 throughout the 1990s, a 
myriad of examples indicated Germany’s persistence in raising issue with the state of human 
rights, rule of law, and democratic values in Iran.  In fact, these issues, including the Rushdie 
fatwa, held so much salience, and engendered such domestic concern within the German 
public sphere and media, that a cultural agreement between Iran and Germany was 
prominently rejected by representatives of Bundesländer.752  In this sense, there was both a clear 
tendency within Germany to express concern over the state of affairs in Iran, as well as 
tangible instances where such concern shaped German policy, albeit largely at the domestic 
level. 
 
However, despite the prominence of such narratives within the public sphere during the early 
years of post-unification relations with Iran, substantive, or genuine commitment on the part 
of the Bundesregierung, still remained a source of debate.  This discussion was particularly 
noticeable during the early years of Germany’s dialogue approach, amongst opposition parties 
on the left.753 Key instances of human rights abuses in Iran were recurrent, including the 
notable arrest and alleged torture of Iranian writer Faraj Sarkuhi following a meeting with 
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Germany’s cultural attaché in Tehran.754  This resulted in further questions of the 
government’s approach, leading Karsten Voigt, a Social Democrat, to implore realisation by 
his colleagues in the Bundestag, that merely “specifying goals and values” is ultimately 
insufficient, and “[Germany] must make clear to the Iranians that the German-Iranian 
friendship […] is not beyond human rights, democracy and international law.”755 In doing so, 
what Voigt’s comments capture well, is a sense that true contingency and meaningful action 
by Germany, was absent, and in the eyes of critics, the government had failed to demonstrate 
its ostensible prioritisation of values regarding human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, 
as a civilian power.  In short, there was a sense for some that Germany’s dialogue policy was 
“too soft and certainly not sufficient” to incentivise desired changes.756 
 
Contributing to this sense, and although a U.N. Special Representative on Human Rights 
report, spoke of encouraging internal developments in Iran during the period of critical 
dialogue, the fact was, in the eyes of onlookers, “no major changes” materialised within Iran’s 
domestic landscape,757 and “observed improvements in the realm of human rights were […] 
ambiguous”758 at best.  Facing questions from parties on the left in the Bundestag, the coalition 
was forced to admit “there can be no doubt, that the unchanged human rights situation in Iran 
gives cause for great concern.”759  Nevertheless, despite this acknowledgement, the coalition 
ultimately remained defensive of its strategy, and countered “the government has […] 
together with their partners in the EU, undertaken a multitude of initiatives for the 
betterment of the human rights situation in Iran,” as well as actively pursued cases of human 
rights violations with Iranian authorities.760 Kinkel himself similarly defended a policy of 
dialogue, arguing “the ‘policy of non-isolation’ along with the goal of ‘active influence’ 
possessed credibility, given it amassed the strong support of all fifteen foreign ministers of the 
European Union”.761  In other words, with a lack of tangible improvement, and noted public 
concern, the coalition’s answer to such challenges was to leverage its espoused commitment to 
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multilateralism as a source of legitimacy for its strategy, and attempt to accentuate its own due 
diligence, by pointing out that notwithstanding a multilateral nature of the policy, Germany 
nevertheless raised the issue on a bilateral basis.  In this sense, and of great significance, for 
the coalition under Kohl, merely raising the issue bilaterally was supposed to evidence 
Germany’s commitment to such interests, and when controversy appeared on the domestic 
front, elite-policymakers invoked a narrative suggesting considerations including 
multilateralism, shaped, and potentially constrained their ability to change course.  However, 
based upon the findings of chapter two –in which Germany was evidenced to act unilaterally 
in pursuit of its subjective interests towards Iran– one would accordingly expect Germany’s 
interests in human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, as a civilian power, to be 
unhindered, if central to explaining Germany’s relationship with Iran. 
 
Consequently, the argument advanced by Kohl’s coalition appears to greatly contradict 
Germany’s previously established behaviour in this relationship, as well as established trends 
concerning the apparent hierarchy of civilian power interests.  Given Kohl’s coalition 
attempted to downplay Germany’s bilateral responsibility for addressing these issues –
notwithstanding clear bilateral attempts– this, in turn, appears to downgrade confidence in 
human rights, rule of law, and democratisation as substantive interests for unified Germany’s 
relationship with Iran, during the early years of its emerging strategy towards Iran.  The early 
years of dialogue not only reflect an elite-led defence of policy failing to demonstrate tangible 
progress in these areas, but far more critically, features misleading claims regarding 
Germany’s capacity to bilaterally advance these issues. 
 
Ultimately, for some observers, in the early years of dialogue, this issue area could be summed 
up as: “Germany […] tolerat[ing] the differences […] between themselves and Iran on the 
issue of human rights” preceding the Mykonos verdict in 1997.762  Others were even more 
cynical in their assessment, arguing that a “defining feature of this relationship […] has been 
the suppression of ‘human rights and democracy”.763  Such criticisms, notwithstanding, shortly 
following the Mykonos ruling in 1997, an interpretation emerged, that at long last, there were 
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not only indications its policy of dialogue was efficacious, but that Germany was approaching 
a juncture at which the advancement of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation could 
be further prioritised. 
 
4.3 Comprehensive Dialogue and Questions of Contingency 
 
On this note, despite a conservative resurgence during Iran’s 1992 Majlis elections, it is said 
the Rafsanjani years “laid the groundwork” for future reforms and moderations, including 
those of Mohammad Khatami.764 Khatami’s ascendency to the Iranian presidency entailed an 
“agenda of détente and reform”,765 and in particular, Khatami voiced aspirations to “safeguard 
the rule of law and human rights”, with “freedom of expression and speech […] [as] the most 
crucial area of contention”.766  In short, Khatami’s rhetoric epitomised the very moderation 
and reforms which Germany espoused to seek in its strategy towards Iran.  As a result, many 
indeed felt Khatami’s ascendency bestowed much desired credibility and legitimacy to 
Germany’s strategy after all,767 with human rights proponents concluding: “the election of […] 
Khatami was a clear vote of the Iranian people for a more accountable government, the rule of 
law, and against the harassment and discrimination of women”.768 
 
With these developments, and notwithstanding setbacks or controversy surrounding the 
relationship, there was “wide consensus across the German political class” that Germany 
should continue its strategy going forward,769 as some argued Khatami’s election confirmed 
that in accordance with Germany’s Ostpolitik-inspired philosophy, isolating Iran, or failing to 
engage, would merely stymie visibly occurring Iranian reforms and moderation.770 With this 
understanding in mind, following Khatami’s election –and despite a Red-Green coalition shift 
in Germany– Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and as his noted human rights advocate Foreign 
Minister, Joschka Fischer, preserved the existing policy approach.  With a mere rebranding 
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from “critical”, to “comprehensive dialogue”, the new coalition’s strategy ultimately aspired to 
address “the same concerns”, with its “continuation […] under a different heading.”771 Yet, 
differently this time, “human rights” purportedly would appear centre stage, as an even more 
preeminent area of concern.772 In this manner, ostensibly, Germany was more committed than 
ever to human rights, rule of law, and democratisation in its relationship with Iran, given a 
very explicit, increased prioritisation of these interests.  Consequently, amidst the renewed 
emphasis on human rights after the rise of Khatami, in many respects, the years following 
implementation of comprehensive dialogue represent the most critical for assessing whether 
human rights, rule of law, and democratisation truly shape Germany’s foreign policy, or 
conversely, challenge civilian power expectations of Germany in this case. 
 
Moreover, in establishing the parameters for this new era of its relationship, Germany 
articulated a need for Tehran to demonstrate tangible convergence to internationally 
recognised norms of human rights and rule of law, “before it could be accepted as a political 
and economic partner.”773 In this sense, although Germany appeared vague regarding 
benchmarks for Iran’s improvement in this area, it was nevertheless explicitly stated, 
intensification in other areas of the relationship remained contingent upon progress in the key 
realms of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation.774 In doing so, Germany’s apparent 
interests entering the period of comprehensive dialogue implied strong consistency with 
civilian power expectations –where one is expected to always prioritise improvement in 
human rights and rule of law over conflicting goals and interests.775  This point is fundamental, 
as current literature concerning the period in question utilises supposed contingency of 
relations, particularly the “systemi[c] inclu[sion] [of] a so called human rights clause in […] 
trade and cooperation agreements with other countries”,776 as evidence corroborating a 
European, and further, German commitment, to the advancement of such concerns.  Given 
critics of Germany’s foreign policy toward Iran often posit Berlin is merely driven by 
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commercial and trade interests,777 utilisation of such a clause, or other contingency, would 
serve to upgrade confidence in assumptions of Germany’s commitment to human rights, rule 
of law, and democratisation, while similarly downgrading confidence in more rationalist, and 
materialist interests, as encapsulated by trade.  Indeed, in such a dynamic, seemingly 
controversial economic engagement could, potentially, be attributable to good faith efforts to 
incentivise reforms, and empower moderates in Iran, by offering an “economic carrot”.778  
However, by expressly articulating such contingencies and related understanding, robust 
engagement in other areas becomes more meaningful, and in turn, could suggest human 
rights, rule of law, and democratisation are subservient to these other interests.  This means, 
to establish confidence in espoused interests as a key factor shaping Germany’s policy towards 
Iran, economic, or other interests, need to be evidenced as potentially attributable to further 
enticement of reform efforts, or constituting secondary interests, rather than a primary goal in 
and of itself –particularly during the period of comprehensive dialogue.  But to what extent 
was this evidenced during Germany’s new era of old policy? 
 
Insightfully, despite voiced optimism, Germany’s relations with Iran following the election of 
Khatami, immediately presented challenges to the Kohl government’s pledge in its final 
months, that “human rights […] will not be left aside under any circumstances.”779 The first 
meeting of a new era found itself marred by Iran’s decision to sentence a German citizen, 
Helmut Hofer, to death by stoning, for his alleged relationship with an Iranian woman, which 
in turn, only served as a prominent reminder to Germany’s public, that Iran’s state of human 
rights, and rule of law, continued to defy German expectations of progress.780 As a microcosm 
of the broader dynamics at play, Kinkel explicitly stated further relations were only possible 
upon resolution of the Hofer case, yet, despite professed contingency, Kinkel and his Iranian 
counterpart Kamal Kharazi nevertheless pursued robust discussion concerning intensification 
of “political and economic relations.”781  When Kinkel’s successor, Joschka Fischer, declared 
the case’s eventual resolution as a “removal of the key obstacle for betterment of German-
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Iranian relations,” it was implied a long awaited movement in the right direction was finally 
occurring.782  However, despite this characterisation, and a previously stated contingency of 
relations upon resolution of this case, Germany’s relationship had, in fact, already witnessed a 
marked intensification, including a myriad of German “business delegations” arriving in 
Tehran, as part of a heightened German interest in “trade and investment”.783 
 
Concurrent to these matters, Iran exhibited a continuation of human rights abuses, including 
a July 1999 attack upon peaceful student protests, by regime-led “club wielders”.784  Amidst 
the occurrence of such events, themes of “civil liberties and human rights [appeared] on the 
forefront of the Iranian political scene”,785 and Khatami’s espoused intent to implement 
reforms in Iran faced a critical challenge, as a “conservative backlash” emerged, featuring 
narratives declaring “violence [as] a legitimate means of asserting authority” by regime 
loyalists.786  Despite such a tense interplay between these Iranian sides, Berlin was 
nevertheless determined to continue relations, and Schröder became “the first Western leader 
to invite the Iranian president” to his country.  The coalition, for its part, attempted to sustain 
human rights, rule of law, and democratisation as considerations within dialogue, leading 
Fischer and his Green Party cohorts to invite a wide range of individuals from Iran for a 
conference, aiming “to guarantee ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental democratic freedoms.’”787 
The planned conference itself was not without controversy, however, as organisers chose to 
exclude certain elements of the Iranian opposition, provoking criticism from human rights 
groups.788 As a result, despite Germany’s cognizance that its “moderates” were comprised of 
numerous groups, within a divisive and contentious Iranian political spectrum,789 it is 
interesting to note, Berlin appeared to selectively engage groups, so as to ensure minimal 
frustration by hard-line forces in Iran.  The implication was: criticism within Germany, that a 
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Green Party once committed to the advancement of human rights, rule of law, and 
democratisation while in opposition, was now wholly indifferent to such issues once in 
power.790  These arguments appeared to gather further momentum publicly in Germany, when 
upon their return to Iran, many of the conference attendees were arrested, and hard-line 
factions in Iran leveraged Germany’s human rights and rule of law forum, so as to legitimise 
the closure of numerous newspapers.791  Critically, despite these clear setbacks to Germany’s 
stated agenda in this area, as well as supposed contingencies, Khatami’s visit to Germany in 
the following weeks was largely notable for a significant increase of Hermes trade guarantees 
by Schröder’s government.792 The outcome not only spoke volumes about the Schröder 
government’s intent to sustain dialogue, but indicated a relative indifference of its policy 
efforts, towards enforcement of contingencies, or prioritisation of human rights, rule of law, 
and democratisation efforts.  Just as Kohl’s government had previously demonstrated, 
Schröder was also unabashed about sustaining ties, and pursuing robust engagement on 
matters such as trade and investment, without necessary improvement. 
 
For Germany, the mere existence of reformist-minded figures such as Khatami appeared to 
meet its burden of proof for legitimizing ties of a non-human rights orientation.  Despite 
obvious challenges, German policy documents conveyed strikingly optimistic assessments 
regarding the prospects for change within Iran’s political spectrum, citing a “dynamic […] 
open […] [and] in particular youthful –society”.793 As one German Foreign Ministry official 
interpreted events at the time, the Majlis was emblematic of a sincere “stakeholder in the 
country’s quest for democracy”.794  However, in reality, these optimistic narratives merely 
obfuscated a resurgence of Iran’s hardliners, and in the early 2000s, “more than ever before, 
the Majlis had become a battle ground.”795 Rather than accurately capture the delicacy of 
Iran’s progress on reforms and political moderation, the German narrative instead chose to 
selectively highlight positive developments, and in this sense, despite many warning signs, 
																																																						
790 Küntzel, Germany and Iran: From the Aryan Axis to the Nuclear Threshold, 178. 
791 Ibid., 179. 
792 Ibid., 180-81. 
793 Bundestag, "Iran: Teherans Hegemoniale Und Nukleare Interessen Und Die Haltung Der Internationalen 
Gemeinschaft," 5. 
794 Kaussler, "European Union Constructive Engagement with Iran (2000–2004): An Exercise in Conditional 
Human Rights Diplomacy," 287. 
795 Ibid., 288. 
		 141	
there was a tendency to interpret events through rose-coloured glasses, amidst a backdrop of 
public concern.  This decision, however, produced cataclysmic results, leading some to infer 
that at precisely the time in which Iran’s reformists needed advocacy the most, a German and 
European resolve to avoid alienating other Iranian factions, led to a “hardliner usurpation” of 
moderate positions.796  This meant conservative factions, which Berlin espoused a desire to see 
supplanted by moderates and reformers in Iran, instead underwent a resurgence in the years 
that followed, with impressive gains in the 2004 Majlis elections.797 Despite these setbacks for 
a human rights, rule of law, and democratisation agenda, during the same year, not only did 
Germany continue trade relations, but German exports to Iran increased by 33%, meaning by 
the following year, trade with Iran occurred in excess of €4 billion.798  The outcome being: 
Iranian “economic liberalisation”, without a commensurate improvement in key areas of 
human rights, rule of law, and democratisation.799 
 
The ensuing years marked a particularly grave deterioration of Iranian human rights, rule of 
law, and democratisation, as the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, resulted in what 
German policy documents note was a sizeable increase in executions, politically motivated 
prosecutions, discrimination of religious minorities,800 and a general expansion of conservative 
“control” over key institutional mechanisms in Iran.801  Nevertheless, Germany continued its 
robust commercial and trade relations, including exports worth over $3 billion as late as 
2012.802  All of this occurring despite a 2010 characterisation in official documents that Iranian 
human rights and rule of law were in a “catastrophic” state.803  In this regard, not only did 
Germany clearly intensify political and economic relations with Iran before any substantive 
reforms emerged, but they pursued an intensification of economic engagement with Iran 
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during a time in which they acknowledged human rights, rule of law, and democratisation 
faced a serious regression.  This, in and of itself, appears to significantly downgrade 
confidence in Germany’s commitment to human rights, rule of law, and democratisation as an 
explanation of the relationship, and in turn, such behaviour largely challenges civilian power 
expectations.  However, even more problematic for such a commitment, and civilian power 
understandings alike, is evidence indicating Germany was unwilling to attempt leveraging its 
economic relationship with Iran, to see furtherance of reforms. 
 
Considering the alleged calculus behind successive dialogues was “the provision of rewards as 
a motivation for change”,804 one would expect commercial and trade relations to serve as 
enticement, and accordingly, bespeak non-economic interests.  For the Iranian negotiating 
parties, however, discussions with Germany over human rights, rule of law, and democratic 
reforms, merely constituted a formality, because Germany both conveyed a strong aversion to 
discontinuing economic ties despite failed progress,805 and appeared to lack the stomach for 
“us[ing] ‘sticks’ or deny[ing] ‘carrots’”.806 In this manner, Germany’s subsequent 
unwillingness to utilise its economic relationship as leverage for normative interests such 
human rights, both evidenced a lack of true contingency for its wider policy, and critically as 
such, implied a potential subservience of human rights, rule law, and democratisation, to more 
rationalist and materialist, economic interests.  This appears particularly problematic, in that 
as noted previously, economic interests for a civilian power, are expected to remain at most, 
secondary to normative interests.807  
 
Interestingly, the only true example of German policy contingency upon human rights, rule of 
law, and democratisation, towards Iran, appeared in the context of its participation in E.U. 
level Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) discussions.  As party to discussions in which 
human rights improvement was an undeniable precondition,808 this gave the impression that 
from 2003 onwards, Germany’s policy towards Iran represented a “conditional 
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engagement.”809  However, what such inferred conditionality, or contingency, seems to reflect, 
is a tendency by some to interpret discrete instances of German contingency in a multilateral 
context, as confirmation of its bilateral interest towards Iran.  In fact, and of profound 
significance, although the E.U. indeed demonstrated serious engagement, discussion, and 
contingency on these issues,810 Germany itself –ostensibly representing a preeminent advocate 
for human rights, rule of law, and democratisation in foreign policy as a civilian power– 
instead stated that while it “thematises human rights violations in Iran through bilateral 
contacts […] most [issues] become advanced as EU-demarches [or] through the EU-
Presidency”,811 implying true responsibility for such efforts, rests with collective European 
initiatives.  In this respect, Germany’s desire to portray such policy interests as an issue for 
the E.U. to address, concurrent to its unwillingness to meaningfully press the issue, or enforce 
contingency at the bilateral level, ultimately suggests Germany’s personal interests in relations 
with Iran, primarily exist beyond the scope of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation. 
 
	4.4 A Movement Away from Human Rights, but Continuity 
in Policy 
 
This interpretation is further encouraged, when considering the fact that despite clear 
challenges to human rights, rule of law, and democratisation during the years of successive 
dialogues, and engagements with Iran, none of the leading parties within the Bundestag called 
for complete severance of ties.  Indeed, criticism was voiced concerning the state of human 
rights, but ultimately, Germany sustained its approach across a series of both “conservative 
and social democratic-led governments”,812 and Germany’s unwavering commitment to its 
strategy, despite an inability to produce reforms, strongly suggests that in the eyes of elite-
policymakers, the benefits were elsewhere.  For some, the implication of policy continuity 
merely meant Germany missed opportunities to fully engage Iranian civil society groups, and 
perhaps failed to grasp Iran’s internal dynamics813 –implying ineffectualness of policy, rather 
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than different underlying interests per se.  However, critically, Germany’s decision to sustain 
its approach, even during noted conservative resurgences in Iran, raises further doubts, given 
that its policy ostensibly sought to empower moderates, rather than to engage the hardliners 
seen as responsible for facilitating abuses of human rights, and rule of law.  That is to say, if 
Germany did engage with such actors in furtherance of its aims, this might cast further doubt 
upon its policy as a meaningful attempt to prioritise human rights, rule of law, and 
democratisation in this case.  But to what extent did Germany’s policy towards Iran include 
engagement with such actors? 
 
4.4.1 German Security Cooperation with Iran 
 
In consideration of whether Germany’s engagement with Iran involved association with 
parties linked to human rights and rule of law abuses, it is particularly revealing to consider 
Germany’s prominent cultivation of ties to Iranian security and intelligence services.  When 
Germany began, in the eyes of some observers, to move away from a preeminent focus upon 
human rights in relations with Iran during the early-2000s,814 a central aspect of this supposed 
shift, entailed expansion of a “bilateral security dialogue”, with “an unprecedented level of 
trust and openness”.815 In doing so, this decision indicated a different prioritisation of policy 
issues for Germany, including terrorism,816 which ultimately resulted in “a commitment to […] 
international security and strategic concerns rather than to human security.”817  
Understandably, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, a greater focus was placed upon 
anti-terrorism efforts, and international security, however, notwithstanding the increased 
policy relevance of such issues, it is profoundly significant to note Germany’s cooperation 
with Iran over such matters, in fact, predated this trend.  German security and intelligence 
cooperation with Iran has constituted a key area of collaboration for Germany since the time 
of unification, with Kohl’s intelligence and security advisor, Bernd Schmidbauer, making an 
official visit to Tehran in 1992.818  In this respect, since the emergence of Germany’s dialogue 
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policy, there is a clear pattern of cooperation between German and Iranian security and 
intelligence services, constituting a fundamental, albeit rarely emphasised aspect of its post-
unification relationship. 
 
Imperatively, though, by cultivating such an aspect of the relationship with Iran, this level of 
engagement appears to problematize both Germany’s espoused policy concerning human 
rights, rule of law, and democratisation, as well as civilian power expectations, in that these 
entities appear detrimental to the empowerment of reformist-oriented stakeholders.  In 
exemplification of this, it is critical to note, German policymakers conceded, the very Iranian 
security services which they engaged, were the same parties responsible for myriad 
assassinations, and other prominent instances of human rights and rule of law abuses.819  One 
of the key figures Schmidbauer and other German officials engaged with regarding security 
matters during the period of critical dialogue, was Ali Fallahian, then head of Iran’s foreign 
intelligence service, and a party not only later implicated by the Mykonos ruling, but one who 
had publicly bragged about Iran’s participation.820  Although Germany’s collaboration with 
these figures provoked significant controversy amongst the German public, policymakers 
were sufficiently indifferent to continue high-profile meetings and official visits.821  However, 
and imperative for considering the manner in which this behaviour casts further doubt on 
Germany’s commitment to human rights, rule of law, and democratisation efforts in this 
relationship, the wider policy narrative reflected underlying concern that engaging such 
parties, did pose a fundamental challenge to Germany’s commitment in this area.  This led one 
Social Democrat to publicly lament Germany “can’t muster enough economic power to 
enforce a decent human rights performance within Iran.”822 Critics in the Green Party were 
even harsher, surmising an apparent conflict of Germany’s responsibilities, and causing one of 
its members to publicly ask: “why does the government hold confidential talks with the chiefs 
of the secret services of totalitarian states?”823  
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In this sense, engagement with these entities appeared to engender a sense Germany’s 
engagement was antithetical to expectations of a state committed to human rights, rule of law, 
and democratisation. Yet, notwithstanding public outcry, and the accentuation of a policy 
appearing to trivialise Germany’s anticipated commitment to interests in this area, elite-
policymakers sustained their collaboration with Iran’s security and intelligence services, and a 
Green Party once critical of this engagement while in opposition, intriguingly “no longer ruled 
out ‘relations with the secret services of Iran’” once in power.824 
 
For Germany, the decision to engage more robustly with Iranian security and intelligence 
services during the 21st Century, in turn, underscored a broader, “unresolved conflict of goals 
between effective action against terrorism and respect for human rights,” as it sought to 
further engage with security services in countries from which terror threats originated.825  
Problematic for a civilian power Germany, however, is that Iran’s “fundamental interest […] 
[of] security [is] security of the regime”. 826 This means, although Germany ostensibly 
prioritises “a relationship between state and society where human rights and rule of law are 
guaranteed,” Iran’s “strong state” definition of security, dictates cooperation is foremost 
predicated upon facilitating its resiliency,827 and hindering reforms seen as destabilizing to the 
status quo. 
 
With this in mind, Germany evidenced a clear, and conscious pattern of engagement with 
factions not simply responsible for past abuses of human rights, and rule of law, but the ones 
seemingly determined to stymie moderates, and reforms in these areas.  In doing so, 
Germany’s engagement with such entities was ultimately considered beneficial to the 
empowerment of “hard-line”828 parties, while similarly “contribut[ing] to […] [the] 
marginalisation” of reformists.829  In particular, Germany’s engagement of these forces during 
dialogue was undeniably problematic for Iranian reformists, in that there was already a 
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palpable sense tangible reforms would not emerge.830  Then, with Germany engaging the very 
entities suppressing such desired reforms, Berlin’s actions appeared to cast further doubt 
upon its ability to facilitate reforms as a staunch advocate thereof.  Its behaviour, in turn, 
provoked questions regarding whether Germany’s engagement with Iran factually serves its 
goal of combating terrorism and oppression, or merely stands to “encourage it.”831 Regardless, 
what remains clear is: Germany’s behaviour evidenced a clear awareness of, and ultimate 
willingness to engage with Iran in other areas of interest, including with non-moderate, non-
reformist actors, at the expense of its espoused ambitions, and civilian power responsibilities, 
as a committed advocate of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
With this in mind, although prevailing understandings of post-unification German foreign 
policy, identity, and interest, as a civilian power, anticipate Germany’s commitment to human 
rights, rule of law, and democratisation, analysis of its relationship with Iran presents clear 
challenges to these assumptions.   
 
To begin, the chapter expanded upon premises of a Germany ostensibly committed to themes 
of human rights, rule of law, and democratisation in its foreign policy, in order to establish 
expected behaviour of a Germany shaped by these interests in its relationship with Iran.  
Following this, the chapter demonstrated clear examples of how such themes appear in post-
unification German foreign policy generally, in order to confirm the validity of these 
expectations in a wider sense. 
 
Having established both expectations and precedent for Germany in this area, the chapter 
turned to consideration of the relationship itself, and demonstrated that German 
policymakers, indeed, invoke a narrative consistent with such interests in the articulation and 
design of foreign policy towards Iran.  Despite this espoused rhetoric by German 
policymakers, however, the chapter critically established that Germany’s foreign policy 
towards Iran, has produced few tangible benefits, or progress, in the areas of human rights, 
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rule of law, and democratisation.  This, in turn, cast doubt upon its interest in these areas of 
the relationship.  Furthermore, despite claims by German policymakers, at critical junctures, 
that Germany would both increase its focus upon such interests, and critically, make 
improvement in these areas a contingency for sustaining other aspects of the relationship, 
evidence indicated Germany did not change its approach, or enforce any contingency, despite 
a clear regression in the state of Iran’s human rights, and rule of law situation.  In fact, the 
chapter showed Germany actually increased its engagement with Iran, including, in 
particular, economic ties. 
 
In this manner, the Berlin Republic evidenced an unwillingness to even attempt leveraging its 
economic relationship to seek improvement in human rights, rule of law, and democratisation, 
notwithstanding expectations that a civilian power would always prioritise such interests 
before rationalist, and materialist interests of foreign policy.  In doing so, Germany’s actions 
not only contradict its espoused aims and interests, but further serve to significantly 
downgrade confidence in its successive dialogues and engagements as predicated upon 
underlying interests of improving human rights, rule of law, and democratisation in Iran.  This 
similarly means a severe challenge for those to whom Germany’s Ostpolitik-inspired strategy 
towards Iran, ostensibly reflects non-economic aims, albeit through economic engagement. 
 
Furthermore, a clear willingness by coalitions, across time and party lines, to sustain 
Germany’s policy towards Iran, suggested its policymakers determine the efficacy of this 
policy from a different vantage point than progress in human rights, rule of law, and 
democratisation.  In fact, despite Germany’s espoused intent to engage and empower 
moderates, or reformers in Iran, its determination to continue its policy, served to illuminate 
Germany’s robust engagement of the very parties responsible for a subversion of human 
rights, rule of law, and democratisation, in Iran. 
 
With this evidence in mind, confidence in human rights, rule of law, and democratisation as 
an explanation of Germany’s behaviour and interest in relations with Iran, is low, which in 
turn, further challenges the civilian power role concept as an explanation of Germany’s 
foreign policy toward Iran.  Considering this facet of the civilian power role concept, not only 
failed to account for Germany’s policy, but in fact, appeared at times, subservient to its 
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economic relationship with Iran, this provokes a fundamental question: does Germany allow 
its commercial and trade interests to come before civilian power interests in this case?  And, 
moreover, can commercial and trade interests alone, explain Germany’s interest in the 
relationship?  With these questions in mind, the next chapter aims to resolve these questions, 
by considering the extent to which economic ties may account for Germany’s relationship 
with Iran, amidst downgraded confidence in two facets of the civilian power role concept. 
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Chapter Five: Economic Interests and Questions of 
Identity in German Foreign Policy Toward Iran 
 
Introduction 
 
Following consideration of two key facets of the civilian power role concept in this 
relationship –a preference for cooperation and multilateralism over unilateral initiatives, as 
well as a commitment to human rights, rule of law, and democratisation– analysis has, thus 
far, suggested prevailing assumptions of German foreign policy, identity, and interest, fail to 
account for Germany’s relationship with Iran.  In doing so, analysis from the preceding 
chapters not only demonstrated several fundamental aspects of German foreign policy and 
identity appear problematized by this relationship, but critically, that such challenges appear 
connected by a common theme of underlying economic interest. 
 
As noted in preceding chapters, the essence of debate, and a source of enduring contradiction 
within analyses of German foreign policy toward Iran, largely rests upon questions of whether 
Germany’s interest is attributable to commercial and trade ties.  As Iran’s former Ambassador 
to Germany has noted, “all the factors that have tended to create a bond between Iran and 
Germany are linked with strong economic relations”.832  In doing so, a leading perspective has 
advanced “trade interests […] desire to ensure repayment of […] debt”,833 and “commercial 
relations” as the “primary goal”834 of Germany’s policy towards Iran.  Thus, despite numerous 
accounts which posit German foreign policy towards Iran bespeaks a commitment to 
normative assumptions over rationalist or materialist calculation –consistent with a 
constructivist-inspired, civilian power explanation–835 the undeniable existence of robust 
commercial and trade relations has, nevertheless, provoked characterisations that “money is 
behind the German decision”836 to cultivate ties.  In other words, notwithstanding an 
ostensible commitment to civilian power assumptions, some critics argue “commercial 
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interests rather than principle”837 are said to shape German policy towards Iran, by which 
Germany immorally “see[s] Iran as a market worth selling their sou[l] for”.838  This obvious 
contradiction, in both literature and supposed disposition for post-unification Germany, has 
accordingly led to a pivotal question of whether “Iran [should] be courted because of their 
enormous market potential or should […] be shunned”.839 Particularly in the sense such ties 
appear to fundamentally problematize normative assumptions of Germany, and may even 
suggest features of normalisation as a result. 
 
Despite referring to perceived issues of morality and norms, it is, in fact, the very inability of 
analyses to address the relationship from a perspective of assumptions underlying German 
foreign policy, identity, and interests, that has allowed for such enduring disputes.  That is to 
say, the inability to determine at which point a German economic relationship with Iran, 
actually challenges civilian power assumptions, has offered ample scope for misinterpretation 
of what does problematize expectations, or may constitute moral indifference.  Yet, by 
considering this aspect of the relationship from an original perspective, concerned with the 
extent to which an economic relationship may constitute not only an identifiable interest for 
German policy, but also, potentially occur at the expense of civilian power’s crucial premise of 
identity shaping policy, existing contradictions within scholarship on the subject can be 
overcome. 
 
In this manner, the question of whether trade and commercial relations with Iran constitute 
Germany’s interest, and can account for the economic policy, is not only fundamental to 
resolving present contradictions, it is essential for addressing the overarching research 
question of this thesis.  The extent to which post-unification German foreign policy towards 
Iran serves to challenge fundamental assumptions of contemporary German foreign policy 
and identity, as encapsulated by the civilian power role concept, is a question based upon an 
inability to demonstrably show effects of interests and identity shaping Germany’s policy, 
beyond the scope of traditional rationalist and material interests.  Or, in other words, interests 
beyond a commercial and trade orientation.   As demonstrated by theoretical and analytical 
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premises established in chapters one and two, this means if rationalist and materialist aims, 
such as trade maximisation, should constitute the leading interest of such relations, this 
accordingly serves to severely downgrade confidence in underlying constructivist assumptions 
such as the civilian power role concept.  In this manner, determining whether commercial, and 
trade relations account for Germany’s policy, and furthermore, may evidence and bespeak 
primarily rationalist or materialist interests, or a means to facilitate non-economic aims, is 
vital. 
 
To accomplish these ends, the chapter will consider a nexus of both primary and secondary 
source material, to address the manner in which both narrative, as well as action, indicate 
whether Germany’s commercial and trade relations constitute a fundamental interest that 
explains its relationship with Iran.  This chapter will then leverage these sources to determine 
whether this interest, indeed bespeaks rationalist and materialist interest calculation, or if 
elements of Germany’s identity, in accordance with the civilian power role concept, may in 
fact, curb or curtail such interests.  In doing so, this chapter aims to demonstrate that while 
economic relations between these two countries does in fact evidence rationalist and 
materialist interests for Berlin, a key facet of Germany’s identity nevertheless serves to curtail, 
and even meaningfully shape an otherwise rationalist economic policy towards Iran. 
 
The chapter will begin by establishing an emergence of economic considerations as a source of 
identity, legitimacy and interest for post-war Germany, which has, in turn, provoked 
questions regarding the orientation of German interest in the post-unification era, amidst 
competing analytical and theoretical perspectives.  Following the establishment of these key 
premises, the chapter evidences contemporary German foreign policy towards Iran as a 
continuation of historically robust economic ties, in which its economic interest vis-à-vis Iran, 
appears to greatly exceed expected valuation of a market Iran’s size.  As a consequence of this 
curious valuation underlying German interest, the chapter then considers why such valuation 
occurs, and ultimately, demonstrates through in-depth analysis of various economic sectors, 
that narrative and action by Germany bespeak a unique long-term valuation.  In doing so, the 
chapter indicates Germany’s desire for maximised economic engagement substantiates a 
strikingly rationalist, and materialist disposition on its part, albeit one that is, in fact, 
ultimately curbed by a non-rationalist, identity-based commitment in policy. 
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With this in mind, before turning to consideration of the relationship itself, it is firstly essential 
to understand the manner in which economic interests emerged as a core aspect of 
contemporary German policy and identity, and how this may appear juxtaposed with 
assumptions of a civilian power Germany.  By establishing this, and the related debates 
concerning the manner in which economic, commercial, and trade relations are viewed as 
consistent with, or divergent from prevailing assumptions of contemporary German foreign 
policy, identity, and interest, one can interpret evidence more effectively. 
 
5.1 An ‘Economic Miracle’ Gives Rise to Post-War German 
Identity, Legitimacy, and Debate 
 
With this in mind, regardless of one’s interpretation of contemporary German identity and 
interests, the centrality of economic considerations to German policy remains unambiguous.  
From the 1951 Schuman Plan of establishing the European Coal and Steel Community840 
onwards, economic growth represented a key source of West Germany’s restoration of 
sovereignty,841 ultimately culminating in a distinctive aspect of contemporary, post-unification 
German power.842  Yet, notwithstanding notions of power, which may appear more consistent 
with rationalist interpretations of foreign policy, than a constructivist-inspired, civilian power, 
the antecedents of Germany’s economic ascendency is a tale originally rooted in both 
profoundly normative perspectives, and interests.  Conceptualizing economic strength as an 
effective catalyst for “democratizing and legitimizing […] previously […] barely legitimate 
political order”,843 cultivating an economically oriented West Germany held promise of 
bestowing legitimacy to the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), both in a domestic 
context, by facilitating “attachment of […] citizens”844 to the new German state through a 
positive state-society interplay, as well as creating a source of “international credibility”,845 in a 
wider external environment. 
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Domestically, the emergence of a soziale Marktwirtschaft, is noted to represent a feature of “a 
Post-Holocaust national identity […] ‘organised at least as much to provide justice as order or 
security’ […] [and] providing […] conditions […] for [a] Zivilmacht Germany”.846 Under the 
guidance of the Economics Minister, and later Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, a German 
tradition of Ordoliberalism847 served an impetus for integration, open markets, non-intervention 
and free trade,848 through enactment of “a socially responsible political economy”,849 in a 
fundamentally normative sense.  In this manner, it can be said, “German collective memory of 
the Second World War and the Holocaust” not only shaped the development of German 
“institutions and policies”,850 but also the initial economic orientation of the FRG.  Bearing 
these factors in mind, in many respects, Germany’s initial economic ascendency appears 
largely consist with civilian power assumptions, despite the tendency for such interests to be 
considered emblematic of rationalist, or materialist, considerations. 
 
Related to this, in a wider international sense, economic participation was central to 
Germany’s initial democratic development within Europe,851 as well as the broader 
international system, whereby a state once driven by grandiose, Machtpolitik ambitions, would 
instead purposively supplant such rationalist tendencies, as “an economic giant but political 
dwarf”,852 minimizing the temptation of old ways.853 In short, the calculus reflected a Germany 
shaped by its historical and collective memories, in which wealth became sought in lieu of 
power,854 so as to ensure peace and corresponding legitimacy, both domestically, as well as 
internationally.  In this sense, it is important to consider economic interests at that juncture of 
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post-war Germany, as indicative of a commitment to non-rationalist, and normative interests, 
rather than aspirations of power, or wealth, constituting interests themselves.  In fact, it is this 
truth, which in turn, gave rise to the very assumptions from which present-day continuity is 
presumed. 
 
With further economic development, however, and increased sovereignty in the economic 
sphere, West German economic policy faced a changing landscape.  Through Erhard’s 
domestic, Ordoliberal inspiration, an emergent Wirtschaftswunder, or economic miracle,855 occurred.  
As a consequence of the FRG’s capacity to “produce consistent wealth for its citizenry”,856 the 
approach became a paragon of economic policy conducive to “social cohesion”,857 as well as 
“openness to global processes”,858 leading to a further characterisation of Modell Deutschland.859  
Others accordingly sought to mirror this approach,860 in which the once problem child of 
Europe, now exhibited impressive credentials, and enviable wealth.  The implication was: 
provided the FRG could sustain its momentum, nothing “could stop […] Germans from being 
the economic envy of the world,”861 and West Germany’s economic legitimacy, once 
predicated upon its ability to restore trust between its citizens and the state, while 
simultaneously reintegrating the FRG into the society of states as a peaceful actor, now 
possessed a capacity to shape others through economic repute and strength.862  In this sense, 
even if indirect, “power and influence” were now tangible features of German economic 
policy, albeit predicated upon a capacity to sustain the status.863  Domestically, there were 
sentiments of a “proud collective memory” as a result of West Germany’s economic 
advancement,864 and even with German dispositional traits of Bescheidenheit (modesty) and 
Zurückhaltung (reserve),865 an overwhelming majority of citizens nevertheless advocated that a 
top economic position in Europe, if not globally, be reserved for Germany.866 Even pride 
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surrounding Germany’s currency, the Deutsche Mark (DM),867 bespoke the valuation citizens 
placed on economic vitality, and the underlying identity central to it.  Yet, by seeking 
legitimacy via the economic sphere, both the deepening “sense of identity”,868 as well as an 
ability to sustain German legitimacy domestically, and internationally,869 became inextricably 
linked to continued success of a German model,870 featuring economic vitality.  
 
For the FRG, and later unified Germany, the key to preservation of economic strength lay in 
a “German foreign economic policy […] in favour of export-led growth”.871  Given the 
German economy particularly craves exports,872 and is profoundly reliant upon them,873 the 
result was a Germany, for whom trade became a fundamental foreign policy interest, and 
active pursuit of trade opportunities constituted a unifying political position.874  With this 
consensus at hand, successive governments, across party-lines, pursued an “explicit, 
dominant, and consistent tradition”, in which pursuant to Germany’s 
“Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz […] trade is principally unrestricted”, and any form of barrier 
would be exceptional.875  In this sense, West Germany’s foreign policy mirrored a “highly 
corporatist” culture in the domestic sphere,876 in which interests of policymakers and business 
leaders aligned, particularly within the foreign, or globalised877 realm of economic policy, trade 
and commercial relations.  The FRG accordingly found itself characterised by some as an 
“extraordinary trader”,878 whereby an alignment of interests, paired with unique institutional, 
legal, and identity-based conditions, encouraged a further deepening of Germany’s trade and 
commercial orientation within wider foreign policy efforts. 
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Critically, however, it is within this very nexus of interests, identities, and conditions, that one 
recognises both elements of a Germany ostensibly committed to its civilian power role, as well 
as one exhibiting interests consistent with a fundamentally rationalist actor, including 
indifference toward a non-rationalist, identity or role concept.  This dynamic serves to 
perplex, leading to questions regarding whether the normative identity underlying Germany’s 
soziale Marktwirschaft is still relevant, within an increasingly globalised economy and 
orientation.879 It similarly provokes consideration of whether a newly unified Germany, 
committed to trade as a fundamental interest, might portend a shift towards more traditional 
features of power and interest, commensurate with its economic position.880  This has, in turn, 
led to prominent characterisations of Germany as a geo-economic power, at the expense of 
prevailing, civilian power explanations.881  In other words, at the core of such broader 
questions regarding German foreign policy, and in a manner that mirrors contradictions of 
German foreign policy toward Iran, is recognition that within German foreign economic 
policy, a blurring of assumed identities and interests occurs, and the extent to which policy 
affirms, or challenges constructivist-inspired interpretations, is often ambiguous.  This 
dynamic is particularly recognisable in the case of contemporary German foreign policy 
towards Iran, in which economic features are not only at the essence of questions regarding 
causality and interest of Germany’s policy, but also the extent to which this relationship may 
problematize leading assumptions of contemporary German foreign policy, which reference 
continuity. 
 
Regardless of whether economic relations indicate continuity or normalisation in a general 
sense, for purposes of analysis in this thesis, it is important to appreciate that the evolution of 
German policy from the FRG’s inception, to the post-unification era, reflects economic, 
commercial, and trade relations, as a primary source of legitimacy (domestically and 
internationally), identity, and interest.  In this manner, and given their unambiguous 
existence, economic features within German foreign policy, ironically constitute the very 
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source of many enduring debates, and contradictions, in that proponents of both continuity, 
and normalisation alike, choose to invoke trade and commercial relations as evidence in 
support of their position. 
 
In exemplification of this dynamic, building upon Johann-Gottlieb Fichte’s seminal work 
from Der geschlossene Handelsstaat,882 Richard Rosecrance’s revival of the Handelsstaat, or 
“trading state” characterisation,883 was interpreted as a key exemplification of how collective 
and historical memories engendered a German “identity” committed to pursuit of trade 
relations.884  With this, an identity, rather than material interest was considered by some 
theorists as a causality, whereby features of a Handelsstaat, such as disinterest in traditional 
power, and the necessity of an “interdependent” series of “peaceful” relations,885 appeared 
consistent with many civilian power assumptions, notwithstanding the intrinsically rationalist 
and materialist nature of most economic relationships.  Further, with identity, legitimacy, and 
interest converging within the realm of trade, a prominent, and widely accepted 
characterisation by “German experts”,886 that Germany is the “epitome of […] a ‘trading 
state’”, in which “commercial and financial roles” supersede traditional power and interest,887 
meant a myopic fixation on rejection of traditional, or rationalist features, provided traction 
for seminal civilian power theorists.  Consequently, trade and economic features of 
contemporary German foreign policy became appropriated as evidence for civilian power 
proponents.  This led Maull, in his seminal civilian power work, to cite Germany as a 
“prototype[e] of the modern trading state,”888 given a perception that “Germans today seek 
enjoyment from wealth not power”,889 by which accumulation of wealth was somehow 
fundamentally about normative interests.  Yet, as a consequence of the inference by Maull and 
others that trade is attributable to an underlying identity that rejects conventional notions of 
power and interest, these interpretations fail to appreciate that although a Handelsstaat is 
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peaceful in nature, the key role, or “‘Schlüsselrolle’ as a ‘trading nation’”, is the purposive 
“cultivati[on] [of] their economic, commercial and financial interests […] rather than 
concerning themselves with […] norms.”890  In this manner, there is a profoundly significant 
implication that a true trading state, is one that exhibits indifference to underlying normative 
considerations, given its primary function is to seek maximisation of a rationalist trade interest 
through material gain, rather than primarily concern itself with matters such as human rights, 
rule of law, or the extent to which cooperation and multilateralism should take precedence 
over economic interests.891 
 
In this sense, although it has been argued trading state characterisations both represent a 
consensus view, and capture the nature of Germany’s foreign policy892 –including with regard 
to Germany’s relationship with Iran–893 the essence of wider debates concerning the nature of 
German foreign policy, nevertheless suggest a “principle role conflict”,894 by which, a 
Germany committed to being a prominent trading state, is not necessarily synonymous with a 
civilian power role.895  In turn, with unification in the early 1990s, the overarching question 
regarding the future of German policy and interest, featured a “core […] question of whether 
the Berlin Republic will be a Machtstaat, Handelsstaat, or Zivilmacht”,896 as these are each, in 
their own way, distinct. 
 
For purposes of analysing German-Iranian economic, commercial, and trade relations, this is a 
critical consideration, as it not only frames in the extent to which overlapping and 
contradictory characterisations of Germany’s role concepts challenge understandings of 
foreign policy in the Berlin Republic, but also highlights that determining whether economic 
relations bespeak rationalist, or materialist interests, is central to resolving similar 
contradictions in explaining Germany’s relations with Iran.  This is why economic ties in 
particular are so essential to broader questions of German foreign policy toward Iran: it is the 
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most salient theme to provoke questions of Germany’s true, underlying disposition, and the 
extent to which traditional, rationalist interests, serve to challenge claims that an identity 
committed to normative, non-rationalist interests, shapes its policy.  With this in mind, before 
moving to analysis of the relationship itself, and bearing in mind that economic features could 
very well support differing interpretations of Germany’s relationship with Iran –much like in 
a broader German foreign policy sense– it is important to expand upon the expectations of a 
Germany committed to civilian power interests in the cultivation of robust trade and 
commercial relations with Iran.  Once this has been established, analysis of the relationship 
can easily reflect the extent to which economic ties with Iran may fundamentally challenge 
assumptions of contemporary German foreign policy, as encapsulated by the civilian power 
role concept. 
 
5.1.1 Analytical Perspectives and Interpretation of Germany’s 
Economic Ties with Iran 
 
As noted previously in this thesis, the underlying basis of assumed continuity in contemporary 
German foreign policy as a civilian power, is predicated upon identification of a “non-rational” 
policy approach, attributable to “collective memory” and “ideological factors”.897 In this sense, 
the civilian power role concept –which is constructivist by nature– represents a counter 
perspective to the assumption of “material interests”898 as the aim of state action, thereby 
“challeng[ing] rationalist accounts” as a result.899 The implication is: for a constructivist-
inspired, civilian power role concept, “ideational as well as material”900 formation of interests 
occurs, and material aspirations, like the maximisation of economic self-interest, cannot fully 
account for state interest and action, because it fails to take identity and norms into account.901  
As noted in the preceding section, a Handelsstaat exhibits indifference to normative 
considerations, so as to maximise trade and commercial relations, whereas in contrast, a 
civilian power implements “value-based foreign policy […] [and] pursues norms even if […] 
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material interests […] would suffer”.902  Bearing this in mind, what is to be expected of a 
German economic relationship with Iran from each position? 
 
In rationalist interpretations of foreign policy –such as neorealism and neoliberalism– 
relations bespeak aspirations of “wealth and power” within a global system of shifting 
“constraints”,903 and “behaviour represents the purposive pursuit of prosperity”.904 In fact, for 
realist interpretations of German foreign policy in particular, “export promotion” constitutes a 
central pillar of its arguments, because “the more a country exports […] the wealthier and 
therefore more powerful it will be.”905 As a result, the essence of rationalist perspectives –
which stand largely in ontological and epistemological contrast with civilian power 
assumptions– see trade and commercial relations as designed to maximise economic dividends.  
This means a German economic relationship with Iran featuring maximisation of economic 
interests as the goal itself, appears in stark contrast to the underlying assumptions of 
contemporary German foreign policy, as encapsulated by the civilian power role concept. 
 
Conversely, in order to confirm civilian power assumptions in economic relations, establishing 
“norms [and] values […] matter”906 in shaping economic interest is fundamental, given at the 
very least, for constructivists, “normative […] interpretations” are said to “shap[e] […] the 
material world” itself.907  Although a state can exhibit materialist features such as economic 
ties, and still be a civilian power, the civilian power understanding relies heavily upon the 
notion “Germany’s defined material interests are deeply influenced by Germany’s foreign 
policy role concept as a civilian power”,908 and economic interests are not simply about pursuit 
of material ends.  Based upon this logic, for civilian power proponents, even if trade occurs, 
and Germany is indeed a “‘trading power’”,909 such material features affirm civilian power 
characterisations of Germany, because “economic means” are invaluable in supplanting 
conventional power and interest, by achieving a nation’s goals through peaceful measures.910 
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It is important, however, to recognise such logic entails specious reasoning, in that it makes a 
profound assumption that an effect of policy –i.e. peaceful means of achieving goals– is in fact 
proof this effect represents the overall interest behind such policy.  In this sense, in order to 
truly establish that economic relations with a state such as Iran affirm civilian power 
interpretations, the key is to identify whether its extensive trade and commercial ties, evidence 
German interests existing beyond the scope of purely economic interests alone.  From a 
civilian power perspective it is clear: “‘norms define interests’”911, and given “identity […] [is] 
constructivism’s core explanatory concept”,912 for confidence to be established in civilian 
power interpretations of economic features of German foreign policy toward Iran, it must 
meet the constructivist standard of “pinpoint[ing] the content of state identity […] [and] […] 
demonstrate its effects.”913 This means to establish confidence in a civilian power 
interpretation of Germany’s relationship, it is vital to demonstrate economic aspects of the 
relationship are not merely attributable to a policy aim of seeking maximisation of economic 
interest, but rather attributable to, secondary to, or ultimately curtailed by, elements of 
Germany’s norms and identity. 
 
Now that both the significance of economic identity, legitimacy, and interest in post-war 
Germany, as well as the expectations of a Germany conformant to, or divergent from civilian 
power assumptions in its economic relationship with Iran are established, it is now possible to 
turn attention towards the relationship itself. 
 
5.2 An Economic Past of German-Iranian Relations 
 
It is helpful to appreciate, long before the unification of Germany, trade and commercial 
relations constituted a primary basis of interaction between successive Iranian and German 
governments.  For Iran, Germany not only “represented a source of top-quality Western 
technology”,914 it was a state considered to lack the very colonial legacy engendering Iranian 
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mistrust towards the West.915  At the same time, in the eyes of Germany, Iran represented a 
prime opportunity for commercial engagement in the early 20th Century.916  In this sense, 
“historically […] friendly mutual opportunism” in the realm of economic ties,917 featuring 
narratives of a non-colonial Germany, seen as indifferent to advancing Western expectations 
of Iran’s internal governance, meant cultivation of long-term economic engagement was 
acceptable to Iranian policymakers otherwise tentative to establish Western relations.  As a 
consequence of this high-degree of trust in German intentions, a quintessentially German 
shaping of many elements of Iran’s economy is recognisable in modern history, such as 
Germany’s attribution as “founder of Persian industry”,918 and German “technocrats help[ing] 
to establish the Iranian National Bank.”919 For an Iran that has paradoxically both exhibited 
infatuation with, as well as apprehension towards, the West, Germany was undeniably a 
unique economic partner.  But of critical importance, the economic engagement was a two-
way street, and trade ties witnessed a meteoric ascendency preceding the Second World War. 
In large part, this was driven by Germany’s substantial, long-term interest in Iranian “raw 
materials”,920 but more than that, it underscored a general ambition in the wake of World War 
One, “to establish its credentials as a reformed, economic power that had abandoned its 
former power-political ambitions.”921  In this sense, not only was the original impetus for 
robust German engagement with Iran attributable to “commercial motives”,922 the narratives 
exhibited striking similarity to contemporary characterisations of Germany’s ostensible 
rejection of Machtpolitik goals, through economic means. 
 
Importantly, this commercial orientation was not limited to pre-war policy alone.  A mere 
month following the FRG’s founding, economic relations with Iran were renewed,923 and by 
1952, the economically oriented West Germany had already supplanted the U.S. as one of 
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Iran’s preeminent trading relationships.924  The atrocities and horrors of the Second World 
War, as well as a reorientation of West Germany’s interests notwithstanding, the relationship 
intensified economically, and narratives concerning West Germany’s lack of colonial legacy 
continued to hold salience for Iranian policymakers such as Mohammed Mossadegh, who 
specifically sought German oil experts “to replace British experts” for proposed oil 
nationalisation, as a consequence of this understanding.925 
 
Interestingly, following Mossadegh’s ouster, the Shah appeared no less inclined to engage 
with Germany economically, and Iran emerged as Germany’s second largest trade partner 
beyond Europe by the 1970s.926  The penchant for commercial engagement between 
prominent German firms and Iran was unambiguous, with Siemens initiating construction of 
major projects such as the Bushehr nuclear reactor in the 1970s,927 and the Shah’s acquisition 
of a large share of German firm Friedrich Krupp.928  But of particular interest, is the manner 
in which an ostensibly civilian power FRG, was unabashed about cultivating economic ties 
with Iran, despite the objections of human rights groups, who took greater issue with the 
internal policies of Germany’s beloved economic partner929 than German coalitions.  Perhaps, 
in this respect, it should come as little surprise that following Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 
1979, Germany was the only Western state inclined to maintain relations with Tehran, and 
despite mass executions, the strong objections of Germany’s key partners in Europe and the 
U.S,930 as well as controversy within Germany concerning Iran’s use of “child soldiers” during 
the Iran-Iraq War,931 the most tangible features of these sustained ties, were economic in 
nature.932 Notwithstanding close ties to the Shah, Khomeini’s regime clearly articulated a 
desire for continued relations with Bonn –particularly of an economic nature–933 since the 
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Western state appeared both unperturbed by the new regime’s actions, as well as absent the 
problematic colonial legacy antithetical to the Khomeini regime’s narrative.934   
 
Exhibiting indifference to these key, identity-based features of concern for human rights, rule 
of law, democratisation, and cooperation with allies, the FRG instead capitalised upon its 
advantage as the only Western player in town, leading Hans-Dietrich Genscher to become 
“the first Western official to visit Tehran”.935 When facing criticism for the proposed visit, the 
Foreign Ministry made clear, according to its calculus, it would be ill-advised “‘to isolate 
regimes just because one did not agree with them, especially when the country [is] […] a 
major economic partner.’”936 In this sense, the pre-unification ties were not only economic-
centric, they further bespoke intent to seek maximisation of potential for rationalist aims, at 
the clear expense of underlying normative assumptions of contemporary German foreign 
policy, and identity, as a committed civilian power.  However, with unification came change, 
and new aspects of Germany’s policy served to confuse a relationship once more conspicuous 
for its rationalist aims, than for advancing concerns about Iran’s internal state of affairs. 
 
5.3 Early-Unification Trade with Iran and the 
Problematizing of Assumptions 
 
If pre-unification Germany appeared interested in economic engagement with Tehran, a 
newly unified Germany was exuberant for further intensification.  Following the death of 
Khomeini, a new momentum for engaging Iran through economic means took shape within 
the European Union, and Germany in particular, aimed to expand its already robust ties, 
through bilateral initiatives.937 Yet, critically, this increased interest was in many respects, 
most significant for its clear divergence from U.S. policy, and as Germany endeavoured to 
engage Iran economically, its more unilateral and assertive policy efforts towards Iran, 
provoked questions of German intent. 
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Although U.S. policy during the Clinton and Bush eras sought to systematically ostracise 
Iran, and limit their room for economic engagement, Germany’s efforts as “a fervent advocate 
of continuing […] business relations” rather than submit to “US pressure to isolate Iran”,938 
meant the totality of Germany’s relationship with Iran appeared in many respects defined by 
its stark differences from Washington concerning trade and commercial engagement, whether 
economic interest is in fact the causality for the contemporary relationship.  The decision by 
Germany to seek “engagement plus trade”,939 featuring clear “economic benefits” and 
considerations for Germany, and in contrast to U.S. policy, which did not,940 allowed many to 
infer economic interests behind relations a priori.  This meant for some, “pragmatic 
considerations, that is, economic factors” were considered the real impetus for this new era of 
economic engagement,941 rather than normative concerns.  Even though this interpretation is 
based more upon the salience of contrasts with U.S. policy, than critical analysis of evidence, 
it was nevertheless further supported by the advancement of economic themed narratives, in 
which German policymakers lamented the “extraterritorial”942 nature of U.S. sanctions against 
German firms seeking to cultivate economic ties with Iran –even resulting in threats of 
economic retaliation during the Kohl era, should German companies face penalty under the 
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).943  Although these objections were hardly concrete 
evidence that Germany’s ultimate goal was economic gain, as opposed to an Ostpolitik 
approach to diplomacy, the economic theme nevertheless began to garner credibility, and 
further credence was given to such narratives from U.S. and Israeli claims that German 
engagement with Iran merely constituted “immoral cover for maintaining lucrative 
commercial relations”.944 In doing so, it was argued that Germany was not only undercutting 
the effectiveness of sanctions, but in “‘trading with the enemy’”945 over material ambitions,946 
was exhibiting indifference to normative, civilian power considerations.  Even Salman 
Rushdie, whose receipt of an Iranian fatwa years prior had facilitated enhanced European 
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engagement over Iranian behaviour, found the economic basis of interactions between 
Germany and Iran particularly suspect.  This lead him to observe: “Germany has more 
economic ties to Iran than any other European state. I must ask myself, why actually? Why is 
there this downright enthusiastic support for this regime in [Germany]?”947  In this manner, 
although the mere existence of economic relations does not, in and of itself, establish a high-
degree of confidence that it explains the wider relationship, for Rushdie and others, the 
prominence of economic elements nevertheless fuelled suspicions that trade and commercial 
relations were, in fact, the main interests, especially given Iran was hardly the typical partner 
for a normatively driven Germany. 
 
However, notwithstanding questions and harsh characterisations by one school, another 
school of thought, utilizing the same available evidence, has conversely interpreted economic 
engagement as a mere feature of wider, non-economic interests, in which German policy not 
only seeks moderation and reform in Iran,948 but in doing so, allows the normative interests of 
a civilian power to meaningfully shape its relationship.  The result is a profound contradiction 
in views, with clear potential for problematizing wider assumptions of German foreign policy.  
Thus, as established in the section concerning general German foreign economic policy, one 
sees the essence of ongoing debates regarding this relationship mirroring a wider question of 
whether economic ties are the interest, in and of itself, or a mere catalyst for non-rationalist 
aims.  Yet, helpfully, in doing so, these existing debates offer a clear means of resolving this 
dichotomy.  Rather than premise analysis of this relationship upon suspicions rooted in the 
relationship’s uniqueness and occurrence with economic features, or the bias of confirming 
pre-existing assumptions –as existing interpretations have largely done– it is important to ask: 
what do the actual developments and narratives concerning economic features of this 
relationship truly evidence, when viewed from the perspective of constructivist-inspired, 
civilian power assumptions underlying contemporary German foreign policy? 
 
5.3.1 German Eagerness and a Unique Valuation of Ties 
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To this question, it might appear problematic that a unified Germany wasted little time in 
pursuing a new level of relations.  The bilateral “German-Iranian economic commission” met 
for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in 1991, featuring not only representatives 
of prominent German firms, but key German officials, including Economics Minister Jürgen 
Möllemann.949  The symbolic implication was that policymakers and business elites alike, 
eagerly awaited opportunities for economic engagement in the forthcoming years, and 
consistent with the corporatist tradition of post-war German foreign economic policy, 
industry was closely intertwined with Kohl’s collation,950 leading German firms in Iran to 
convey excitement.951 However, critically, German policymakers were hardly passive 
regarding private sector interests in Iran, and instead of merely taking a position of non-
interference concerning such interests, it was, in fact, the government itself that actively 
encouraged a deepening of economic links, by extending “the highest level of Hermes 
insurance cover”, of all its economic partners, to Iranian trade.952  In doing so, German firms 
otherwise hesitant to consider business opportunities in Iran, had a clear sense the 
government was more than supportive of their efforts, and prominent German companies 
such as “Siemens […] Krupp, Daimler-Benz”953 as well as Volkswagen,954 sought to make 
further inroads.  As a result of this shared public-private interest, nearly 200 German firms 
were engaged in Iranian business by 1997,955 and Germany not only became Iran’s largest 
trading partner quantitatively speaking, in the immediacy of unification,956 but it was 
considered preferential to “other Western countries” by Iranian policymakers for “traditional 
reasons”.957  
 
With these factors combined, German exports that amounted to 2.5 billion DM in 1989, 
experienced a meteoric increase to 7.9 billion DM by 1992.958  It is further revealing to note, 
that in addition to trade itself, economic interests appeared to deepen in other realms as well, 
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as Germany became the “main external creditor”, and Iranian debt owed Berlin approximated 
“$8.6 billion” in the early 1990s.959  Given the significant financial costs of reunification facing 
Kohl at this time,960 repayment on such debts, combined with new trade and commercial 
opportunities in Iran, meant the economic implications of failed Iranian ties were not without 
consequence. 
 
In this manner, economic considerations emerged not only as a key feature of Germany’s 
dialogue policy, but such commercial interests further constituted a central aim of relations 
themselves, even if secondary to other interests.961 Yet, most importantly for purposes of this 
chapter, is recognizing the manner in which such interests occurred at the expense of civilian 
power assumptions.  As established in the preceding two chapters, it is assumed a Germany 
committed to civilian power interests in its foreign policy toward Iran, would exhibit a 
commitment to cooperation and multilateralism, as well as seek to affirm a promotion of 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law, while not engaging with an autocratic state’s 
hardliners.  Despite these assumptions, it is revealing to consider policy statements and 
existing analyses alike, indicate post-unification German economic policy towards Iran, 
demonstrates both a clear bilateral basis of engagement,962 and per the preceding chapter, 
occurs despite an assumed prioritisation of human rights, including alleged contingency upon 
progress.963  As a result, it is of profound significance for this thesis, that early dialogue with 
Iran “was most prominent in the area of trade and investments”,964 and featured a Germany 
unwilling to leverage economic ties for realisation of non-economic goals,965 as this would 
appear to significantly downgrade confidence in civilian power aims, through an economic 
catalyst.   
 
Yet, for proponents of a normatively-driven Germany in its Iran relations, despite challenges 
at times, a reduction in German trade flows during the 1990s was attributable to “EU […] 
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improvements […] in Iran’s human rights record as a precondition for closer economic ties”, 
and a general willingness to bow to U.S. pressure.966  For these interpretations, one of the 
most compelling pieces of evidence, is that relatively speaking, these “economic interests are 
not paramount”,967 and given German policy documents even state its economic ties with Iran 
are “not particularly large”,968 this would imply trade is too miniscule to possibly account for 
Germany’s interest.969  On the surface, this argument is fairly convincing, as it begs the 
question as to why a Germany driven by maximisation of economic interests would risk its 
more valuable economic relationship with the U.S. over ties that even during a particularly 
robust trade year of 2006, still amounted to “less than half of one percent” of Germany’s 
overall trade.970 
 
However, although in a relative sense these economic relations are insignificant, this is again, 
specious reasoning.  In truth, relative inconsequentiality of trade flows does not conclusively 
evidence disinterest in economic goals.  Accordingly, and of great importance, regardless of 
validity, this interpretation highlights how existing analyses are overly reliant upon 
interpreting relations within a predetermined set of assumptions, rather than objectively 
approach the broader economic complexities surrounding the relationship, as well as the 
unique value German policymakers place upon Iran.  In fact, despite a decline in trade with 
Iran, and the relatively small fraction it represents, German policy documents explicitly note 
“intensification” of trade during the mid-1990s remained an interest of both sides,971 regardless 
of ongoing human rights concerns.  The document not only explicitly rejects the U.S. 
sanctions-based approach that some advocates of a non-economic interpretation have cited as 
a reason for Germany’s reduction of trade in the mid-1990s, but further, it attributes the 
decline in question to an ongoing economic crisis in Iran, rather than a change in policy, or 
reflection of disinterest.972  In other words, the decline in trade cited as crucial evidence in 
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support of normative interpretations of Germany’s Iran policy, is in fact, merely a 
misinterpretation of economic circumstances taking place within Iran,973 and is factually 
unrelated to Germany’s policy.   
 
This point is further demonstrated by the fact that although it was noted German trade 
bottomed out in 1996, and therefore implied “economic interests are not paramount,”974 
German exports to Iran rebounded to the highest level since 1993 the following year,975 and 
despite U.S. passage of the ILSA in 1996, German trade increased following its 
implementation.976  Bearing these facts in mind, it is fallacious to infer German disinterest 
from this decline, or to attribute it to a shift in policy positions.  What the policy narrative and 
trade flows cited in these claims do, however, critically evidence, is a German interest in 
seeing economic ties expand in the future from the relatively miniscule numbers at present, 
thereby increasing the possibility that notwithstanding Iran’s small role in German trade 
policy at the time, long-term valuation of the relationship is not adequately captured by 
numbers alone, and the factors behind this valuation may occur with indifference to the 
normative considerations of a committed civilian power. 
 
Importantly, the narrative surrounding private sector interest supports this potential 
explanation, with German investors elated throughout the 1990s to see continuation and 
expansion of ties in the forthcoming years –even following the Mykonos ruling.977 Meanwhile, 
the German government demonstrated its own commitment towards this interest, through 
active efforts both to “happily reschedule[e] the debt” Iran owed them when necessary, and 
despite growing controversy regarding the coalition’s engagement with Iranian government 
officials suspected of human rights abuses,978 to consistently extend Hermes guarantees at 
crucial junctures.  This included Hermes guarantees of 150 million DM in 1995 “to revitalise 
economic relations”, despite U.S. and Israeli objections, and amidst an alleged decline in 
German interest. 979  More importantly, these did not occur as discrete instances of German 
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policy, but represented a trend, with another Hermes cover of 200 million DM in 2000 
immediately following a human rights crackdown.980   
 
In this sense, it is interesting to recognise, the initial years of economic relations in Germany’s 
dialogue, set the tone and precedent for economic relations in future years.  And 
notwithstanding changes in coalitions, trade and commercial relations that appeared to come 
at the expense of civilian power assumptions of Germany, nevertheless continued to entice 
strong interest from German policymakers, long after Kohl’s departure from the Chancellery.  
In fact, despite occasional criticism, or calls for cessation –particularly from parties on the 
political left– all mainstream German parties, including many within the Greens, nevertheless 
accepted economic relations with Iran as positive, albeit for differing reasons.981 This is not 
only well evidenced by the relative continuity in policy, but comments from the likes of 
Joschka Fischer, who both noted the Berlin Republic “is amongst Iran’s most important 
trading partners”, and that economic relations between the two nations is “without a doubt a 
positive factor,” in further expressing Germany’s desire to see a “deepened collaboration in 
[the] business-technological area.”982  
 
Bearing this perspective in mind, it comes as little surprise that despite a contentious decline 
of trade in the 1990s, in the early 2000s, German exports to Iran increased to the highest 
levels since the early 1990s,983 and statistics provided to the Bundestag indicate that by 2006, 
German exports to Iran had nearly tripled since the year 2000.984  The message was clear: for 
Germany, economic relations were not only a consistent feature of interest, they were 
conceived in terms of future possibilities and potential, as much as, if not more than, their 
current state.  In this sense, it is critical to understand, despite contentions that quantitatively 
low trade bespeaks disinterest, narratives and actions alike demonstrate the essence of 
Germany’s trade interest during the 1990s onwards, exceeds expected value.  This dynamic is 
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particularly recognisable in the manner in which Germany did not exhibit true economic 
contingency upon progress in human rights and political moderation, or feature a cooperative 
attitude in its relations, thereby downgrading confidence in civilian power assumptions, while 
upgrading confidence in an economic causality for the relationship.  After all, if 
inconsequential economic relations are said to evidence disinterest in goals beyond a 
normative realm, would the marginalisation of normative interests by inconsequential 
economic ties not accordingly trivialise the norms and identity said to be affirmed by this? 
 
Taking this into consideration, what analysis of early-unification economic relations with Iran 
indicates, is a clear necessity of determining the underlying rationale of Germany’s unique, 
long-term valuation of economic relations with Iran.  This is essential, so as to determine 
conclusively, if its long-term goals, indeed, demonstrate a Germany driven by economic end 
goals, or ones in which its commitment to economic aspects of the relationship, is merely a 
catalyst for non-economic interests, only realised through long-term economic engagement. 
 
5.4 Banking, Finance, and a Narrative of German Interest 
 
To this point, although banking and finance might not constitute a long-term interest per se, it 
does represent one of the most prominent and consistent features of long-term economic ties 
between the two nations, albeit one that existing literature has largely ignored the significance 
of.  Indeed, part of this disregard reflects a lack of available data on the subject.  Nevertheless, 
analysis regarding banking and finance in this relationship is of particular importance, given 
that while the Western world demonstrated an aversion to facilitating Iranian financial 
transactions, Germany, on the other hand, because of its subjective valuation, maintained 
numerous banking ties.  It emerged as the only Western state willing to reschedule debts, and 
even expressed a desire to extend Hermes insurance covers for trade.985  This, in turn, implies 
that analysis of banking and finance can help to further illuminate a value not necessarily 
captured by trade flows alone, but which captures the long-term interests Germany seeks to 
realise through its distinctive ties.  But what do the narratives and actions indicate? 
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In one prominent respect, the uniqueness of Germany’s banking and finance ties with Iran 
have served to engender particularly strong criticism from the U.S. –which implored 
Germany to stop such transactions–986 and allegedly led officials from Washington to visit 
Germany, “to pressure politicians and businessmen” alike.987  Yet, critically, notwithstanding 
strong pressure from a partner central to Germany’s cooperative identity as a civilian 
power,988 it is insightful to consider that German policy documents explicitly state, preserving 
“intensive dialogue with […] German […] business” as well as “close and faithful dialogue 
with the German financial community” regarding Iran,989 remains a key consideration of its 
policy.  In this sense, banking and finance intersections between Germany and Iran are 
particularly instrumental for substantiating a German preoccupation with business interests in 
the context of policy vis-à-vis Iran.   
 
In one prominent case, U.S. officials sanctioned the “European-Iranian Trade Bank” –located 
in Germany– for illicit activities, including those allegedly related to nuclear proliferation 
efforts.990 However, notwithstanding a “blacklisting” by U.S. officials,991 German policy 
statements underscored a willingness to allow this Iranian bank to continue its activities on 
German soil, because as “one of the few remaining financial facilities for Iranian business in 
Germany and Europe”, the bank has “steadily increased in importance”.992  In this manner, a 
German willingness in this case to reject sanctions, and allow the bank’s continued operation, 
was largely attributable to a calculus of economic opportunism.  This point is captured well by 
the additional articulation within the document, that “further sanctions will further shrink 
German-Iranian trade”, in a broader context.993  For German policymakers, what ultimately 
shaped their policy in this case, was not merely a unique, and financially beneficial 
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opportunity in the banking sector to capitalise upon, but a further association that robust 
banking and finance ties were instrumental to a wider realisation of rationalist interests, in the 
form of trade.   
 
This is similarly recognisable in statements by the former German Ambassador to the United 
Nations, in which a rejection of sanctions was presented as attributable to the desire “not […] 
to hurt our small- and medium-sized enterprises”.994  Accordingly, in contrast with U.S. 
policy, it is vital recognise that German policy statements expressly note, Germany’s 
willingness to support a freezing of assets from a financial institution would only occur if in 
relation to nuclear proliferation, terrorism, or the illegal weapons trade.995 Furthermore, the 
burden of proof for Germany is exceptionally high in this regard, whereby, according to a 
spokesperson for the German Economics Ministry, “the prerequisite […] is concrete evidence 
of participation by the person or entity”.996  In doing so, the high burden of proof bespeaks a 
determination to avoid as many limitations or constraints to economic interests as possible.  
This sentiment is further captured by Germany’s clear resentment towards unilateral attempts 
to hinder financial transactions between Germany and Iran, as indicated by the additional, 
and pointed criterion that even if such evidence existed, the “U.N. Security Council –not the 
U.S. – sets the standard by which Germany imposes sanctions on Iranian banks operating in 
Germany”.997 In responding this way, the narrative captures a German government strikingly 
perturbed by attempts to counter its ambitions in the Iranian economic sphere. 
 
With Germany responding as such, U.S. policy efforts shifted towards German banks 
engaging in business with Iran themselves,998 rather than attempt to persuade German 
policymakers to change their ways.  As a consequence of this shift, Deutsche Bank, among 
others, severed ties with Iranian firms and entities, fearing much greater implications for their 
bottom line than passing up opportunities with Iran.999  For such banks and financial 
institutions, the calculus was obvious, and captured well by U.S. Senator Tom Cotton’s 
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comment, that “countries have to make a decision […] do they want to deal with the United 
States’ $19 trillion economy, or do they want to deal with Iran’s economy […] about the size 
of Maryland?”1000  Given this choice, businesses often elected not to engage in Iranian 
business.  Yet, insightfully for purposes of this thesis, while individual German firms may 
have been deterred as a result of U.S. policy, the narrative indicates German policymakers 
nevertheless remained determined to see continuation of ties despite this ultimatum, as well as 
increasingly preoccupied with the manner in which U.S. policy had profoundly economic 
implications for Berlin’s subjective interests.   
 
In exemplification of this, German documents note an interpretation that reluctance to engage 
in business with Iran is a consequence of “Western banks bowing to the pressure of 
America”,1001 further implying and lamenting perceived coercion of German banks.1002  In 
doing so, the narrative emphasises that severing of ties is contrary to the German 
government’s position and interest of seeing economic relations occur without hindrance, as 
well as inconsistent with natural business calculation.  In this sense, it is particularly critical to 
appreciate such evidence strongly indicates Germany’s economic policy towards Iran is not 
attributable to business influence on government policy, but rather, demonstrates such 
transactions largely occur as a result of endogenous government efforts to encourage trade 
with Iran.  This dynamic is recognisable in coalition efforts throughout the post-unification 
era to actively incentivise German firms’ engagement with Iran, both by “reassuring 
companies and banks […] they have political support”,1003 as well as mitigating financial risks 
of investment through Hermes insurance and export credits.1004  In doing so, efforts to 
reassure evidence a German government not merely assuming a position of non-interference 
in the private sector, but rather one of coaxing businesses to trade with Iran.   
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Insightfully, German policymakers are unabashed about this strategy, leading then German 
Economics Minister Brigette Zypries to publicly proclaim in the wake of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): “I deploy myself [on behalf of the coalition] for 
[…] financing projects” in Iran.1005  In this sense, there is undeniably an interest underlying 
the German government’s encouragement of German banks and firms to engage.  However, 
this returns to the overarching question: what does this interest in economic ties with Iran 
actually bespeak?  Helpfully, analysis of post-JCPOA discourse is particularly illuminating, 
regarding how a decision by Germany to go beyond mere encouragement, further suggests a 
possible economic explanation itself. 
 
5.4.1 It’s Not About Being Loved, It’s About Billions Lost 
 
As stated in official documents, not only did “Germany […] awai[t] a market worth billions” 
in Iran following the JCPOA, it did so vis-à-vis a country which, according to then German 
Business Minister Sigmar Gabriel, has a “long tradition of […] business relations […] even 
during sanctions”.1006  In this sense, the official narrative is almost boastful, as well as defiant 
of perceived interference in Germany’s ties, but in particular, it is one explicitly invoking 
desired gains through long-term economic and financial engagement, rather than valuation 
existing in the present.  German businesses were particularly excited to see realisation of trade 
and commercial opportunities, and it appeared a possible lifting of sanctions would allow for 
Germany to pursue a maximisation of desired economic engagement.1007 However, amidst 
uncertainty regarding sanctions removal, statements from Gabriel focused in particular upon 
enduring “problems with the banking sector” due to “unilateral sanctions”, which he 
protested, “have nothing to do with the nuclear agreement”.1008 Brigette Zypries similarly 
noted in the context of JCPOA uncertainty, that for Germany, a desired intensification of 
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economic ties existed,1009 thereby making clear from a narrative standpoint, Germany’s 
concern over the JCPOA, and economic interests, are not unrelated.   
 
Critically, in this regard, for German policymakers like Gabriel and Zypries, although the 
eventual U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA held broader implications for myriad aspects of 
Germany’s relations with Iran, including diplomacy, the issue nevertheless appeared framed 
and criticised in undeniably financial terms.  This led to German complaints that such a 
withdrawal would only worsen the situation further, given “they [the U.S.] already hinder 
[…] corporations and banks’ business with Iran”.1010  In late 2017, this position was similarly 
voiced by then German Ambassador to the United States, Peter Wittig, who lamented above 
all, concerning a forthcoming JCPOA withdrawal by Washington, that “German companies 
have suffered billions and billions and billions of dollars”.1011  Notwithstanding Wittig’s 
further contention that economic relations can serve to moderate Iranian behaviour in a 
broader sense,1012 the narrative is nevertheless focused as much upon the seemingly rationalist 
implication of lost monetary potential, as it did upon Germany’s other espoused interests, 
including the ability for trade and commercial relations to facilitate non-economic aims. 
 
Taking into consideration that Sigmar Gabriel previously articulated a position that 
Germany’s business dialogue was both necessary, and critically, “not about [being] loved […] 
it’s about German […] interests”,1013 a primary fixation upon unrealised economic potential 
within the narrative upgrades confidence that Germany’s interest in economic relations, 
occurs for purely economic goals.  In this manner, the narrative surrounding banking and 
finance is particularly illuminating, in that it captures a Germany exhibiting a profoundly 
rationalist, and materialist preoccupation with the economic implications of stymied banking 
and finance, despite the ostensible civilian power commitment to ensure rationalist, and 
materialist interests are at least secondary, or subservient, to those of a normative basis.1014  In 
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doing so, this upgrades confidence that long-term interests facilitated through Germany’s 
unique banking and finance ties with Iran, can in fact, account for Germany’s interest in the 
relationship.  But taking into account that banking and finance are merely a feature of the 
long-term interests themselves, this begs the question: what are the specific long-term 
economic interests leading Germany to lament an inability to conduct unrestrained 
transactions with Iran? And what do these inform about whether Germany’s interests are in 
fact, economic in nature, or ultimately, curbed by Germany’s identity and interest as a civilian 
power? 
 
5.5 Fuelling an Economic Giant Provides Further 
Opportunities 
 
Bearing these questions in mind, it is helpful to consider another, more tangible manifestation 
of Germany’s desired economic transactions with Iran: energy resources.  Despite its 
impressive capacity to manufacture, Germany is, in fact, “highly dependent” upon acquiring 
“raw materials, particularly energy” from others.1015  It is this very dependency that led to a 
historic espousal of “justification for aggressive expansion”,1016 within Germany’s Machtpolitik 
past, and in this regard, for a Germany committed to sustaining its economic vitality, an 
ability to acquire, as well as diversify energy imports, is a natural, rationalist consideration.  
Even civilian power proponents of German foreign economic policy have conceded energy 
remains central to security of the German economy, meaning a “competitive market on the 
supply side” remains a best-case scenario.1017  Given this relative insecurity about fuelling its 
economic prowess, it comes as little surprise that according to German policy statements, 
“alongside […] environmentally sound energy supply, security of supply is […] [a] key […] 
objective”1018 in policy. 
 
For Germany and its European allies, the 1973 oil crisis served to impress upon them, in a 
most serious manner, that long-term strategy was needed, given oil and energy resources now 
																																																						
1015 Crawford, 44. 
1016 Ibid., 45. 
1017 Maull, Germany's Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, 169-71. 
1018 Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, "Security of Supply: Monitoring the Security of Supply," 
(2018). 
		 180	
constituted a means of political leverage.1019  In this manner, “German policy increasingly 
reflected its dependence on Arab states”,1020 whereby energy policy not only represented a key 
feature of foreign economic policy, it fundamentally shaped policy, as if it constituted a 
rationalist and material interest itself.  Insightfully, central to Germany’s policy of establishing 
security of supply, was identification of countries willing to provide energy when others 
would not, so as to ensure appropriate diversification.  Iran, as it so happens, was one of them, 
both imploring the Arab states to end the 1973 embargo,1021 while striving to “increase [its] 
production” during the crisis.1022  Consequently, despite being a member of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iran was nevertheless independent at the 
time when it came to its politicisation of energy resources, and this did not escape notice by 
German policymakers.   
 
According to data from the World Bank, Iran currently possesses the second largest natural 
gas reserves, as well as the fourth largest proven oil reserves,1023 meaning Iran is a very 
appealing choice in terms of developing a strategic partner for energy security.  The Berlin 
Republic has faced an “especially fragile”1024 reliance upon a Russian monopoly of natural 
gas,1025 whereby the inability to diversify away from Russia could limit its policy options when 
dealing with Moscow.  Cognizant of this dynamic, to address “growing demand without 
increasing dependency on Russia”, Germany has actively sought alternatives.1026  Critically, 
German policy statements explicitly reference “Iran after Russia” as the leading natural gas 
reserve option,1027 and have similarly underscored a preeminent desire to collaborate on 
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energy.1028  Accordingly, mirroring the narrative of policymakers and government offices, 
energy has emerged as a prominent aspect of post-unification economic ties between the two 
countries, leading to the signing of prominent energy agreements in the early 1990s.1029 For 
some, “energy security” remains one of “three decisive interests” of Germany’s overall regional 
policy,1030 and in this manner, many scholars interpret oil and gas as a leading policy interest 
of Germany vis-à-vis Iran.1031 
 
Nevertheless, others counter that despite the existence of such an interest, “German firms do 
not have substantial […] investment in the Iranian energy sector”,1032 thereby implying once 
again, that quantitative data disproves such rationalist, and materialist interests of policy 
toward Iran.  But here again, analysis indicates accurate valuation may exist in terms beyond 
present numbers, and reflects long-term valuation, based upon potential growth.  In 
exemplification of this, much of the interest German firms place on economic ties with Tehran 
is predicated upon the hope Iran can “develop as an anchor of stability”,1033 and when it comes 
to the energy sector, projects such as the development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
terminals, and overland pipelines for improving supply routes, are conceptualised in terms of 
“decades”.1034  The interest on both sides for energy relations is palpable, with the likes of ex-
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder visiting Iran in 2009 to discuss natural gas opportunities, 
concurrent to statements by Iranian Oil Minister Gholan-Hossein Nozar, “advocate[ing] a 
strategic German-Iranian alliance, with Iran supplying the natural gas and Germany the 
technology”.1035  Yet, imperatively, and related to such comments from the Iranian side, 
although the “longer term Iranian oil and gas resources will have an important role […] for 
[…] German energy supplies”, this will necessitate “long planning and construction 
periods.”1036  
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Accordingly, and most critically, central to the very realisation of Germany’s long-term energy 
plans regarding Iran, is another, in some respects, even greater economic opportunity for 
Germany: that modernisation of Iran’s energy-related infrastructure is required, both to 
“increase delivery volume”, as well as “lower production costs”,1037 creating a very real, and 
quite sizeable demand for German firms in particular.1038  In this sense, even if long-term 
energy interests are somewhat intangible in the present, and Germany continues to reduce its 
dependency on fossil fuels in the long-term as it has stated,1039 analysis of the energy sector 
both confirms a Germany conceptualizing its economic valuation of Iran in terms of future 
growth, more than present numbers, as well as a Germany appearing to possess a substantial 
economic opportunity in the present, by facilitating Iran’s modernisation efforts through 
collaboration and commercial relations.  Bearing in mind this opportunity exists, 
presupposing economic, commercial, and trade relations constitute the preeminent 
explanation of Germany’s post-unification relationship with Iran, one would, in turn, expect 
Germany to seize the opportunity created by exporting and collaborating on matters of 
technology and modernisation.  But to what extent does Germany capitalise upon the 
economic opportunity of exporting technology and goods? And if so, does Germany ever 
appear to curb these interests based upon its identity, and interest as a civilian power, or does 
it merely seek maximisation of these seemingly rationalist and materialist interests? 
 
5.6 Trade in Technology and Expertise 
 
In order to establish confidence in economic interests as the sole explanation of German 
foreign policy toward Iran, it remains essential to demonstrate that Germany, above all, seeks 
to capitalise upon its potential, and interest in this realm.  But to what extent is an economic 
relationship fully embraced? And what, if any limitations to Germany’s economic interest 
exist?  To answer these questions, analysis of trade in technology and expertise is particularly 
illuminating, given the opportunity for Germany to trade in technology and knowhow with 
Iran remains highly lucrative.  For example, taking into consideration the preceding section, it 
has long been noted that should sanctions against Iran be lifted, the demand for capable 
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“international” firms to modernise and enlarge Iran’s “energy infrastructure”, with competitive 
technologies, will be sizeable.1040 Imperatively, however, the economic opportunity created for 
Germany through Iranian modernisation needs, extends well beyond the scope of the energy 
sector alone.   
 
On the one hand, the energy sector is emblematic of German interest in Iran that is long-term 
by nature, but it is similarly but a single component of a broader German opportunity, present 
throughout a myriad of Iranian economic sectors.  Beginning around the time of German 
unification, Iran sought to undertake “billions of dollars in modernisation and reconstruction” 
efforts following the Iran-Iraq War, and German firms, including Siemens and Krupp, 
emerged as key players for realisation of this initiative, through transference of German 
technology and knowhow.1041 Indeed, the revitalisation of commercial relations was natural, in 
that it represented the continuation of a long-legacy of industrial modernisation and 
training1042 –with some even positing Germany is the “real founder of […] Persian industry”–
1043  but in reality, more than anything, Germany represented a vital relationship Iranian 
industry not only favoured, but frankly needed to fulfil its desired economic growth. 
 
As Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif put it: “made in Germany […] has 
particularly great meaning” in Iran.1044  For one, Germany is considered by Iranian consumers 
as the best source of imports,1045 with current Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei even 
noted to favour Germany’s BMW when it comes to automobiles.1046  But above all, the actions 
of Iranian policymakers have echoed a strong desire to see trade in technology and knowhow 
between the countries flourish, leading Iranian officials to encourage German investment in 
Iranian modernisation efforts, while particularly articulating a determination to collaborate in 
areas of “technology and machinery”.1047 For Iran, access to Western technology and 
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knowhow remains central to establishing competitiveness1048 in numerous sectors, meaning 
cultivating a partnership capable of facilitating these needs remains an imperative of its 
economic policy. 
 
Yet, most insightful regarding the implications of such an imperative, is that German 
policymakers are fully cognizant of this dynamic, leading policy statements from the Foreign 
Ministry to both acknowledge that “Iran […] views [Germany] as a preferred trading 
partner”,1049 as well as to actively encourage German firms to engage in this field, given Iran’s 
“sizeable modernisation needs in industrial and infrastructure sectors, [means] German firms 
can achieve an important premium with their products and technologies.”1050  This calculus is 
significant, not only in that German policy efforts consistently reflect an unabashed desire for 
intensification of commercial and economic relations, despite noted challenges to normative 
concerns such as human rights,1051 but also, in that it bespeaks recognition within Germany 
that a substantive economic carrot, or stick, to utilise against Iran exists, given the leverage 
they hold over Iranian modernisation needs.   
 
While preceding chapters have established Germany is often averse to thinking in terms of 
carrots and sticks analytically, it has similarly been argued that much of Germany’s inability 
to utilise economic relations with Iran, or at least incentivise tangible reforms in non-economic 
realms through trade, is attributable to the fact German-Iranian economic ties are not 
meaningful enough to Iranian policymakers to create leverage for a carrot or stick scenario.1052  
This remains a critical analytical point for interpretations which might posit a continuation of 
economic relations between Germany and Iran, despite a lack of progress in non-economic 
areas, could nevertheless remain consistent with non-economic aims and interest.  This could 
theoretically occur, if a lack of leverage meant Germany could not utilise a carrot or stick 
option, even if they wanted to, meaning despite the assumption an ideal-type civilian power 
would sacrifice economic ties for normative concerns, a continuation of ties could, 
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nevertheless, strive for alternative goals of moderation and integration, rather than rationalist, 
self-interested, economic gain. 
 
However, what cognizance on the part of German policymakers regarding their importance to 
Iran economically, suggests, is recognition of the very existence of leverage, but a fundamental 
unwillingness to utilise this for normative concerns such as human rights.  Instead, it bespeaks 
a determination to encourage firms to leverage their competitive advantage for profoundly 
economic ends.  Analyses of German-Iranian economic relations are fairly unanimous: 
Germany is not only “Iran’s most important […] partner in the field of high-tech”,1053 “Iran’s 
technical sector […] depends heavily upon German products and services”,1054 meaning both 
German technology and machinery,1055 as well as expertise of German firms, remains central 
to Iran’s modernisation efforts,1056 and in turn, its long-term economic and political interests.  
From this, it is argued “in economic terms, Germany is more important to Iran than Iran to 
Germany.”1057 This argument appears largely confirmed by data, which indicates two-thirds of 
all Iranian industrial businesses1058 utilise German machinery and engineering products,1059 
and “Germany is the market leader in seven out of nine engineering sectors” within Iran.1060 
This means Germany’s role is not only vital to Iranian economic interests at present, it will 
remain so for the foreseeable future, with German parts, technology and knowhow 
concerning “machinery, motor vehicle[s] […] components, hardware […] metal products, 
and chemical products”, constituting a core of German exports to Iran.1061   
 
With this, the economic imperative of Germany only deepens for Iran.  Consequently, for 
German policymakers, commercial and trade relations, particularly in terms of technology and 
knowhow, is notable in that it represents a clear opportunity for realisation of two different, 
and somewhat mutually-exclusive interests: leveraging ties for reform in non-economic areas, 
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albeit at the expense of current economic interests, or seizing an opportunity for long-term 
economic engagement and growth.  Naturally, the former is that which is expected of a 
civilian power Germany, whereas the latter, largely challenges civilian power expectations, 
and bespeaks more rationalist and materialist aims. 
 
With this in mind, the policy narrative, juxtaposed with action by Germany, remains 
particularly insightful.  Taking the Kohl years as an example, on the one hand, German policy 
documents stated the Berlin Republic implements a “very restrictive […] export policy” vis-à-
vis Iran, in which trade between the countries is heavily scrutinised.1062  Notwithstanding this 
contention, however, data in fact indicates Germany cultivated 3.241 billion DM by 1996 in 
post-unification technology trade with Iran.1063 Insightfully, this position of coalitions has 
continued into the contemporary era, leading Merkel’s government in 2008 to lament U.S. 
attempts to stymie German trade in the “machine and engineering” sectors, noting the 
government’s interpretation that trade in technology and knowhow is wholly immaterial to 
wider concerns regarding Iran, including proliferation.1064  In doing so, this establishes a clear 
delineation for German policymakers, whereby trade with Iran, particularly in the lucrative 
area of technology, is legitimised and even prioritised, because they fail to infer value in 
sacrificing economic engagement, for most non-economic concerns.  In framing the policy as 
such, this would certainly appear to upgrade confidence in seeking economic engagement, for 
maximisation of economic returns.  But does this delineation and prioritisation factually 
evidence rejection of normative, and non-rationalist considerations in German trade policy 
with Iran?  To answer this question, it is particularly helpful to consider Sigmar Gabriel’s 
comments preceding a visit to Tehran in 2016. 
 
As characterised by Gabriel, there is, in fact, “a moral” form of Germany’s dialogue,1065 which 
would accordingly imply normative considerations, and potentially upgrade confidence in 
civilian power assumptions.  However, Gabriel’s further comments reinforce the clear 
delineation of German trade policy, noting “we are a country that lives on exports”, and 
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adding “with states such [as Iran] […] commercial relations are [essential despite its] 
“authoritarian led regime”.1066  In presenting it as such, although Gabriel maintains a 
normative side of Germany’s relationship exists, he is unabashed in articulating a German 
calculus that economic engagement with Iran constitutes a fundamental interest in the 
relationship for Germany, and that such engagement for explicitly rationalist, and materialist 
interests, occurs with indifference to the authoritarian form of government.  In being stated 
this way, such comments bear striking resemblance to the previously mentioned Handelsstaat 
interpretation, which entails indifference to the normative considerations of a civilian power 
type, despite attempts of civilian power proponents to appropriate this term.  It is imperative 
to recall from preceding chapters that a central element of a civilian power disposition in 
economic relations is to avoid engaging with authoritarian figures in such regimes.1067  This 
means Gabriel’s statements not only strongly upgrade confidence in a Germany seeking 
economic relations as a fundamental interest of its relationship with Iran, but they also 
significantly downgrade confidence that economic ties represent a catalyst for realisation of 
any non-economic goals.  This is discernible from the clear attempt by policymakers to 
establish a delineation of economic interests, from other considerations, which accordingly 
reinforces the interpretation economic interests occur independent from other, normative 
aims.  Consequently, present interpretations in literature which seek to legitimise German 
economic engagement with Iran, based upon perceived non-economic, underlying interests, 
are severely challenged by these findings.   
 
Yet, before determining with any confidence that economic relations constitute the ultimate 
explanation of Germany’s relationship with Iran, or entirely refute assumptions of a civilian 
power Germany in this case, by demonstrating normative concerns, or identity, fail to have 
demonstrable effects, it is firstly imperative to determine this economic interest occurs without 
limitation, or parallel interest.  And secondly, if any such limitations or parallel interests 
should exist, do they indicate identity-based considerations shape, or inform this policy 
interest?  Helpfully, there exists a key dynamic of Germany’s commercial relations with Iran, 
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in the context of technology and knowhow, which serves to develop an answer to these 
questions. 
 
5.6.1 Trade Limits, Identity, and the Contingency of German 
Economic Interest 
 
It is interesting to note, transference of technology and knowhow to Iran has not simply 
transpired through conventional transactions, but often occurred through elaborate, 
clandestine Iranian efforts.  In one prominent instance, an “Iran-linked”, but German-
operated factory, was established in Dinslaken, Germany, as “part of a global network of […] 
businesses designed to funnel […] materials to the Iranian government and to evade 
sanctions”.1068  The factory was noted to exhibit surprising disinterest in profit, but a keen 
determination to leverage “material and expertise” from Germany, for purposes experts 
contend, was related to nuclear proliferation efforts.1069  Critically, this discrete instance is but 
a microcosm of a wider trend, in that Germany’s position as a leader in technological 
components utilised in Iran, and its Iran-friendly business attitude, had fostered the 
emergence of Germany as a key locale for Iranian acquisition of materials for nuclear 
proliferation and military ends.  Given the inability to legally purchase many such 
components, rather than seek acquisition through conventional avenues, Tehran 
demonstrated a desire to “acquire critical German technologies” from “German soil”, that are 
banned for export to Iran.1070   
 
However, in doing so, this dynamic presents a valuable lens through which to assess 
Germany’s position concerning potential maximisation of commercial and trade relations, in 
that if Germany willingly, and knowingly allowed illicit trade, with probable use for military 
ends, to occur, this would certainly downgrade confidence in the pertinence of any normative, 
or civilian power preoccupations, within the economic relationship.  Yet, critically, evidence 
indicates that rather than allow such illicit trade between the two countries, these Iranian 
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efforts have, in fact, constituted a cause for proactive German intervention regarding exports 
to Iran.  As a result, during 2006, German “authorities raided 41 small- to medium- sized 
domestic firms […] suspec[ted] of supplying Iran with […] dual-use technology”,1071 and in 
doing so, demonstrated that a definitive limitation to trade with Iran exists. 
 
Notwithstanding a clear desire to see maximisation of trade with Iran in a conventional 
context, dual- and military-use contexts remain an area in which the otherwise ardent trade 
proponent, exhibits an entirely different attitude and policy.  Yet, importantly, such a 
limitation is not, in and of itself, evidence of German willingness to sacrifice economic 
relations for normative considerations.  In fact, not only has evidence to date indicated 
Germany’s actions in relations with Iran bespeak indifference to most facets of the civilian 
power role concept, as well as wider assumptions of contemporary German foreign policy and 
identity, it highlights a Germany inclined to seek maximisation of trade and commercial 
relations, while lamenting the extent to which external factors hinder these interests, and cost 
them monetarily.  In this sense, evidence is compelling that Germany’s actions in economic 
relations with Tehran, exhibit the hallmarks of a rationalist, and materialist economic actor.  
Yet, the existence of any limitation to trade does represent a potential challenge to an 
economic explanation for Germany’s relationship with Iran.  With this in mind, in order to 
make a final determination, it is vital to consider whether limitations to trade in dual-use and 
military technologies challenge pragmatic, economic interests, or in fact, serve to evidence 
considerations beyond mere rationalism, including potentially, the civilian power role concept.  
In this manner, one must consider the extent to which Germany’s policy towards dual-use and 
military goods with Iran may reflect features of Germany’s identity. 
 
5.7 Key Economic Limitations: Dual-Use Goods and 
Concern Over Use of Force 
 
Given the previous section evidenced a clear limitation to an otherwise rationalist, and 
materialist economic interest on the part of Germany, attributing this restraint to either wider 
rationalist, or non-rationalist interests, is vital for purposes of this thesis.  To this point, it is 
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important to recall that in addition to evidence in this chapter, which upgrades confidence in 
Germany seeking economic relations as a core interest of the relationship itself, preceding 
chapters have demonstrated a fundamental German aversion to implementation of sanctions, 
or other similar hindrances to economic ties.1072  In doing so, this general aversion suggested a 
potential interest in, or causality of, economic ties, whereby, amidst a perceived “conflict […] 
of goals between trade and […] sanctions”,1073 choosing to reject sanctions would appear 
consistent with a desire to seek maximisation of trade and commercial relations, rather than 
allow other interests to curb economic ties.   
 
Potentially problematic for such interpretations, however, is recognition that Germany has 
nevertheless, at times, agreed to implement sanctions which stand to impact wider trade 
interests, despite an evidenced willingness to prioritise economic considerations.  In doing so, 
and in similar fashion to Germany’s readiness to limit trade at a certain point, this sporadic 
sanctioning presents an interesting puzzle for rationalist explanations, and accordingly, raises 
a vital question: what accounts for this seemingly capricious position? And furthermore, is 
there a discernible connection between this occasional shift on sanctions, and Germany’s other 
evidenced limitation to economic relations with Iran? 
 
Previous chapters noted this shift may occur as a result of seeking to ensure use of force does 
not occur, or to pursue non-economic goals.1074  However, this chapter has severely 
downgraded confidence that economic engagement occurs for any reason other than purely 
economic interest.  In this manner, the mystery surrounding a willingness to curb economic 
interests presents a key hurdle for resolving the question of causality, and explanation for 
German interest in the relationship.  Yet, helpfully, analysis of German policy demonstrates 
that actions of policymakers concerning Iranian trade policy, mirrors articulated policy, in 
noting the position of “no […] further measures [against Iran, than to prevent][…] military 
use […] [and] dual-use” exports.1075 Bearing in mind one of the most salient characterisations 
regarding Germany’s aversion to sanctions is that such policy aspires to “impose as few 
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sanctions as possible but as many as are strictly necessary to […] avoid [a] […] military 
attack”,1076 it would appear a consistent theme emerges from analysis of Germany’s trade 
policy toward Iran, in which themes of military force, and bestowing means of applying force 
to others, coincide with a willingness to curb otherwise ardent support for maximisation of 
economic relations.  But despite critical recognition of this limitation, what, precisely, does 
this apparent intersection of concern over military force inform about German interest and 
identity in the context of Germany’s policy? 
 
In a general sense, it is said for post-unification Germany, “the export of sensitive technologies 
exposes the age-old national policy conflict between the pursuit of security and pursuit of 
wealth”,1077 and the case of German foreign policy towards Iran appears no different.  
Regarding this dilemma, it is critical to appreciate that post-war Germany was brazen in its 
willingness to export technologies and materials utilised in both nuclear proliferation, as well 
as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs,1078 amidst a leading interest of successive 
coalitions “to ensure […] Germany’s industry sustain as little negative impact as possible”.1079  
Having implemented such a policy, this would appear to suggest that a post-unification 
Germany willing to export dual-use products, is in fact, consistent with past tendencies of the 
FRG.  Critically, however, a sudden and profound transformation in Germany’s policy 
regarding export of dual-use goods and weapons occurred1080 during the early years of 
unification, resulting in Germany becoming a staunch advocate for increasing control over 
sensitive exports.1081  This transformation even culminated in a key, 1994 amendment to 
Germany’s export law, aimed to increase government oversight, and severely punish firms in 
violation.1082  Consequently, in stark contrast to “Germany’s foreign policy tradition” of 
avoiding export restrictions, Germany instead emerged as a prominent leader in Europe for 
implementing export restrictions on dual-use goods.1083 Although this restriction is strictly 
limited to dual-use and military hardware, the decision nevertheless suggests Germany’s 
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“preference for a stable and secure international system” effectively supplants “traditional 
national gains from trade” as an interest, given such a profound German policy shift 
contradicts rationalist expectations of unlimited, and maximised trade potential.1084   
 
Taking this into account, the policy decision not only appears to challenge interpretations of a 
Germany committed to unrestrained economic engagement with Iran, but it suggests a 
Germany, for whom banning dual-use exports to Iran is potentially attributable to 
considerations beyond the scope of, if not antithetical to, rationalist and materialist 
calculation.  This, in turn, provokes crucial questions: including what transpired to induce this 
policy change for Germany, as well as why this momentous transformation in its foreign 
economic policy would occur so rapidly?1085 
 
Interestingly, according to “conventional wisdom and almost universally accepted” analysis, 
the impetus for this transformation is attributable to the “Rabta affair”, in which a German 
company was responsible for exporting technology and material to Libya, utilised for 
production of poison gas.1086  Of vital importance, the salience of controversy surrounding the 
Rabta affair, which ultimately served to transform German policy concerning exports, was 
rooted in “its reminder of the Nazi past that tapped into collective memory shaping foreign 
policy culture.”1087 Critically, this calculus is confirmed by analysis of policy narratives, 
including those of Helmut Kohl, who stated: 
 
“enhancement of export controls is extraordinarily important […] because of Germany’s 
historical experiences […] [by which Germany] “recognises particular responsibility for a 
restrictive arms export policy and […] export controls for dual-use goods”.1088  
 
In this manner, it is of paramount importance to recognise the causality of this sole, evidenced 
area of limitation to German trade relations with Iran, is fundamentally attributable to the 
salience, and influence of historical and collective memories, rather than rationalist 
calculation.  This means despite arguments Germany curbed its trade relations with Iran as a 
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result of pressure from Washington,1089 evidence in fact demonstrates that Germany’s decision 
was a consequence of its own policy interest, and one attributable to normative 
understandings and interests.  In this sense, despite relations with Iran constituting a source 
of transatlantic strife,1090 Germany’s policy regarding dual-use exports represented one of the 
few instances of policy convergence1091 with Washington, leading one Clinton-era U.S. 
policymaker to reference Berlin’s “remarkable restraint”,1092 given the potential windfall from 
such exports to Iran.  But to what extent does Germany allow the salience of its identity in 
this context to impact upon wider economic interests, and what does this inform about a 
potential economic explanation of the relationship? 
 
Critically, policy statements have attempted to leverage reference of “a complete weapons 
embargo and export ban for dual-use goods”, as supporting evidence for contentions 
Germany’s policy, does in fact, strive for non-economic goals, including moderation of the 
Iranian leadership.1093  However, evidence in this thesis clearly demonstrates that Germany’s 
economic relations underscore a fundamental desire to maximise economic ties, provided they 
are beyond dual-use and military contexts.  This means such contentions are suspect, and likely 
attributable to seeking legitimisation of its ties, just as Germany has shown in the past by 
leveraging narratives of E.U. collaboration to justify its policy decisions vis-à-vis Iran.1094  
Nevertheless, it is insightful to recognise that despite a clear tendency on Germany’s part to 
refuse sanctions participation beyond the scope of U.N. Security Council mandates,1095 when 
it comes to the issue of dual-use goods, Germany’s policy efforts have, in fact, represented a 
stricter benchmark than the U.N. measures concerning this area of trade.1096  This is 
particularly significant, as Germany’s willingness to implement sanctions against broader 
Iranian economic sectors in relation to Iranian proliferation and illicit military technology 
acquisition, directly resulted in economic consequences for core, medium-sized enterprises in 
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Germany,1097 entirely unrelated to dual-use exports.  In doing so, this demonstrates that when 
faced with a hard decision between much wider economic interests vis-à-vis Iran, and 
commitment to its identity, Germany allows the identity to triumph as the ultimate arbiter of 
policy.  Illustrative of the depth of Germany’s commitment to hindering military-related 
implications through its relationship, it has been noted that “all [Germany’s] […] sanctions 
[are] […] made with clear intent to avoid a military strike.”1098 As a result, it would appear 
that Germany’s identity-based limitation to economic interests, extends beyond the scope of 
preventing exportation of dual-use technologies and weapons, and in fact accentuates a wider, 
preeminent commitment to ensuring German policy towards Iran does not directly, or even 
indirectly, result in military force being utilised by any respective party. 
 
This dynamic is similarly recognisable in the case of Germany’s curious, and most 
uncharacteristic support for a 2012 European Union oil embargo against Iran, entailing 
further peripheral sanctioning in the Iranian “financial sector”.1099  For a Germany evidenced 
to demonstrate objection to sanctioning Iran, keen to separate financial transactions from 
wider Iran policy efforts, and seeking maximisation of economic ties beyond the scope of dual-
use and weapons, this apparent shift in policy problematizes an otherwise very consistent 
position of successive Berlin Republic coalitions.  Yet, analysis of German statements 
explaining the rationale note this decision occurred amidst particular concern over Iran’s 
missile program,1100 as well as proliferation efforts.  In this sense, it is of profound significance, 
when viewed from the standpoint of concern over escalation to military conflict being a 
possible explanation of Germany’s Iran policy, that such policy statements regarding a 
perceived shift in policy, are, in fact, wholly consistent with post-unification policy trends.  
Confidence in this interpretation of its decision to limit economic relations is well-evidenced 
by statements addressing the embargo and sanctioning, which note, this feature of a “dual-
track approach”, entailing dialogue and diplomacy, as well as pressure,1101 aspires “to serve [a] 
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peaceful aim”,1102 in which “all activities of the Bundesregierung, on both strands of the, ‘dual-
track approach’ […] served and serve the hindrance of military escalation”.1103 
 
As noted in other German policy documents, a “dual-track” approach is not indicative of a 
policy shift, but rather demonstrates consistency of policy, from another vantage point.  
Bearing in mind the findings of chapter three –which noted both Germany’s commitment to 
its subjective policy interest, and a willingness to increase pressure so as to ensure diplomacy 
occurs, rather than use of force– this interpretation of German economic policy towards Iran 
appears to evidence that an otherwise economically driven relationship, is nevertheless still 
consistent with a German desire to seek diplomacy, amidst concern over potential military 
escalation.  In doing so, this demonstrates that notwithstanding Germany’s desire to see 
maximisation of economic relations beyond the realm of dual-use goods, a commitment to its 
identity, predicated upon collective and historical memories, is nevertheless shown to have 
greater influence upon Germany’s policy position in this area.  Accordingly, and in support of 
this analysis, it is worthwhile to ponder the significance of Germany’s stated desire to see a 
full, and revitalised economic relationship in the wake of the JCPOA’s conclusion, albeit still 
curbed by a dual-use ban.1104  In doing so, this highlights, for Germany, policy in fact 
maintains striking consistency in the economic sphere, and an occasional willingness to 
undermine economic interests, is attributable to perceived infringement upon a more 
preeminent concern of mitigating military escalation vis-à-vis Iran.  In this manner, 
Germany’s foreign policy toward Iran could best be described as: economic in nature, but 
nevertheless constrained by the influence of an identity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the first section of this chapter, it was demonstrated that for post-war Germany, economic 
relations not only emerged as a source of legitimacy and identity, but metamorphosed through 
a nexus of these, into a fundamental interest.  However, in doing so, questions have arisen 
regarding the extent to which such an interest reflects a rationalist, normalised interpretation 
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of contemporary German foreign policy, or serves to affirm constructivist-inspired 
interpretations, which perceive continuity in German foreign policy, and the influence of 
identity as a civilian power.  It was instrumental to note that in order to affirm a 
constructivist-inspired characterisation, such as the civilian power role concept, this would 
require one to determine that normative assumptions and identity have a demonstrable effect 
on policy and interest.  Conversely, this section noted that a Germany driven by economic 
interests, as the aim in and of itself, would not only appear more similar to a Handelsstaat 
characterisation, but would imply a more rationalist approach to its relations with Iran.  
Critically, in this manner, it was demonstrated that questions of rationalism, versus 
constructivism in the economic sphere, are not only at the core of existing disputes in 
literature regarding interpretation of economic ties between the two countries, but further, 
central to answering questions of underlying German interest in the wider relationship, as 
well as determining the extent to which such ties may challenge prevailing assumptions of 
contemporary German foreign policy, identity, and interest, in a broader sense. 
 
With this in mind, it was shown that contrary to many arguments regarding the relationship, 
which posit economic relations are too minuscule to shape German interest, or explain the 
relationship, German policymakers and firms place a value on economic relations that are not 
adequately captured by numbers alone.  This long-term valuation, and the manner in which 
various facets of the valuation occur, evidenced a Germany both driven by a desire to see 
unrestricted transactions and trade beyond the scope of military use, as well as one shown in 
analysis of narratives, to particularly lament the financial losses incurred, rather than concern 
itself with the impact upon most non-economic, and normative interests.  This dynamic was 
further evidenced within policy statements reflecting a general disinterest on the part of 
Germany to leverage its economic relationship for normative ends, and instead, demonstrated 
its active encouragement of businesses to seek maximisation of economic ties.  In this sense, 
the evidence compellingly established a Germany driven by economic interests, and 
fundamentally challenging many assumptions underlying German foreign policy, identity, and 
interest, per the civilian power role concept.  This means a Handelsstaat interpretation of 
Germany, featuring maximisation of interest, and general indifference to normative 
considerations such as human rights, would appear to best characterise most of Germany’s 
economic relationship with Iran. 
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This characterisation notwithstanding, it was similarly evidenced that limitations to such 
interests do, in fact, exist, and most importantly, are attributable to a German identity rooted 
in historical and collective memories.  In doing so, this appears to meet the threshold of 
demonstrating the effects of normative concerns and identity, albeit in a very limited part of 
economic ties.  By evidencing this, the chapter has established confidence that limitations to 
economic ties are attributable to identity –something existing accounts have failed to 
adequately evidence, despite arguing a curbing of economic ties may occur for various 
reasons.  This means, in a first for literature on the subject, the chapter demonstrates with a 
high-degree of confidence, that Germany’s only limitation to economic interest vis-à-vis Iran, 
is a commitment to prevent military action, as a consequence of its normative and identity-
based interest formation. 
 
Taking the evidence of this chapter into account, it would appear the best characterisation of 
Germany’s relationship with Iran is economic, but with the profoundly significant 
contingency that it does not interfere with this identity.  Bearing this conclusion in mind, it is 
clear to see how existing interpretations of the economic relationship have managed to 
surmise strikingly different, and antithetical conclusions, despite possessing the same 
evidence.  From an epistemological and ontological standpoint, rationalist and constructivist 
accounts are largely incompatible, and mutually exclusive.  Yet, despite this fact, Germany’s 
actions herein demonstrate a state driven by primarily rational economic interests, which are 
curbed by the influence of another, non-rationalist aim, to the extent they conflict.  In this 
manner, by establishing confidence in such an interpretation of this relationship, a more 
accurate understanding of German interest and identity can be forged.   
 
While confidence in a limitation to such economic interests has been evidenced, and 
accredited to identity, this provokes a vital question for purposes of addressing the 
overarching questions of this thesis: to what extent is this identity indicative of a civilian 
power commitment?  To answer this question, the next, and final chapter, will aim to address 
a potential linkage between Germany’s civilian power role concept, and concern over use of 
force in relations with Iran. 
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Chapter Six: Use of Force and Identity in Germany’s 
Relationship with Iran 
 
Introduction 
 
The preceding empirical chapters demonstrated that three facets underlying Germany’s 
civilian power role concept,1105 are unable to explain Germany’s post-unification relations with 
Iran.  In failing to do so, this inability has served to challenge prevailing understandings of 
post-unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest, as a civilian power.1106  Rather 
than supporting such an understanding of Germany, the previous chapters have instead 
evidenced a non-civilian power understanding –manifested in Germany’s ambition to cultivate 
robust commercial and trade relations with Tehran– largely serves to explain its interest in 
relations with Iran.1107  However, notwithstanding a high-degree of confidence in an economic 
explanation concerning most of the relationship, the preceding chapter similarly established a 
critical, identity-based commitment to avoiding use of force, or even indirectly contributing to 
the potential for use of force through economic ties, curbed, or at times, stymied, this 
economic explanation of the relationship.  Considering this identity-based commitment 
appears closely related to the fourth facet of Germany’s civilian power role concept –in which 
use of force is detested, and political solutions are always preferred1108– the following chapter 
aims to examine whether such a facet of Germany’s civilian power role concept can explain its 
policy in this regard.  Furthermore, it intends to evaluate whether such an interest may 
account for other features of the relationship as well, beyond at times, curbing economic 
interests.  As the theoretical framework and methodology chapter noted, a civilian power 
account of foreign policy need only to establish demonstrable effects of such an identity on the 
course of policy.1109  This also means, despite evidenced interest in commercial, and trade ties, 
to fully understand, and properly account for Germany’s post-unification relationship with 
Iran, this necessitates explaining the case, without leaving aspects out. 
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1108 Refer to chapter two. 
1109 Refer to chapter two. 
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With this in mind, the chapter will begin by presenting the antecedents of Germany’s post-
war aversion to use of force, including how this abhorrence ostensibly shapes its interest as a 
civilian power.  Once established, the chapter then addresses how such an identity, and 
interest, have manifested themselves in the post-unification era, including debates concerning 
whether Germany may, in fact, exhibit a changing attitude towards utilisation of force, and 
participation in military engagements.  Following this, Germany’s relationship with Iran will 
be considered in light of these themes –through analysis of narratives and actions, in 
accordance with the process-tracing methodology– to answer the critical question, whether 
features of the relationship appear attributable to an interest of avoiding use of force, pursuant 
to civilian power assumptions.  In doing so, this chapter aims to ultimately demonstrate, 
through consideration of primary, and secondary evidence, that Germany’s policy towards 
Iran appears meaningfully shaped by the fourth, and final facet of the civilian power role 
concept, in which a commitment to preventing use of force, and seeking political solutions to 
foreign policy issues, does explain key elements of Germany’s post-unification relationship 
with Iran, beyond economic interests alone. 
 
6.1 Post-War Germany and a New Military Culture 
 
Before turning to analysis of the relationship itself, it is firstly imperative to consider how 
themes regarding use of force have gained meaning, and evolved as interests of post-war 
German foreign policy.  Only once this is accomplished, is it possible to interpret the manner 
in which Germany’s post-war aversion towards use of force, may serve to account for its 
policy towards Iran, beyond a mere rationalist, and materialist explanation, and in accordance 
with the civilian power role concept.  In this regard, it is critical to appreciate that preceding 
the Second World War, Germany exhibited a strong military culture,1110 in which, pursuant to 
Clausewitzian notions, utilisation of military force remained a natural extension of the political 
playbook.1111 Accordingly, Germany held a fundamentally Machtpolitik outlook towards the 
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international environment, and this shaped the course of its policy and interest.1112 However, 
notwithstanding this pre-war culture, and its more rationalist implications for understandings 
of German foreign policy, as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) emerged from World 
War Two a semi-sovereign state,1113 and facing imposed measures regarding the future of its 
armed forces,1114 it appeared pre-war militarism would be supplanted by a post-war military 
subordination.1115 
 
Importantly, however, far from being the mere result of exogenous expectations concerning 
the future of a West German military, it was West German society itself that expressed a 
strong aversion to its “pre-war military ethos”.1116  The prevalence of this sentiment cultivated 
a post-war rejection of Germany’s traditional Machtpolitik approach,1117 as the internalisation 
of “pacifistic principles”,1118 resulted in a conscious repudiation of military force as an 
acceptable means of achieving foreign policy goals.1119  With this, not only was “a ban on wars 
of aggression”, central to all of West German foreign policy,1120 but the FRG further diverged 
from rationalist accounts of foreign policy,1121 in its avoidance of any military capacity, 
consistent with its strength and political importance.1122  In accordance with Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer’s vision,1123 West Germany spurned unilateral military capacity,1124 and 
instead, willingly made its military strategy one of subservience,1125 by seeking to become a 
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key player within multilateral defence institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).1126 
 
Accordingly, “peace and security” was more than a “main pillar” of West German foreign 
policy,1127 it was embodied in an “anti-militarist political culture”,1128 in which, consensus 
noted,1129 West Germany had declared “‘total peace’”.1130  In this sense, the cultural 
transformation of post-war German society concerning use of force, was particularly 
significant, in that it reflected how underlying convictions and values,1131 particularly of a 
normative basis, ultimately functioned to determine that traditional power,1132 and use of force 
as a foreign policy tool, should be avoided.1133  Operating as such, this normative 
understanding towards use of force, captured the influence of history, or historical 
memory,1134 in which remembrance of the National Socialist past, as well as the Second World 
War, ostensibly served to explain the sudden emergence of “a stable anti-militarist political 
culture”.1135 Thus, in accordance with a constructivist account of foreign policy –as noted in 
previous chapters–1136 this objective, historical memory, paired with its subjective, present 
understanding of the past, as collective memory, coalesced to forge West German restraint.1137 
In this regard, not only are post-war German foreign policy, and its related military culture, 
attributable to profoundly ideological grounds –in stark contrast to rationalist and materialist 
understandings–1138 but critically, these ideological factors served to determine an underlying 
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identity,1139 in which anti-militarism became defined as a preeminent interest,1140 and manifested 
itself as a key component of Germany’s supposed essence in foreign policy, as a civilian 
power.1141 
 
Accordingly, it would appear there is, indeed, a strong correlation between Germany’s civilian 
power role concept, and a previously evidenced willingness to subordinate economic interests 
in the relationship, to identity-based concerns over potential use of military force.1142 But 
having noted a connection between Germany’s identity, and related interest in rejecting use of 
force as part of its civilian power role concept, this raises an important question: if Germany’s 
civilian power role explains aspects of its policy in the relationship with Iran, in what manner 
would this anti-militarism interest be expected to inform their behaviour as a civilian power?  
By answering this question, it then becomes possible to determine whether the behaviour of 
post-unification Germany in the relationship, in fact corresponds to that of a civilian power. 
 
6.2 Civilian Power Germany, and a Politics, Not Force, 
Approach to Foreign Policy 
 
In regards to this question, for a civilian power Germany, the doctrine of peace remains one of 
the “two most important” aspects of its role.1143 As suggested by the term civilian, there exists 
an intrinsic association between the role concept, and notions of a non-militaristic bearing.1144 
Indeed, based upon such notions, civilian powers actively strive to supersede rationalist, 
“military enforcement of rules”, with “socially accepted norms”, intended to “pacif[y] […] 
[and] civili[ze] international relations” in the process.1145 This appears in a determination to 
focus foreign policy efforts on alternative, pacifistic methods of achieving its ends,1146 as 
civilian powers not only oppose the appropriateness of using military force in international 
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relations, but further, question a connection between their own security, and military 
abilities.1147 In this regard, the interest of an “ideal type” civilian power, fundamentally exists 
in its resolution to “limit and abolish the use of war and violence in international relations”,1148 
and an overall “quasi-pacifistic” disposition.1149 Yet, critically, the implication of this role-
based abhorrence of utilizing military force, and the overwhelming preference for pacifistic 
tools1150 that comes with it, presents itself as a fundamental commitment to a policy of “‘politics 
not force’”.1151 In this manner, a clear favouring of political solutions to foreign policy issues, 
supposedly determines the course of policy,1152 because its identity1153 holds political and 
diplomatic efforts are the only, fully-justifiable approach.1154   
 
This means more than simply expecting a committed civilian power Germany to oppose 
military solutions vis-à-vis Iran, one would anticipate it demonstrating a “preference for 
diplomatic solutions and the exhaustion of all peaceful instruments before military action is 
considered”.1155  For a civilian power Germany, foreign policy is, at its essence, a means of 
staving off war, so as to avoid participation in it.1156  Thus, although a civilian power may 
exhibit robust participation in collective, and cooperative security organisations,1157 the 
underlying impetus for this nevertheless exists in the intentness to withhold force, by 
relegating security issues to the realm of multilateralism, and international cooperation.1158  
However, it is imperative to recognise that notwithstanding a willingness –in exceedingly 
limited instances– to participate in collective security operations,1159 for a civilian power 
Germany, the only conditions under which it entertains collective participation, occur under a 
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genuine belief that “peaceful means” are fully “exhausted”,1160 and the use of force itself is the 
only course of action “to reach a peaceful outcome”.1161 
 
In this regard, for a Germany adhering to its civilian power role in relations with Iran, one 
expects to see a clear determination to mitigate all potential for escalation of a military 
situation.  This means an anomalous prevention of dual-use and military exports, at the 
expense of other evidenced interests in the relationship –as noted in the preceding chapter–1162 
does appear strongly consistent with the expected behaviour of a civilian power.  More than 
that alone, the expectations of a civilian power Germany make clear: a Germany conformant 
to the civilian power role concept would be expected to demonstrate a consistent pursuit of 
non-military, political, and diplomatic approaches to the relationship itself.  Accordingly, it is 
imperative to consider, where applicable, whether evidence suggests Germany’s unique 
strategy underlying its relations with Iran, is attributable to this wider concern over use of 
force, and a commitment to political solutions.  Before turning to the relationship, however, it 
is important to address another question: to what extent might Germany’s post-unification 
attitude concerning use of force be evolving?  And to what extent does change suggest 
features of Germany’s civilian power identity, and interest, are similarly evolving on the 
subject?  In order to establish full confidence in the role expectations of a civilian power 
Germany regarding themes of military force, and Iran, such questions must be answered. 
 
6.3 Post-Unification Questions of a Changing German 
Military Culture 
 
With this in mind, it is imperative to recall from previous chapters, that with unification of 
Germany, widespread speculation, and a core question of German foreign policy and interest 
emerged, about whether based upon rationalist understandings of international relations, 
Germany might revert to its former, militaristic ways, as a fully normalised, and unrestrained 
state.1163  In this manner, the question of post-unification Germany’s attitude regarding use of 
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military force, in many ways, embodies the essence of wider questions concerning supposed 
continuity as a civilian power, in the post-unification, Berlin Republic.1164  Despite rampant 
speculation, however, key indicators in the early years of reunification suggested the previous, 
anti-militarist culture underpinning the FRG, indeed, continued to shape post-unification 
German foreign policy, identity, and interest.1165 Public opinion underscored both a “peaceful” 
disposition in Germany,1166 and a general abhorrence of using force,1167 in which some 
concluded, assuredly, post-unification “German power does not take the form of tanks and 
guns”.1168 Yet, notwithstanding initially unambiguous evidence of continuity, new challenges 
emerged over time, leading others to posit, after a decade of unification, Germany’s attitude 
towards use of military force had evolved considerably.1169 
 
Almost immediately following unification, Germany’s policy regarding military force was put 
to the test, as intense, and at times, “acrimonious debate”, over German participation in the 
Gulf War, bespoke a deeper, unresolved question, about the future of German interest, and 
power.1170 Despite such questions, low public support for German involvement,1171 and the 
continued salience of Germany’s anti-militarist political culture,1172 resulted in a strong 
rejection of participating in a military coalition.1173  In doing so, Germany’s policy reflected a 
continuation of the FRG’s foreign policy, identity, and interest concerning use of force, as 
now unified Germany, deliberately sought to avoid military engagement,1174 in order to convey 
its “peacefulness and anti-militarism”, in accordance with civilian power role expectations.1175 
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Nevertheless, a key result of Germany’s overt abstention, was the emergence of further 
debate, in which many questioned whether Germany should, or even legally could, support 
multilateral military efforts, bearing in mind the centrality of multilateralism and cooperation 
to the civilian power role concept.1176 
 
As new questions emerged over time, Germany’s policy exhibited subtle adjustments.  
Limited, non-combat roles, with United Nations-backed, multilateral military operations in 
Cambodia (1991-93), as well as Somalia (1993) occurred, under a rationale that supporting 
humanitarian, and peacekeeping efforts, remained consistent with Germany’s identity-based 
commitment to peace and cooperation, and did not fall into the category of using military 
force.1177  Indeed, with such a noted calculus, in these cases, a German public that was 
strongly averse to military participation in the Gulf War, expressed “cautious […] approval” 
of Germany’s policy in this area.1178 Parallel to this, debates –continuing from the Gulf War 
period– surrounding the legality of German participation, culminated in the July 12, 1994 
ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court,1179 which stated, provided there is a majority 
consent from the Bundestag,1180 and the efforts are fundamentally about ensuring peace,1181 
Germany could partake in out-of-area, multilateral military operations.  Now, not only was 
Germany unrestrained in terms of sovereignty as a military actor, it was legally empowered to 
act within multilateral military frameworks.  But to what extent did full empowerment 
actually engender, or even suggest, tangible change?  Or, did Germany continue to restrain 
itself in accordance with its identity-based commitment to avoiding use of military force as a 
civilian power? 
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As discussed previously –in chapter four of this thesis– Srebrenica represented a critical 
turning point in post-unification foreign policy,1182 as an ostensibly civilian power Germany 
found itself facing an existential dilemma: allow a genocide to occur, or use military force in 
order to prevent it.1183 As noted in chapter four, facing this dilemma, robust debate led to 
“majority support” for Germany’s limited participation in aspects of the Balkans conflict,1184 in 
stark contrast to previously overwhelming opposition to German military participation during 
the Gulf War.1185 However, as similarly presented in chapter four, the circumstances of this 
case were profoundly unique, in that German participation was fundamentally predicated 
upon saving human lives,1186 protecting human rights,1187 cooperation,1188 and ultimately, 
peacekeeping.1189  As such, the favourable public opinion regarding participation, resulted 
from the salience of humanitarian concerns, per civilian power role expectations, rather than 
indicated evolving understandings of power and force per se.1190  In this manner, although 
some have cited German participation in the Balkans conflict as both a turning point towards 
embracing a military role,1191 as well as the emergence of normalisation in German foreign 
policy and interest, at the expense of civilian power accounts,1192 Germany’s behaviour in this 
case, was in fact, still attributable to “normative” factors, rather than rationalist interests.1193   
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Critically, in functioning as such, rather than indicate meaningful change regarding its role 
concept, and use of force, a now legally empowered Germany’s behaviour in this instance, 
instead reinforced civilian power accounts of German foreign policy, identity, and interest,1194 
in which despite a willingness to participate under exceptional circumstances, Germany, in 
general, continued to exhibit an abhorrence of using military force,1195 and eagerly strived to 
reach a political and diplomatic solution throughout conflict in the Balkans.1196  Importantly, 
in doing so, this event further confirmed a key feature of Germany’s adherence to the civilian 
power role concept: one in which political and diplomatic solutions are always sought, even 
when seemingly unavoidable conflict emerges.  This precedent is critical, and as will be 
demonstrated later in the chapter, is particularly important in order to fully understand how 
Germany’s policy towards Iran, may reflect an interest of avoiding use of military force. 
 
Conflict in the Balkans was not the only case for which consideration of military action in the 
post-unification era highlighted a continued German interest in avoiding use of military force.  
Although Germany became an active coalition partner in Afghanistan –per former Chancellor 
Schröder’s declaration of “‘unconditional solidarity’” with the United States (U.S.) in the fight 
against terror– and a German “consensus [that] action […] against terrorist” threats is fully 
acceptable emerged,1197 its divergent position from the U.S. regarding the invasion of Iraq 
remains informative of their position towards using force.  In the case of Iraq, Germany’s 
intent to categorically reject military action1198 was so strong, it is often cited in German policy 
documents, as well as scholarship, as the “first” instance of true German assertiveness, and 
discord in post-unification relations with the U.S.1199  Notwithstanding the fact chapter three 
evidenced discord over Iran policy vis-à-vis the U.S., in fact predates this supposed, initial 
instance, Germany’s opposition remains profoundly significant in this case, as the very essence 
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of German opposition towards military action in Iraq, and its assertiveness to that end, 
underscores a “clash of strategic cultures” over military force.1200   
 
Specifically, the clash itself reflected that in contrast to a U.S. willingness to use force in the 
case of Iraq,1201 Germany’s military culture as a civilian power, engendered the staunch 
opposition,1202 in which “large segments of German society” opposed military action based on 
“ideational factors”, and instead, espoused interest in a “peaceful solution”.1203 In this manner, 
despite claims Schröder’s calculus of opposition reflected mere electoral considerations,1204 by 
mirroring these empirically evidenced beliefs, Germany’s behaviour appeared not only to 
demonstrate its continued civilian power interest of avoiding use of force, but in turn, further 
established a behavioural precedent of a civilian power Germany assertively assuming a foreign 
policy position, based upon an identity and interest of seeking peaceful solutions, in lieu of 
conflict.  As will be demonstrated later in the chapter, this further precedent regarding civilian 
power interest is particularly illuminating, when considering the extent to which Germany’s 
relationship with Iran, may be explained by this facet of the civilian power role concept. 
 
But regarding the previously stated questions of potential change in civilian power identity, 
and interest, in a more generalised context, although many posit change has occurred in 
Germany’s policy and receptiveness to utilizing force in the post-unification era,1205 all 
instances of German military participation appear consistent with civilian power role 
expectations and interests.  A cultural, identity-based, abhorrence of military solutions is 
noted to endure within wider German society,1206 and as such, memory concerning the “past”, 
continues to define German interest through an “antimilitaris[t] approac[h]” to foreign policy, 
and “societal preferences for peaceful, diplomatic” solutions to conflict.1207 Based upon this, it 
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would be expected Germany’s role behaviour as a civilian power, is similarly reflected in its 
relationship with Iran, to the extent themes of utilizing force manifest themselves in that 
context.  Yet, more than this alone, it is imperative to appreciate the enduring civilian power 
aversion to use of force, is also expected to manifest itself through “arms control and non-
proliferation” efforts,1208 which are themselves, consistent with “its role conception as a civilian 
[…] ‘pacifist’ power.”1209   
 
Thus, regarding a key question emergent from the previous chapter, the identity-based 
determination to curb, or at times, sever, trade and commercial relations, is, indeed, an 
expected feature of a civilian power Germany in avoiding use of force through its policy 
towards Iran.  In this regard, there is a high-degree of confidence demonstrable effects of this 
civilian power role concept facet exist in the relationship, and serve to explain some aspects of 
the ties.  However, based upon the wider, generalised expectations, now elaborated, this 
naturally provokes a necessary consideration of the full extent to which this facet of the 
civilian power role concept may explain the specific case of Germany’s relationship with Iran.  
With this in mind, it is now necessary, once again, to turn attention towards the relationship. 
 
6.4 A German Strategy for Peaceful Interests? 
 
As established by the preceding chapter, at the time of unification, increased concern emerged 
over the appropriateness of trading in weapons, and dual-use technology, given its apparent 
challenge to German identity, and relatedly, interest.1210  Moreover, as this chapter has 
indicated, the particular identity in question, mirrors a facet of the civilian power role concept.  
In this manner, it is revealing to consider that following Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
German policy interest, resulted in strong weapons-based export controls in trade with Iran, 
entailing a full cessation of trade in military goods,1211 and a severing of all military-related 
contacts.1212  Given this shift occurred despite an evidenced interest in commercial and trade 
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relations –even after 1979–1213 policy choices such as this remain emblematic of how, 
notwithstanding substantive economic interests, Germany’s identity-based interest as a 
civilian power, has a demonstrable effect, which transcends rationalist, and materialist 
explanations alone.  This dynamic is both consistent, and easily discernible in the post-
unification era, with policy documents from the 1990s to present-day, reflecting that despite 
robust trade and commercial relations, Germany remains wholeheartedly committed to 
avoiding any “military use” and “dual-use” trade with Iran.1214 Accordingly, and as chapter 
five evidenced, discourse is unambiguous: German concern over use of force not only has 
demonstrable effects on an otherwise economic interest behind relationship, but it establishes 
a meaningful hierarchy of interests. 
 
But although this dynamic may be clear from analysis of the relationship in an economic 
context, what remains less apparent, is the extent to which an interest concerning use of force, 
has demonstrable effects beyond the scope of curtailing economic interests.  In this regard, it is 
significant to appreciate concern over potential use of force, and a related preoccupation over 
challenges to peace, thematically manifest well beyond the scope of trade and commercial 
relations alone.  Beginning as early as February 1991, concern over potential use of force 
emerged as an area of discussion between newly unified Germany, and Iran –at the time based 
upon shared concern that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait would escalate–1215 and in doing so, from 
the relationship’s post-unification inception, German opposition to using military force 
appeared as a central theme within the relationship’s narrative.  Of far greater significance for 
understanding the relationship, however, rather than emerge as a trend of agreement between 
the two states, Germany’s interest in peaceful solutions to conflict, has largely constituted an 
area of profound disagreement with Tehran, leading to concern in Germany over Iran’s 
challenges towards interests of securing regional peace, and preventing military conflict.1216   
In this manner, it is, in fact, the centrality of divergent interests from Iran regarding regional 
peace and stability, which in turn, have given added salience to German interest beyond the 
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economic realm, and critically, as such, further encouraged a German belief that a strategy of 
“dialogue could eliminate these problems.”1217  In this respect, even more than a central theme, 
the prominence of a German interest in preventing use of force, may very well have 
demonstrable effects in terms of shaping the overall form of its policy strategy. But to what 
extent is this true? 
 
To consider this matter further, it is essential to recall the findings of chapter three, in which it 
was noted Germany’s approach to bilateral relations with Iran, exists in terms of a firm 
commitment to pursuing dialogue1218 –a strategy for which Germany remains the strongest 
advocate.1219 Although chapter three did not precisely define what interests might underlie this 
commitment –instead discussing its attributes– it is important to recall the German interest in 
pursuing dialogue towards Iran, largely functioned in stark contrast to Washington’s 
approach.1220  In this respect, and mirroring Germany’s oppositional position concerning the 
Iraq War, while successive administrations in Washington aimed to sanction and isolate 
Tehran,1221 conversely, the German way of thinking held a general aversion to implementing 
sanctions,1222 and from its inception in 1991, exhibited a consistent narrative in support of 
diplomacy.1223 In doing so, Germany’s pursuit of dialogue not only “served as a vehicle for 
[…] major issues” specifically relating to use of force, such as regional peace, and concern 
over Iran’s acquisition of weapons,1224 but importantly, it encouraged a perception that 
Germany was “the main defender of the diplomatic and non-military approach” towards Iran, 
because of its commitment to a dialogue approach.1225 
 
But although the effect of Germany’s strategy produced such a belief, for purposes of 
explaining the relationship, in its entirety, the imperative question is: what interest actually 
underlies this commitment to dialogue? And, relatedly, to what extent might this interest be 
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explained by a civilian power desire to avoid use of force, and pursue political solutions?  In 
order to address these questions, it is necessary to consider once again, the specific philosophy 
underpinning this strategy, and its related calculus. 
 
To this point, it is revealing to consider that despite initial public concern in Germany over 
establishing ties with Iran,1226 German public opinion nevertheless expressed a strong 
scepticism of the U.S. strategy towards Iran, because it exhibited notable philosophical 
differences from Germany’s,1227 and accordingly, provoked questions of efficacy.1228 In this 
manner, it would appear the answer to questions of underlying interest in dialogue, exist in 
terms of differing cultural philosophies –similar to the noted difference between Germany’s 
military culture, and that of the U.S.  Consequently, it is valuable to recognise the essence of 
philosophical beliefs underpinning these strong opinions in the German public, are discernible 
from consideration of the Ostpolitik antecedents of Germany’s belief in dialogue.  As noted 
previously, in chapter three, the emergence of an Ostpolitik strategy during the 1970s was a 
seminal moment of assertiveness in West German foreign policy,1229 and at its philosophic 
core, existed a belief that pursuing dialogue was central to resolving conflict, and economic 
sanctioning was ineffective.1230 Finding its impetus from the influence of historical, as well as 
collective memories,1231 Germany’s pursuit of Ostpolitik, and its corresponding rejection of 
economic pressure mechanisms, bespoke a moralistic perspective,1232 and affirmed a 
“normative aspect of Germany’s post-war foreign policy.”1233  More specifically, however, the 
core of moral interest inherent in Ostpolitik was, in fact, “support for non-military means of 
[…] ensuring security”, which “reinforced […] antimilitary” attitudes in West Germany.1234  
Not only was the policy predicated upon a desire to mitigate possible military conflict, but 
public support for an Ostpolitik strategy increased over time, because it was considered a 
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fundamental rejection of utilizing force,1235 and underscored a public preference for diplomatic 
solutions.1236   
 
In this regard, an Ostpolitik-inspired dialogue, is, at its philosophic core, emblematic of an 
identity-based interest of pursuing a politics, not force, approach to foreign policy.  
Consequently, it not only appears highly informative that an Ostpolitik-inspired approach is 
central to Germany’s policy towards Iran,1237 but that the strong philosophic differences 
underlying German public opposition to the U.S. approach, are at their essence, based upon a 
once philosophic affirmation of antimilitarist interest in German foreign policy efforts.  In this 
sense, more than merely an effect of dialogue, an antimilitarist interest as a civilian power, may 
very well constitute a cause of Germany’s choice of dialogue.  However, in order to determine 
whether, and to what extent, this is the case, it is necessary to consider whether evidence 
establishes confidence in such conclusions.  Helpfully, in this regard, discourse surrounding 
the relationship may offer an answer. 
 
6.4.1 Discourse, Policy Choices, and Concern Over Use of Force 
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, it was, at the very least, envisaged that dialogue could 
potentially serve to bridge differences with Iran over peace and security in the Middle East.  
In this manner, there appeared to exist a discernible benefit from pursuing a dialogue 
approach, in terms of mitigating potential use of force, even if indirect.  Yet, insightfully, 
consideration of discourse during the post-unification relationship indicates concern over use 
of force may very well represent a central interest behind the choice of sustaining a dialogue 
strategy.  Beginning in the 1990s, concern emerged in Germany that Israel or the U.S. might 
launch a military strike against Iran.1238 German policy documents unambiguously reference a 
preeminent concern that use of force might occur against Iran.1239 In fact, they specifically 
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bespeak an additional fear that mere “threat of military means can […] hinder a peaceful 
resolution” of disputes with Iran.1240 In this sense, discourse surrounding the relationship is 
clear, beginning in earlier years of the post-unification relationship, a preoccupation appeared 
in Germany over potential for use of military force against Iran, and as such, the prominence 
of this issue indicates an underlying interest on the issue.  But although an interest in 
preventing use of force may be visible from these statements, what is less apparent, is whether 
this interest, in turn, explains continued implementation of a dialogue approach. 
 
Regarding this question, it is helpful to consider policy statements demonstrate a consistent 
desire for negotiations, rather than military intervention against Iran.1241  Not only did 
members of the Bundestag, explicitly “call on the United States of America” to forego any 
“military measures against Iran”,1242 but these statements further elaborate that a desire to 
mitigate potential use of force through “diplomatic efforts”1243 occurs, because consideration of 
military methods are “counterproductive” to German interests in this context.1244  As stated by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, Germany “hold[s] any form of military solution as absolutely 
inappropriate and put[s] forth diplomatic efforts”,1245 whereby more than a question of 
efficacy, the aversion to military methods is fundamentally predicated upon a logic of 
appropriateness, consistent with constructivist understandings of interest formation.1246  This 
interpretation of interest, underlying German policy towards Iran, is further bolstered by 
public opinion data, which noted in 2007 –at a time of particular concern in Germany that 
Iran might become a second Iraq–1247 that 75% of the German public was opposed to any 
military action against Iran, even provided diplomatic initiatives at the time failed to produce a 
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satisfactory outcome.1248 Based upon this calculus, as German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas 
presents it, the German government is therefore interested in “working against every military 
escalation, and to fight on every level for political solutions.”1249 
 
With expression of these non-rationalist, non-materialist calculations, discourse accordingly 
indicates a clear German interest in pursuing a politics, not force approach in relations with Iran.  
But of equal importance, policy statements further serve to acknowledge that for German 
policymakers, the very rationale for continued implementation of “intensive dialogue”, is 
attributable to its underlying interest in pursuing diplomatic efforts,1250 by means of “civilian 
instruments”.1251  In other words, not only is avoiding use of force evidenced by discourse to 
constitute a preeminent interest of post-unification German foreign policy towards Iran, but 
the decision to sustain a dialogue approach, predicated upon understandings of 
appropriateness, is directly attributed to this interest.  In this manner, from a discourse 
perspective, dialogue in the case of Iran relations, appears emblematic of a wider “ideational 
[…] preference for diplomatic […] instruments” and abhorrence of using force, considered 
both intrinsic to the philosophical underpinnings of Germany’s past dialogues,1252 and 
consistent with civilian power explanations. 
 
Yet, beyond discourse itself, to what extent does this identity-based interest as a civilian 
power, have a demonstrable effect in shaping dialogue policy itself?  In other words: does 
policy action, in fact, mirror this stated interest within discourse?  For such questions, it is 
helpful to recall that a central feature of Germany’s Ostpolitik-inspired dialogue, entails a 
general aversion to economic sanctions.1253  It is accordingly insightful that concurrent to its 
rhetoric of opposition towards using military options in Iran policy, Germany has, as a general 
trend, endeavoured through policy actions, to oppose economic sanctions against Tehran.1254 
Considering the findings of the preceding chapter, including Germany’s strong opposition 
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towards limitations on its trade and commercial ties with Iran,1255 it might be natural to 
assume this policy choice is attributable to a desire for maximizing economic potential.  
Despite this potential explanation, however, German policy statements have often expressed 
in relation to such action, a fundamental concern that imposing sanctions against Iran could 
precipitate conflict.1256 Such statements have underscored a belief “sanctions against Iran 
further contribute to the aggravation of the situation,”1257 and even labelled them “conflict 
increasing sanctions”.1258  Given the prominence and prevalence of such sentiments, it would 
appear the policy decision to generally oppose implementation of sanctions, as part of an 
Ostpolitik-inspired dialogue, is in part, attributable to German antimilitarist interests, rather 
than merely ascribable to economic interests of maintaining an open marketplace alone. 
 
Not only is interest in diplomatic alternatives to military force incontrovertibly evidenced in 
relation to features of Germany’s Ostpolitik-inspired dialogue, but the conviction to sustain 
implementation of dialogue policy –in the face of marginal success for most stated goals of 
dialogue1259– suggests the perceived efficacy of this policy approach, must rest elsewhere.  In 
this manner, a diplomatic, and non-military interest, represents a highly probable explanation 
of Germany’s policy, including the more unilateral, if not assertive, pursuit of non-military 
policy towards Iran,1260 previously discussed in chapter three.1261  After all, policy documents 
acknowledge that for Germany, divergent policy from multilateral positions often underscores 
“it’s not always simple […] to find a unified position […] particularly given potential military 
engagement”.1262  It would therefore appear interest in avoiding use of force –as captured by 
discourse, and pursuant to civilian power role expectations– serves to explain many of 
Germany’s policy choices in the relationship, which occur beyond immediate economic 
interests.  Moreover, it does so without leaving any pieces of the puzzle out. 
 
																																																						
1255 Refer to chapter five. 
1256 Bundestag, "Iran: Teherans Hegemoniale Und Nukleare Interessen Und Die Haltung Der Internationalen 
Gemeinschaft," 15.; Jones. 
1257 Bundestag, "Eskalation Im Atomkonflikt Mit Dem Iran Verhindern," 2. 
1258 "Weiter Verhandeln – Kein Militäreinsatz Gegen Den Iran," 1. 
1259 Refer to chapters three through five. 
1260 Harnisch, "Germany and Eu Foreign Policy," 12.; Küntzel, "Germany and a Nuclear Iran," 55. 
1261 Refer to chapter three. 
1262 Bundestag, "Die Nahostpolitik Deutschlands Und Russlands Seit 1991," 6. 
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Yet, despite the compelling potential of this explanation behind Germany’s actions in support 
of sustaining dialogue, including a general philosophical opposition to sanctions, Germany has 
also, at times, exhibited a curious willingness to implement sanctions, and economic 
embargoes against Iran.1263 In this manner, if policy steps to oppose sanctions serve to 
evidence an interest in avoiding use of force, as an explanation of the relationship, it would 
then be logical to assume support for sanctions initiatives, albeit less often, downgrades 
confidence that Germany’s implementation of Ostpolitik-inspired dialogue, is in fact 
attributable to a civilian power interest of avoiding use of force.  Interestingly, however, as 
similarly noted in preceding chapters, there also appears to be a strong correlation between 
Germany’s change in policy towards limited sanctions implementation, and concern over use 
of force.1264  Insightfully, policy documents clearly articulate the rationale underpinning this 
potential contradiction in stated interests, by noting a belief that under particular 
circumstances, implementation of sanctions functions “to serve a peaceful aim”.1265  
Elaborating further upon this calculus, documents underscore a belief “sanctions measures 
[…] can successfully result in diplomatic resolution” of  disputes with Iran,1266 and if 
necessary for continued advancement of diplomacy and peace, sanctions measures are thereby 
central to a dialogue strategy, rather than suggestive of a movement away from this 
approach.1267  Thus, ironically, the policy choice to implement sanctions under limited 
circumstances, is not only predicated upon the same concern over use of force invoked by 
Germany in its more common opposition to sanctions, but such policy action is further 
presented as a proof point of this interest. 
 
But if both opposition to, and endorsement of sanctions are emblematic of a desire for political 
solutions, then at what point does Germany’s policy shift towards favouring economic 
sanctions occur, and how does such a shift advance explanation of Germany’s policy interest 
in this relationship?  Helpfully, expanding upon the articulated desire for a diplomatic 
																																																						
1263 Refer to chapters three and five. 
1264 Refer to chapters three and five. 
1265 Bundestag, "Antwort Der Bundesregierung: Sanktionspolitik Und Wirtschaftsembargo Gegen Den Iran —
Drucksache 17/10508," 3.; Bundesregierung, "Antwort Der Bundesregierung: Das Iranische Atomprogramm 
Und Die Verhängung Von Sanktionen Seitens Der Eu Gegen Iran," 2-6. 
1266 Bundestag, "Antwort Der Bundesregierung: Sanktionspolitik Und Wirtschaftsembargo Gegen Den Iran —
Drucksache 17/10508," 6. 
1267 "Antwort Der Bundesregierung: Die Iran Politik Der Bundesregierung, Drucksache 16/5533," 1. 
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solution through such measures, policy documents indicate a change towards sanctions often 
correlates with elevated concern force might be used vis-à-vis Iran.1268  In this manner, the 
catalyst for supporting sanctions appears to result from palpable fear that military measures 
are an increasingly distinct possibility, suggesting Germany alters their position on sanctions 
at times, because they fear not doing so could precipitate a conflict.   
 
The narrative surrounding Germany’s relationship with Iran appears to support this 
interpretation, in which policy statements note: “all activities […] serve the hindrance of a 
military escalation”,1269 and sanctions are themselves presented as a manifestation of this 
interest.1270 Documents critically state that although sanctions-free “negotiations” are 
preferred, “provided this remains unsuccessful –non-military sanctions are the only justifiable 
way”.1271 Accordingly, in a striking parallel to the ideational and normative underpinnings of a 
civilian power identity, concern over justifiability, and legitimacy, present themselves as a 
shaping force in policy implementation.  As Germany’s former Ambassador to Tehran, Paul 
Freiherr von Maltzahn, explains it, for Germany, “it would be wrong to follow the motto 
‘keep all your options open’ because this includes the possibility of a military strike.”1272 Thus, 
notwithstanding a strong preference to avoid implementation of sanctions, per the philosophic 
underpinnings of an Ostpolitik-inspired dialogue, when the alternative appears to be military 
action, sanctions are envisaged as “the price that has to be paid” for peace,1273 and German 
policy becomes one of “as few sanctions as possible […] to avoid […] [a] military attack.”1274   
 
In this regard, interest in avoiding use of force appears to hold particular salience and 
influence upon German policy towards Iran.  In fact, one of the few consistent issue areas in 
which Germany does express particular concern over Iran’s machinations, and relatedly 
conveys a desire to pursue a tougher stance on sanctions policy towards Tehran, is that of 
																																																						
1268 Heinrich.; Bundestag, "Antwort Der Bundesregierung: Sanktionspolitik Und Wirtschaftsembargo Gegen 
Den Iran —Drucksache 17/10508," 1-2. 
1269 "Antwort Der Bundesregierung: Sanktionspolitik Und Wirtschaftsembargo Gegen Den Iran —Drucksache 
17/10508," 12. 
1270 Küntzel, "Germany and a Nuclear Iran," 52. 
1271 Bundestag, "FüR Ein Friedliches Vorgehen Im Konflikt ÜBer Das Iranische Atomprogramm –
Demokratische Entwicklung UnterstüTzen," 1. 
1272 Küntzel, "Germany and a Nuclear Iran," 55. 
1273 Germany and Iran: From the Aryan Axis to the Nuclear Threshold, 241. 
1274 "Germany and a Nuclear Iran," 52.; Germany and Iran: From the Aryan Axis to the Nuclear Threshold, 241. 
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Iran’s missile program1275 –a clear manifestation of potential use of force.  In this manner, 
despite potential contradictions, it is clear the underlying interest, which explains Germany’s 
curious policy shifts between opposing, and endorsing sanctions as part of its commitment to 
dialogue, is a preference for political solutions, and abhorrence of using force.  This, in turn, 
confirms the anticipated interests of a civilian power Germany.  Moreover, it is profoundly 
significant that concern over use of force is central to both opposition, as well as support for, 
sanctions, because although opposition to sanctions could be attributable to economic 
interests, support for them certainly is not.  Consequently, not only does this evidenced 
interest have demonstrable effects upon Germany’s policy action towards Iran, but the 
centrality of this interest, amidst policy changes, only further serves to upgrade confidence 
that concern over use of force is more than simple rhetoric designed to obfuscate economic 
interests, it is a definitive interest itself. 
 
But although the interest appears consistent with that of civilian power role expectations, does 
support for sanctions present any challenge to the expected behaviour of one?  Interestingly, 
for a civilian power Germany, sanctions are not, in fact, a refutation of civilian power 
interests.  Although a general aversion to sanctions –as exhibited by Germany in its pursuit of 
an Ostpolitik-inspired dialogue– is evidenced to bespeak underlying interests of a civilian 
power, sanctions, nevertheless, remain a tool at the disposal of an ideal civilian power.1276 
Although this may appear contradictory, the reason is in fact revealing.  As sanctions 
constitute “the most powerful instruments of a civilian power”,1277 the implication is: sanctions, 
for a civilian power, are effectively the last resort in efforts to advance civilian power policy 
interests.  In this manner, far from challenging the expected role behaviour of a civilian 
power, that Germany demonstrates a general aversion to sanctions, but at critical instances in 
which it appears use force is imminent, evidences a willingness to implement them, is actually 
strikingly consistent with that of a civilian power explanation.  As noted by former German 
Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, Germany feels it “must do everything to prevent a 
																																																						
1275 "Härterer Kurs: Deutschland Erwägt Offenbar Neue Iran-Sanktionen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
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subsequent worst-case-scenario: […] a military attack”,1278 and with such a civilian power 
interest at stake, shifting policy towards sanctions is not only emblematic of expected interest 
underlying a civilian power, it is the expected behaviour of one. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based upon evidence presented in this chapter, there is a high-degree of confidence the 
fourth, and final facet of Germany’s civilian power role concept as envisaged by this thesis –a 
commitment to avoiding use of force, and preference for diplomatic, or political solutions– has 
demonstrable effects upon Germany’s relationship with Iran, beyond the explanatory scope of 
rationalist, and materialist accounts alone. 
 
This chapter began by establishing the manner in which concern over use of force, and a 
preference for diplomatic, or political solutions, emerged as a key feature of post-war German 
foreign policy, identity, and interest, manifested in the civilian power role concept.  Following 
this, the chapter demonstrated that notwithstanding a perceived change in German policy 
towards use of force in the post-unification era, Germany’s civilian power role concept, and 
inherent concern over use of force as such, nevertheless endure as a core interest of German 
foreign policy.  This further allowed for the clear articulation of expected behaviour of a 
committed civilian power Germany in this area, for its relations with Iran. 
 
With these considerations in mind, the chapter evidenced, through consideration of both 
discourse, as well as policy action, that Germany’s identity-based commitment as a civilian 
power to avoiding use of force, not only explains its willingness to curb or stymie trade and 
commercial relations, but the manifestation of this interest, extends well beyond the economic 
sphere alone, and serves to explain Germany’s enduring commitment to an Ostpolitik-inspired 
form of dialogue.  In doing so, this chapter demonstrates that despite an ability for trade and 
commercial relations to explain most of the relationship, Germany’s civilian power role 
concept, nevertheless remains the final arbiter of German interest, and relatedly, policy, 
towards Iran.  In this manner, Germany’s fourth, and final facet of the civilian power role 
concept, is capable of explaining the remaining features of German policy towards Iran, and 
																																																						
1278 Julia Amalia Heyer et al., "Das Ultimatum," Der Spiegel, April 28, 2018 2018. 
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accordingly, supports a civilian power explanation of German foreign policy and interest in 
this case, albeit far more limited in scope than would be expected.  In other words, Germany’s 
policy towards Iran, although largely evidenced to be explained by underlying economic 
interests, nevertheless finds such interests wholly contingent upon another, ultimate basis of 
interest, namely: the extent to which concern over use of force manifests itself in the context 
of the relationship.  Consequently, although the findings of this chapter support and affirm a 
constructivist-inspired, civilian power explanation of some aspects of Germany’s relationship 
with Iran, these findings do so with the acknowledgement a constructivist-inspired 
explanation is far more limited in explanatory scope than prevailing interpretations of post-
unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest would anticipate. 
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Conclusion 
 
Based upon consideration of the four distinct facets underlying Germany’s civilian power role 
concept, this original perspective of research on Germany’s relationship with Iran offers 
strong evidence in support of a new explanation.  As noted previously, existing accounts of 
the relationship are few and far between, and largely present contradictory explanations of 
Germany’s interest.  For one school of thought, Germany’s relationship with Iran bespeaks an 
economically driven Germany, indifferent to normative, and identity-based considerations.  
For another, Germany’s relationship affirms a commitment to multilateralism, human rights, 
rule of law, and the advancement of diplomatic solutions to conflict.  In this manner, the 
essence of such contradictions was shown to mirror differing theoretical and analytical 
explanations of Germany’s interest in relations with Iran.  However, despite recognition of 
fundamentally differing theoretical understandings of the relationship, prior to this thesis, no 
work had meaningfully addressed the bilateral relationship from any theoretical, or analytical 
perspective, and certainly not from the prevailing understanding of post-unification Germany, 
as a constructivist-inspired, civilian power.   
 
This is significant, in that although a constructivist-inspired, civilian power role concept, 
ostensibly accounts for post-unification German foreign policy, identity and interest, 
fundamental questions have emerged concerning the continued validity of Germany’s civilian 
power role concept in the post-unification era.  In turn, this makes a discrete case study of this 
sort particularly valuable in a wider context, given that such prevailing civilian power 
explanations of German interest and policy, appear to be problematized in the context of 
Germany’s under-evaluated relationship with Iran, amidst two seemingly antithetical 
explanations of its interest and behaviour.  Two differing accounts of a case, which mirror a 
wider, fundamental question of whether post-unification Germany exhibits continuity as a 
civilian power, or appears as an increasingly normalised state.  Accordingly, notwithstanding 
the tendency of existing literature to focus on a multilateral level of Germany’s relations with 
Iran, there is particular value of addressing the relationship from this unique, bilateral level of 
investigation. 
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Amidst this profound gap in addressing the relationship, and bearing in mind these 
contradictions mirror wider, and pivotal debates regarding the continued validity of civilian 
power explanations of Germany, this shortcoming, in turn, necessitated further consideration 
of the extent to which such ties did in fact, challenge fundamental assumptions of post-
unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest.  In other words, before this study, 
not only did contradictory explanations of the relationship result from the absence of 
meaningful theoretical, or analytical perspectives, but this gap further meant the wider 
implications of this case study for questions of German foreign policy, identity, and interest, 
had gone unnoticed. 
 
Such limitations to knowledge notwithstanding, the results of this thesis indicate a clear 
explanation of Germany’s relationship with Iran does exist, and is best realised from the 
original perspective undertaken in this thesis.  By utilizing the constructivist-inspired, civilian 
power role concept, as a theoretical framework, this thesis was able to establish clear role 
expectations of a civilian power Germany, in the form of diagnostic criteria.  Used in 
conjunction with a case-explaining, process-tracing methodology –which aims to explain a puzzling 
case, by considering diagnostic criteria for a hypothesised causality– the civilian power 
theoretical framework allowed for a compelling explanation of this case to emerge, given its 
almost prescriptive expectations.  Pursuant to such a theoretical framework, and 
corresponding methodology, it was noted that if Germany’s relationship with Iran is explained 
by its underlying identity, and interest as a civilian power, the behaviour of Germany in this 
case, would evidence the demonstrable effects of at least one facet of a civilian power 
Germany, which as envisaged in this thesis, entails: 
 
• A commitment to multilateralism and cooperation. 
 
• Promotion of normative concerns –including human rights, rule of law, 
democratisation, and social justice– through bilateral relations, even if this stymies 
other interests. 
 
• Norms and values superseding material interests. 
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• A belief that political and diplomatic solutions are optimal, and use of force is detested. 
 
 
Approaching it from this unique perspective, role expectations were greatly challenged by 
Germany’s evidenced willingness to assertively pursue its subjective interests in policy 
towards Iran, at the expense of partnerships considered central to Germany’s post-war 
identity.  Germany’s role enactment in this context, served both to challenge the expectations 
of a civilian power concerning cooperation towards Iran in its policy, as well as critically, 
pinpointed an initial instance of post-unification German policy conflict with the U.S. –
something existing scholarship posits did not actually occur until debate surrounding the Iraq 
War. 
 
It was further indicated bilateral political and economic relations with Iran lacked true, or 
meaningful contingency upon concern over human rights, rule of law, and democratisation 
efforts, as such non-material, identity-based interests, were shown to be subservient to the 
intensification of trade and commercial relations.  All this despite German cognizance of a 
regression in the state of Iranian human rights, rule of law, and democratisation –which 
severely downgraded confidence in its influence upon Germany’s policy, similar to the 
multilateral, and cooperative facet. 
 
In this context, there is a high-degree of confidence, that commercial and trade relations 
explain most of the relationship, and in doing so, this largely downgrades confidence that 
Germany’s civilian power role concept –as currently understood– can explain the relationship.  
Nevertheless, despite the capacity for commercial and trade relations to explain most of 
Germany’s interest in Iran relations, the thesis critically recognised that aspects of the 
relationship cannot be accounted for by such interests alone.  In fact, it was clearly evidenced 
the economic interests of Germany in its relationship with Iran, are at times, curbed, or even 
stymied, by an identity-based interest of avoiding use of force, or precipitating use of force.  
Hence, although an economic explanation is well-evidenced, if these interests appear in 
conflict with this particular, identity-based interest of a non-economic basis, then an 
		 226	
explanation extends beyond the scope of commercial and trade interests alone.  In functioning 
as such, Germany’s core interest of trade and commercial relations is inherently contingent, 
upon a non-material, non-rationalist interest, attributed to Germany’s identity. 
 
Bearing this in mind, it was empirically demonstrated, that indeed, Germany’s fourth facet as 
a civilian power –a belief that political and diplomatic solutions are optimal, and use of force is 
detested– accounts for the identity-based limitation to commercial and trade relations, and 
moreover, serves to explain Germany’s particular determination to sustain an Ostpolitik-
inspired, dialogue-based approach, towards Iran.  Consequently, by leveraging this unique 
theoretical framework and methodology, this thesis evidenced clear, demonstrable effects of 
Germany’s identity, and related interest, as a civilian power, upon the course of the 
relationship, beyond the economic scope alone.  Given that economic interests were evidenced 
to come at the expense of three facets of the civilian power role concept, but were later 
demonstrated to remain strongly contingent upon identity-based interest formation, this, 
establishes a clear hierarchical picture of underlying interest, with sufficient evidence for an 
explanation of the relationship. 
 
Taking these findings into account, there is a high-degree of confidence that Germany’s 
relationship with Iran is mostly explained by economic interests, thereby challenging many 
fundamental assumptions of post-unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest.  
Yet, critically, despite these fundamental challenges to numerous facets of the civilian power 
role concept, it is nevertheless imperative to recognise such interests only account for 
Germany’s policy towards Iran when peaceful solutions, and political instruments endure.  
When facing a dilemma of choosing between a course of action most conducive to trade and 
commercial interests, or that of preserving peace and diplomacy, Germany has clearly 
evidenced a preference for the latter in its post-unification relationship.  In doing so, per the 
civilian power role concept, the final arbiter of Germany’s relationship with Iran remains its 
identity-based concern over use of force, and a corresponding preference for political 
solutions. 
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Despite this, however, one must also recognise that beyond shaping its Ostpolitik-inspired, 
dialogue approach, the identity-based interest underlying Germany’s policy, only manifests 
itself in limited instances of perceived conflict with economic interests, rather than such non-
rationalist, non-materialist interests constituting the core impetus of the relationship.  That is 
to say, commercial and trade relations merely remain contingent upon avoiding use of force, 
and a continuation of diplomacy, rather than use of force and political solutions being the 
preeminent causality of Germany’s behaviour in the relationship.  In demonstrating such a 
calculus, the findings of this thesis stand to alter existing understandings of the relationship, 
since prior to this study, accounts of the relations were largely mutually exclusive, in positing 
either an economic explanation, or a non-rationalist, non-materialist one. 
 
Consequently, by approaching it from the unique perspective of expected behaviour of a 
civilian power Germany, this thesis evidences, with a high-degree of confidence, a new 
understanding.  According to this understanding, although Germany’s relationship with Iran 
is mostly explained by commercial and trade relations, and occurs at the expense of numerous 
facets of prevailing, civilian power explanations of Germany, these economic interests 
nevertheless remain contingent upon Germany’s commitment to a lone facet of the civilian 
power role concept. 
 
Based upon the assumptions of a constructivist-inspired, civilian power Germany, this new 
explanation appears to largely challenge wider, prevailing understandings of post-unification 
Germany, in which a multifaceted, identity-based interest formation, ostensibly supersedes 
traditional rationalist, or materialist aims, such as trade and commercial relations.  Yet, despite 
evidencing such critical challenges to broader civilian power role expectations, as conveyed by 
the word contingent, these economic interests underlying the relationship, nevertheless remain 
conditional upon fulfilment of key identity-based interests, beyond the explanatory capacity of 
commercial and trade relations alone.  Bearing in mind this thesis established a vital premise 
that affirming the civilian power role concept, merely required evidencing demonstrable 
effects of one facet of the civilian power role concept upon the relationship –based upon the 
diagnostic criteria envisaged in this investigation– Germany’s civilian power role concept is, 
ultimately, affirmed, albeit far more limited in scope than would be expected.  
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With this explanation, although partially affirmed, fundamental assumptions of post-
unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest, are severely challenged in the case of 
its post-unification relationship with Iran, amidst a clear disparity between policy 
implementation, and role expectations of a civilian power Germany.  Importantly, not only 
were the interests underlying Germany’s approach evidenced to contradict key, role 
expectations of a constructivist-inspired, civilian power actor, but the manner in which such 
interests were illustrated to come at the expense of three out of four civilian power role facets, 
establishes an indifference not explainable by non-rationalist interests –such as use of force– 
alone.  In this manner, such an explanation of the relationship captures an assertive German 
policy approach towards Iran, in which key material interests underlie much of Germany’s 
policy, and both bespeak more normalised behaviour and interest, as well as downgrade 
confidence that a high-degree of continuity with wider, pre-unification tendencies, exists in the 
context of this specific case. 
 
Although this thesis was temporally limited to the period of time between unification and the 
U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, events transpiring following the U.S. withdrawal are 
particularly revealing, and highly consistent in this regard.  Germany has not only continued 
to assertively pursue its economic interests with Iran, including through implementation of an 
Instrument in Support of Trade Exchange (INSTX) mechanism, but it has further articulated 
a clear rejection of Washington’s “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran, while reiterating 
its personal commitment to diplomatic solutions.  In this manner, not only does the future of 
Germany’s bilateral relations toward Iran appear consistent with post-unification behaviour to 
date, but intensification of Germany’s bilateral level of engagement appears increasingly 
likely, as the diplomatic landscape in Europe stands to be altered with the United Kingdom’s 
departure from the European Union.  With such a change to existing multilateral avenues of 
Germany’s engagement with Iran, and continued disagreement between Berlin and 
Washington regarding underlying strategy, Germany will likely continue its clear articulation 
and pursuit of subjective interests vis-à-vis Iran, rather than solely relying on the guise of 
multilateralism in furtherance of its goals.  In this sense, Germany’s relationship with Iran 
continues to underscore a more normalised disposition on the part of Germany, and in turn, it 
		 229	
highlights the diminished relevancy of wider, civilian power features, in explaining a 
particular case of German foreign policy. 
 
Recognition of this wider relevance is of particular significance.  Prior to consideration of the 
bilateral relationship from this original, and essential, civilian power theoretical perspective, 
the relationship was not only under-evaluated, as well as contradictory, but ambivalent 
towards much of its wider implications.  By looking at this relationship from the original 
perspective of expected behaviour and interests underlying post-unification Germany, this 
thesis not only makes a significant and original contribution to knowledge by more effectively 
explaining the relationship, and the importance of apparent contradictions to assumed 
behaviour, but in doing so, it allows for the impact of this case study to extend beyond the 
scope of Germany’s relationship with Iran alone.  Although this thesis acknowledges one 
cannot extrapolate the findings of a single-case study to all other cases, and is in this sense 
limited, the manner in which such an explanation of Germany’s interest in relations with Iran 
serves to challenge many prevailing assumptions, nevertheless evidences a critical instance of 
post-unification German foreign policy and interest, occurring beyond prevailing explanations 
of civilian power tendencies, and continuity in post-unification Germany.  In doing so, this 
case study of Germany’s relationship with Iran casts German foreign policy, identity, and 
interest, in a different light, in which although aspects of continuity may exist, the scope of 
such continuity may be far more limited than presently accepted. 
 
Civilian power explanations of German foreign policy, identity, and interest, continue to face 
a myriad of potential challenges, and questions over its enduring relevance remain paramount.  
Domestically, Germany has witnessed an intensification of anti-status quo political 
movements –such as the far-right political party Alternative für Deutschland– and 
increasingly struggled with questions regarding its foreign policy interests in a multilateral, or 
supranational setting, amidst potentially changing features of German identity and interest.  
In a wider, international context, Germany has both witnessed calls for it to assume a more 
prominent role in defence of the rules-based international order, as well as faced growing 
resistance from other European Union countries regarding its subjective foreign policy 
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ambitions.  Accordingly, the question of Germany’s orientation in foreign policy remains 
imperative and implicative in a much wider context. 
 
Amidst such dynamics and questions, however, Germany has continued to exhibit both a 
determination to pursue its subjective economic interests in the face of international resistance 
–such as its prominent lamenting of sanctions relating to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline– and 
conveyed a strong commitment to diplomatic solutions to international conflict.  Accordingly, 
in the midst of questions regarding Germany’s orientation in foreign policy, it is insightful to 
consider many of these wider features of Germany’s present foreign policy behaviour, and 
interest, appear to mirror its behaviour and interest in the context of this discrete case study of 
German foreign policy toward Iran. 
 
In this manner, this thesis not only offers an original, and valuable contribution to a growing 
body of literature addressing fundamental questions of Germany’s present, and future foreign 
policy disposition, but it encourages further case studies along these lines in the context of 
other relationships as well.  Since this is but one case study, among many different 
relationships for Germany, the findings of this thesis are inherently limited.  However, what 
this intrinsic limitation indicates, is the particular value further research from such a 
perspective offers, given similar cases may suggest a necessary reconsideration in scope, of 
assumed continuity in post-unification German foreign policy, identity, and interest, as a 
civilian power. 
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